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Abstract
The Arctic region has been the subject of international attention in recent years. The magnitude of 
impacts from global climate change, land-use change, and speculations about economic development 
and accessible polar shipping lanes have intensified this focus. As a result, the potential to manage 
complex ecological, social and political relationships in the context of changes, risks and opportunities is 
the focus of a large and growing body of research. This dissertation contributes to the expanding 
scholarship on managing arctic social-ecological systems for resilience by answering the question: What 
conditions improve cross-scale learning and resilience in nested social-ecological systems experiencing 
rapid changes? Using the framework of social-ecological systems and the drivers of change that can 
transform fundamental relationships within, three studies profile the spatial and temporal dimensions 
of learning and risk perceptions that impact nested social systems. The first study presents a spatial and 
temporal analysis of scale- and level-specific processes that impact learning from risks. It draws on four 
cases to underscore the need for a plurality of risk assumptions in learning for resilience, and sums up 
essential resources needed to support key decision points for increasing resilience. Two additional 
studies present research conducted with northern Alaska communities and resource managers. In these 
studies, I analyzed the extent to which perceptions of risks scale horizontally (between same-level 
jurisdictions), and vertically (between levels in a dominant jurisdictional structure). These examples 
illustrate the need for innovative institutions to enhance cross-scale learning, and to balance global 
drivers of change with local socioeconomic, cultural, and ecological interests. Based on findings of the 
dissertation research I propose recommendations to optimize the tools and processes of complex 
decision making under uncertainty.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 INTRODUCTION
This dissertation explores learning and adaptive capacity as components of risk and disaster resilience.
In the chapters that follow I apply the social-ecological systems (SES) framework (Berkes et al., 1998; 
Gunderson and Holling, 2002) to evaluate multiple case studies. The case studies consider the drivers of 
change that can transform fundamental relationships within systems, and profile the dimensions of 
uncertainty, complexity, hazards and risks that may arise with transformative change. Fundamentally, 
this study examines how risks and their perceptions impact social systems. This research is part of an on­
going and critically important dialogue on global impacts of human activities, the intensity of which has 
prompted discussions about an Anthropocene—the new epoch of anthropogenic environmental change 
(Crutzen, 2006). If indeed we are living in such an epoch where the greatest environmental changes are 
induced by human activities, then by extension, human decision making plays an important role in 
mitigating risks. An important question to ask is: How do we create shared meanings of societal risk?
Societal thresholds for coping with 21st century global challenges such as climate change, growing 
energy demands, water and food security, and biodiversity loss vary greatly (Cutter et al., 2008). In 
many localities, socio-economic pathologies combine with impacts from environmental hazards to 
increase vulnerabilities to disasters. Some of the most vulnerable communities live under frequently 
recurring, and sustained, long-term disaster processes (Gaillard et al., 2007). The ability of a community 
to recover from disasters can be thought of as resilience. Holling's original definition (1973) describes 
resilience as a system's ability to absorb change while still maintaining the relationships between its 
components. Throughout this dissertation I use resilience to describe a system's ability to navigate 
through change as per Fath et al (2015). Resilience is a learning process (Folke et al., 2010), a complex 
task of (a) profiling change processes (risks, disasters) to understand how the features of each impact
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capacity to prepare and respond, (b) targeting the cross-scale root causes of risks and vulnerabilities, 
and (c) implementing complementary knowledge-to-action models to successfully adapt to change. 
Learning outcomes depend greatly on how well nested social systems are able to align their goals and 
resources to move toward mutually agreeable futures. This dissertation is fundamentally focused on 
patterns of learning from risks and disasters, and SES resilience; and the types of knowledge that 
translate into action on the policy stage.
1.2 MAIN QUESTIONS, METHODS AND OUTLINE OF DISSERTATION
This dissertation contributes to literatures on sustainability, risks and social-ecological resilience (Beck, 
1992; Cash et al., 2006; Crichton, 1999; Fath et al., 2015; Fischer, 1993; Gunderson and Holling, 2002; 
Holling, 1973; Walker et al., 2004). Relying on resilience theory (Holling, 1973) as its conceptual model, 
this research evaluates changing resources and evolving relationships in SESs in response to risk. The 
sustainability of SES depends on sustaining the evolving relationships, components, and resources of 
nested systems (Gunderson and Holling, 2002). The resilience of SES similarly depends on successfully 
navigating the cycle of change that occurs in the adaptive cycle. The externalities of these changes that 
are unanticipated, unmanageable, or unavoidable under the worst circumstances, or manageable with 
careful strategies under the best of circumstances, can be thought of as risks. The extent to which risks 
are manageable depends on the level and type of uncertainty surrounding the risks, the resources or 
buffer capacity available, and agreement on priorities and desired outcomes among decision makers 
(Fath et al., 2015). Thus, overarching research question of this dissertation is: What conditions improve 
cross-scale learning (adaptation, capacity-building) in nested SES experiencing rapid changes?
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To address this question, I address the following sub questions:
1. What scale- and level-specific processes impact learning from risks?
2. What role does risk perception play in the adaptive capacity of social systems?
3. What recommendations can be made to stakeholder groups, based on the findings from 
questions #1 and #2, to optimize decision making in nested SES?
To explore these questions, this chapter introduces relevant theories and concepts behind (i) resilience 
science; (ii) risk and risk perception; and (iii) learning.
The dissertation is organized as three publishable stand-alone chapters that address the overarching 
research question. Chapter 2 is a historical, descriptive-qualitative analysis of disaster preparedness, 
response and recovery, seeking answers to question 1 above. Using a disciplined-configurative approach 
(Eckstein, 1975), and descriptive-interpretive analysis of findings (Merriam, 1998), Chapter 2 examines 
four disaster case studies with distinct spatial and temporal features. The chapter introduces climate 
change as a slow-moving disaster, and the need to reimagine social-decision processes to compensate 
for unpredictable futures and increased uncertainties. An important finding calls for inclusion of plurality 
of risk assumptions, setting the stage for the studies outlined in Chapters 3 and 4.
Chapters 3 and 4 introduce case studies of stakeholder perceptions at different scales, regarding risks, 
changes and complexity of SES. These chapters are based on findings from survey research, and apply 
mixed methods including qualitative content analysis and univariate descriptive and multivariate 
inferential statistics, to compare group-level risk perceptions. Chapter 3 examines the extent to which 
risk perceptions scale horizontally, by comparing respondent feedback from two northern Alaska 
boroughs. This analysis provides insight into similarly positioned social systems, in this instance two 
boroughs that occupy different jurisdictional units, but are on the same jurisdictional level.
Chapter 4 presents the extent to which risk perceptions scale "vertically" between dissimilar
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jurisdictional levels, based on interviews with two groups. North Slope tribal council members comprise 
one group, who represent village-level tribal governments. The other group is composed of Alaska State 
and US Federal employees who have professional expertise in the region's resources, and who represent 
state and federal levels of government. The group of state and federal employees are not residents of 
the North Slope region, unlike the tribal council cohort. Interviewed agency staff reside in Fairbanks and 
Anchorage, two of Alaska's largest urban centers. Selection of respondents from the two groups was 
made to observe their respective perceptions about risks to community sustainability in the North Slope 
region.
Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation by addressing the questions asked in this introduction, 
summarizing the findings of each chapter about types of conditions that improve cross-scale learning 
(adaptation, capacity-building) in nested SES experiencing rapid changes. In this chapter I reframe social- 
decision processes, considering both the process itself (how social systems conceptualize change, risk 
and learning), and who makes decisions (at what scale are they examining the SES). This final chapter 
makes recommendations about conditions that enhance learning and capacity-building in social decision 
processes, and ultimately impact resilience at each level of nested SES. Fig. 1.1 outlines the chapters of 
this dissertation and their conceptual links.
4
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1.3 MAIN CONCEPTS
1.3.1 Resilience science
Coupled SES are linked social systems (humans and their patterns of actions, relationships, institutions) 
and ecological systems (the living and non-living components of the environment) (Berkes et al., 1998; 
Gunderson and Holling, 2002). Changes in coupled SES depend on variables that operate across a range 
of spatial and temporal scales (Chapin III et al., 2009). Typically, ecological resilience is controlled by 
slow changing variables, while social resilience can be controlled by either slow or fast variables (Walker 
et al., 2006). Because physical, social, and ecological processes are highly interconnected and driven to 
change constantly by both slow and fast variables, social-ecological systems have highly specialized 
networked sub-systems that have increased resilience to smaller shocks, but have also increased 
vulnerabilities to large, systemic shocks (Holling, 2001). This dynamic may mean that a source of risk 
that is localized to one area or region may initiate cascading events with global impacts. For example, if 
a region provides a specialized service on which other components of the system depend, the greater 
impacts can extend to other regions. The reverse of this is also true. A global scale risk, such as climate 
change, will impact local-level systems with varying intensity levels. Those most vulnerable will be 
impacted more, which brings about ethical issues that must be weighed during decision-making. 
Furthermore, the pace of global demographic and economic growth has also placed immense demands 
on ecosystem services (Hassan et al., 2005), and the interaction of man-made risks that are contingent 
on human decisions, and so-called natural hazards such as earthquakes, have resulted in risks that are 
dynamic, multifaceted and scale-sensitive.
Vulnerability is the propensity of experiencing loss, or the degree to which a system is likely to 
experience harm due to exposure to a hazard (Turner et al., 2003). Measuring vulnerability is difficult 
due to dynamic system states where physical and social processes interface (Adger, 2006). Because
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human agency is crucial to the adaptive capacity of social-ecological systems, the types of capital 
(natural, social, economic, infrastructure) available as a resource within the system to respond to 
perturbations, becomes an integral component of the resilience of communities to respond to change 
(Brown and Westaway, 2011; Kofinas et al., 2010), and merit discussion.
Approaches to reducing vulnerability include (1) mitigation by reducing exposure to stressors; (2) 
sustaining natural capital and well-being in order to reduce sensitivities; and (3) increasing adaptive 
capacity and resilience (Turner et al., 2003). Social capital and adaptive, learning-based institutions 
become important (Adger, 2000). Social capital can mean fate control, as in a community's capacity to 
make its own decisions and the resources to implement them or social learning, as in building 
consensus, empowering stakeholders to adapt, reducing conflicts, and increasing fairness (Lebel et al., 
2010). It is clear however, that adaptive capacity is crucial in reducing vulnerability, and human capital 
is a vital component of adaptive capacity (Turner et al., 2003). Further discussion of adaptive capacity 
and resilience theory can be found in Chapter 2, detailing how these concepts support the chapter's 
methodology.
1.3.2 Risks and perceptions
1.3.2.1 Risks, hazards and disasters
Many definitions of risk exist in literature, as risk can evolve based on the scope of inquiry, be it social, 
economic, business, safety, military, or political risk (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981, p.11). Perhaps the most 
widespread conceptual model represents risk as a function of probability of occurrence times the 
magnitude of impact (e.g. Van Ryzin, 1980). A related model, the risk triangle, operationalizes 
probability of occurrence and magnitude of impact as the intersection of exposure, hazard and 
vulnerability (Crichton, 1999). Hancock and Holt (2003) note that risks can be typed as deterministic,
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statistical, uncertain, and emergent, based on the level of uncertainty about probability and outcomes 
(Kampf and Haley, 2014, p.151). As the literature has expanded and grown beyond exclusively 
quantitative, technical formulas, risk has been acknowledged as a both analytic and perception-based 
normative concept. (Beck, 1992; Haimes, 2009; Klinke and Renn, 2002).
The United Nations defines disaster as "a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a 
society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which 
exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources" (UNISDR, 
2007). Hazard may refer to potential effects from natural (e.g. geophysical) or technological (man- 
made), or quasi-natural (interaction of both) processes, signaling a potential threat to humans and their 
welfare (Smith, 2013, p.11). Some definitions of hazard build on this concept, but clearly distinguish it 
from risk based on whether or not vulnerable system elements are exposed to the potential adverse 
effects: If vulnerable elements of the system are not yet exposed to potential harmful effects, we speak 
of a hazard. Risk, on the other hand, is an event, process or state, in which vulnerable elements of a 
system are exposed to hazard (e.g. Crichton, 1999).
1.3.2.2 Risk perception's role in risk management
Risk assessment is essential to risk management because only acknowledged risks can be eliminated, 
managed or compensated (Beck, 1992). Risk assessment techniques based on arithmetic calculations 
such as the statistical probability simulation model Monte Carlo, risk-ranking methods, and dose- 
response models provide technical analyses of risks (Burgman, 2005). Numerical risk assessments, 
however, cannot rule out uncertainty or bias because their underlying assumptions and models include 
pre-existing uncertainties and are bound and structured by what the analyst finds important (Burgman, 
2005). Risk management practices tend to follow an expert science-based regulatory model, deficient in
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the deliberative processes that are now embedded in academic literature (Petts and Brooks, 2006). The 
governance of modern risks, however, requires dynamic, learning-based, and scale-sensitive institutions 
(Adger, 2000; Blair et al., 2014). Exactly what such risk governing institutions should look like is unclear, 
and complicated by the nested layers of jurisdiction that characterize social systems. For this reason, 
the "fit" of institutions with the SES they are meant to govern is subject to much scrutiny, as policies are 
subject to election cycles and tend to prioritize short term problems and planning, while risks, hazards 
and vulnerabilities demand long term planning (Cash et al., 2006; Galaz et al., 2008).
The quantitative (mathematical-probabilistic) and qualitative (value-based, descriptive) approaches to 
risk and policymaking have resulted in distinct approaches to risk calculus (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979; Sjoberg, 2000). Purely quantitative calculations are not adequate in instances when risks become 
a policy matter, such as having to decide whether to employ risky technologies or not (Bennett et al., 
2009; Gooch, 2007; Nelson et al., 2009; Raudsepp-Hearne et al., 2010). In cases of divergence in 
epistemic perspectives during risk assessment, such as when Western science and other ways of 
knowing become complementary pillars in advising policy, there is a need for pluralism of values and 
knowledge systems (Barnhardt and Kawagley, 2005; Eicken et al., 2009; Heazle, 2004; Mercer et al., 
2009).
An optimal design for risk assessment combines the technical and social dimensions, and involves 
stakeholders and experts in an iterative process (Burgman, 2005). Social scientists have undertaken the 
task of risk perception research, identifying the drivers behind variances in risk perception among 
individuals and across groups of people, because it may change the way we make decisions and we 
communicate risks (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983; Fischhoff et al., 1978).
Risk perception research has greatly evolved over the years and can provide a complementary social 
component to risk assessment. Efforts to tie theory to methodology so far have been grounded in
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specific disciplines, and with different units of analysis. For example, cultural risk theory (Douglas and 
Wildavsky, 1983) provides an anthropological perspective about the cultural processes that shape 
individual risk perception, while decision theory investigates risk disposition as a strategic construction 
of preference (e.g. Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2006). Psychometric theories focus on risks as social artifacts 
from feelings and affect (e.g. Slovic, 1992), while quantitative risk assessments attempt to define risks by 
calculating probabilities and outcomes (e.g. Van Ryzin, 1980). Decision theory evaluates individual 
reasoning behind choice under uncertainty (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). Cultural Consensus 
Analysis (CCA) extrapolates group-level, culturally appropriate answers from individual-level data 
(Romney et al., 1986), while the Social Amplification of Risk Framework (Kasperson et al., 1988) provides 
a transdisciplinary conceptual model that explores the interplay between cultural, cognitive, and social 
processes in risk amplification and attenuation. However, the latter is not a method of risk perception 
measure. Rather it is a qualitative narrative of processes. Table 1.1 lists these theories, methods and 
their potential utility in considering systemic adaptive capacity.1
There are times when official risk warnings are attenuated within local cultural contexts (Gjernes, 2008). 
Kahan (2012) suggested that official framing of information and policies must bear a plurality of meanings 
that can be simultaneously endorsed by opposing cultural groups, a strategy for generating positive-sum 
solutions for cultural conflicts. Marris et al. (1998) warned that risk perception studies tend to focus too 
much on aggregate public risk definitions, and not enough on differences between individuals and groups 
within their specific social contexts. Cultural consensus analysis may assist in such endeavor because it 
conceptualizes idiosyncratic versus cultural variances (Romney et al., 1986). For example, it can help 
identify shared cultural spaces, within which specific risk definitions exist.2 Paton et al. (2008)
1 Chapters 3 and 4 build on risk perception theories. Chapter 3 introduces a consensus-focused approach to risk perception 
assessment, while Chapter 4 is a mixed-method comparative analysis of between-group risk perceptions.
2 Chapter 3 presents a case study relying on CCA, and provides further details about this method's applicability
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Table 1.1 Sum m ary of risk perception research theories, methods. The relevance of each theory to adaptation science is indicated.
Theory or Framework
and Unit of Analysis
Hypothesis M ethod (source) Interaction w ith adaptive  capacity
Cultural Theory
Individual (Ind irect group - 
level analysis of processes is 
possib le w ith careful 
individual-level analysis)
Patterns of social relations drive risk 
perception.
Q uantitative  survey, four scales of cultural bias as per 
Douglas (Dake, 1991; W ildavsky and Dake, 1990)
CT inform s adaptation research about individual biases tow ards 
risks as form ed by ad herence to social rules and relationships. 
Exam ple: Individuals m ay be m ore or less likely to com p ly w ith 
official em ergency preparedness bulletins based on hierarchical 
vs. individualist view s.
Cultural Theory: Cultural 
Cognition
Individual (Ind irect group- 
level analysis of processes is 
possib le w ith careful 
individual-level analysis)
The degree of attachm en t to patterns 
of social relations will im pact risk 
perception.
Q uantitative  survey, spectral positioning on tw o 
continuous scales: hierarchy-egalitarianism  and 
individualism -com m unitarian ism  (Kahan et al., 2007)
CC inform s adaptation research about individual biases tow ards 
risks as form ed by ad herence to social rules and relationships. 
Exam ple: Individuals m ay be m ore or less likely to change habits, 
or to adopt risk m itigation m easures based on w h eth er they 
place as egalitarian individualists or hierarchical 
com m unitarianists.
Psychometric
Social artifact (risk)
Risk exists only in cognitive and cultural 
spaces; it is a lack of know ledge such as 
uncertainty about probabilities; 
descriptive  cognitive attributes of risk 
give reliable predictors of risk 
perception.
Q uantitative  survey; respondents rate risk sources, 
fo llow ed by data analysis across risk sources along 
nine attributes of risk: voluntariness, im m ed iacy of 
effect, know ledge of risk, controllability, new, 
chronic/catastrophic, dread, severity  of consequences 
to see w hich drives variance in risk perception of each 
hazard source. (F ischhoff et al., 1978)
Psychom etric research m ay inform  adaptation studies and 
decision m akers in particu lar about w hat drives som e risks to the 
forefro nt of public interest, w hile  others are ignored. Exam ple: 
Public m ight rate a specific  risk source  as unacceptable  due to 
high level of dread despite the low probability of occurrence. 
These risks require special treatm ent for increased public input 
during decision m aking.
Extended Psychometric 
Model: Tampering with 
Nature
Social artifact (risk)
Risk exists in cognitive and cultural 
spaces; interest in risk is a predictor of 
dem and fo r m itigation; risk perception 
should not be analyzed only w ith 
reference to negative feelings; 
tam pering w ith nature as a facto r of 
risk perception has greatest 
explanatory power.
Q uantitative  survey; respondents rate risk sources, 
fo llow ed by data analysis of individual responses 
along fou r facto rs (tam pering w ith nature, dread, 
new, disaster) (Sjoberg, 2000)
Tam p ering w ith nature m ay inform  adaptation stu dies and 
decision m akers in particu lar about w hat attitudes and moral 
perspectives drive som e risks to the forefront of public interest, 
w hile others are ignored.
Exam ple: Som e groups m ight rate a specific risk sou rce  as 
unacceptable due to low interest in techn olo gy involved, or fear 
of im m oral or "Franken" technology. Th ese  risks require special 
treatm ent for increased public input, consen su s build ing during 
decision-m aking.
Social Amplification of Risk 
Framework
Social interactions: The 
social processes that 
influence the passing / 
com m u nications of risk
Psychological, socio logical and cultural 
processes together shape public 
response to hazards; public risk 
concerns m ay intensify or dim inish 
through these processes.
Q ualitative, interdiscip linary analysis of social 
processes rooted in co m m unications theory 
(Kasperson et al., 1988)
SARF m ay aid adaptation research by revealing w ays in w hich risk 
com m unication  at various levels of social organization im pact 
public risk perception.
Decision Theory
Individual
Individuals tend to  act based upon se lf­
interest, and guided by heuristics to 
sim plify com plex judgm ents; choices 
under both risk and benefit are 
governed by strategic  decision m aking 
techniques.
Q uantitative; expected utility theory; contingent 
valuation; prospect theory (e.g. Tversky and 
Kahnem an, 1986)
Decision theory m ay aid adaptation research by revealing 
em ergen t risk attitudes /  behaviors under changing conditions 
(econom ic, environm ental, social etc.)
Exam ple: G am e theory exercises help reveal coping m echanism s 
that m ay be em ployed by groups in dealing w ith the effects of a 
changing clim ate.
Cultural Consensus Analysis
Group
Culturally appropriate  answ ers as well 
as individual cultural com p etency can 
be extrapolated from  individual-level 
data.
Quantitative; m athem atical calculations from  
patterns in data. Individual responses are w eighted 
based on com petence, fa cto r analysis to find cultural 
m eaning at the aggregate  level. (R om n ey et al., 1986)
CCA m ay aid adaptation research by surveying group-level 
m eanings of goals, values, risks or coping strategies.
Exam ple: CCA can give answ ers to questions such as w hat risks 
does a group find of utm ost priority?
demonstrated that in terms of policy outcomes, risk perception is influential in managing risks, but posit 
that it is the quality of relationships and communication, and the levels of trust between people, 
communities and civic agencies that most strongly shape whether the public are receptive to hazard 
education. The flow of information and shared risk perceptions are closely examined via Arctic community 
case studies in Chapters 3 and 4. This research is done to evaluate the extent to which perceptions of risks 
scale between and among communities of people and agencies, in fast changing SES.
1.3.2.3 Learning as adaptation
A fundamental premise of this dissertation is that learning from risks and disasters is crucial to resilience 
(e.g. Folke et al., 2002; O'Brien et al., 2010). This seemingly simple premise however raises the question 
of what do we mean by learning?
The literature on learning is vast, but in many cases is vague in specifying who learns (May, 1992).
Parson and Clark (1995) provide a robust theoretical overview of learning in the context of sustainable 
development. Their account is relevant to this dissertation because resilience shares with sustainable 
development many of the same attributes, challenges, and resources brought about by the complexities 
in the interactions between the natural and social systems. The authors note that social learning 
scholarship has no common theoretical perspective, rather its contributions are interdisciplinary and 
grounded in diverse definitions and approaches. The concept of social learning has roots in theories of 
individual learning as well as organizational learning. The authors also discussed scientific learning and 
political learning as two special cases in social aggregate (or organizational) learning. Within individual 
learning, social learning refers to an actor's learning in social settings shaped by social determinants. 
Some examples are cognitive dissonance theory, rational-actor models and their variants such as 
bounded-rationality , and cognitive science, all of which model individual learning from their respective
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approach (Parson and Clark, 1995). Some important lessons from these streams of scholarship come 
from observations on failure to learn processes and organizational routines under uncertainty (Table 
1.2).
Learning in science focuses on collective learning to generate and establish truth via scientific inquiry, 
including extent to which social factors and political agendas may or may not permeate scientific lines of 
inquiry (Kuhn, 1970). A related type of social learning involves policy-making, where decision-makers 
rely on scientific findings to inform and arrive at a decision. Parson and Clark (1995) conclude their 
overview by identifying five groups of learners in sustainable development: i) decision-makers, ii) 
scientific communities, iii) industrial organizations, iv) NGOs, and v) citizenry. As to the question of what 
is learned, they caution that things learned move differently through the different groups, but state that 
in general, learning results in scientific models, policy theories, technologies, norms, preferences, and 
broad worldviews.
Table 1.2 Theories, models, approaches and focal questions in social learning (based on Parson and Clark 1995)
Individual learning theories
and their focal questions
Organizational learning theories
and example works
Social learning theory: the psychology of individual 
learning
W hat are the social determinants of individual 
learning? (Bandura, 1969)
Cognitive science:
W hat type of mental phenomena and modes of 
representation impact information processing in 
individuals? (Piaget, 1977)
Cognitive dissonance theory:
How do tensions among cognitions or between 
cognition and behavior bring about changes in 
attitude and belief? (Festinger, 1962)
Bounded rationality models:
To what extent is it possible for individuals to fully 
account for and calculate all information and their 
constraints as they search for alternatives, make 
decisions, learn?
(Simon, 1972)
Social learning theory: the sociology of shared learning
Organizations can and do learn by observing others. Such learning 
can be incremental (Argyris and Schon, 1978) or radical (Duchesneau 
et al., 1979).
Decomposition: group learning as the sum of its members.
Complete learning cycle (March et al., 1976) accounts for incomplete 
learning via (1) role-constrained learning, (2) audience learning, (3) 
superstitious learning, (4) learning under ambiguity
Analogy: learning as autonomous, group-level processes
Study of routines and procedures (Levitt and March, 1988) show that
organizational routines are chosen based on legitimacy (as opposed
to outcome calculations), actions are determined by past outcomes
and adjusted incrementally, and are oriented to targets with learning
typically coming into play due to shortfall or scarcity as opposed to
success.
Behaviorist model: successful routines will be repeated 
(Cyert and March, 1963)
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Policy learning, in particular, is relevant to this dissertation because it is through the engagement of 
public and private stakeholder groups that diverse experiences, knowledge systems, assumptions and 
expectations can become legitimized or not. Policy scholars have long described learning based on 
patterns of change in policies: During times of stability, incrementalism (Lindblom, 1959), or small 
incremental trial-and-error style changes to existing policies is the dominant paradigm alternating with 
punctuated equilibrium or radical shifts following times of rapid changes (Baumgartner and Jones,
1993). The multiple streams theory recognizes that policy windows may open when problems, policies 
and politics converge, allowing room for reform if policy entrepreneurs seize the moment following a 
focusing event that captures the public's attention (Kingdon, 1984). Disasters have such an agenda- 
setting potential when, immediately following a disaster, the public and elected officials briefly show an 
increased interest in disaster preparedness, mitigation and response, but attention to this problem can 
quickly fade (Birkland, 1997). Policy networks and policy communities can be crucial in this process. 
Policy networks are essentially relationships that reflect the power of particular interests in a policy area 
and their potential to influence policy outcomes, whereas policy communities are a special type of 
policy network that are insulated from other networks and coalesce around a specific function of 
government (Rhodes, 1990, p.304). Through policy networks, local issues can jump scale to engage 
stakeholders beyond their formal political platforms, creating new networks of knowledge (Rhodes, 
1990). Table 1.3 summarizes the leading streams of literature on policy learning, the actors involved and 
the type of learning that may result.
Streeck and Thelen's (2005, p.9) typology of institutional change juxtaposes the process of change 
(incremental or abrupt) with the result of change (continuity or discontinuity) to identify four types of 
institutional change. Of the four, they emphasize the role of so-called gradual transformation or 
incremental, creeping change that results in institutional discontinuity to be most influential in modern- 
day capitalist regimes. This gradual transformation may happen via one of five change processes:
14
displacement, layering, drift, conversion, and exhaustion. Their theory has been influential in 
institutional and policy analysis because of the underlying framework pairing changes and impacts.
Table 1.3 Types of policy learning. Source: adapted from Birkland (2006) with additions based on Trein et a/.(2015)
Learning Type Who learns LearnsWhat Learns Why To what effect
Important Parallel 
Research Streams:
Government
learning
State officials Process
related
Improve
organizational
behavior
Organizational
change
(Etheredge, 1981)
Policy diffusion: 
focus on agent 
interaction: coercion, 
competition, learning 
and emulation
Policy transfer: 
focus on process of 
. transfer, such as 
agents involved and 
obstacles to learning; 
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 
2000; Rose, 1993)
Lesson
drawing
or
instrumental 
policy learning
Policy
networks
Instruments,
means
Adopt new 
instruments, 
improve conditions
Program change 
(Heclo, 1974; 
Rose, 1993)
Social
learning-type 
of policy 
learning
Policy
communities
Ideas, goals 
(Sabatier,198 
8)
Solve issues, gain 
knowledge
Paradigm shift, 
policy change 
(Hall, 1993; 
Heclo, 1974)
Political
learning
Political
actors
Strategies Maintain power, 
maximize legitimacy 
(Boswell, 2009)
Improved 
arguments for 
particular policies 
(May, 1992)
We expect to find increased innovation and investments in disaster avoidance in the case of slow-onset 
disasters due to the increased warning and window of opportunity to mitigate impacts, and greater 
emphasis on disaster relief in the case of rapid-onset events. We also expect to see variations in the 
extent and diffusion of learning patterns as mediated by the spatial scale of impacts: the smaller the 
community of impacted victims, the less likely that learning is large-scale and transformative. However, 
we expect other factors, such as the temporal scale of impacts, to also be influential, such as long-term 
impacts to catalyze change and learning. Furthermore, political hindrances to learning are expected to 
be present. For example, political demagoguery can be an effective vehicle for manufacturing 
uncertainties around science-based issues such as climate change (e.g. Nisbet, 2009). These hindrances 
present challenges to collective action and the overall resilience of social systems, as detailed in Chapter
2.
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The resilience and adaptation framework is one starting point to understand changes in complex 
systems resulting from endogenous and exogenous drivers of change (Gunderson and Holling, 2002). 
The dynamic systemic evolution underlying adaptation in social systems can itself be taken to imply a 
type of social learning (Fazey et al., 2007). Indeed, evolutionary models originally based in biology, have 
been applied to learning processes at the individual and organizational levels in an effort to account for 
the spread pattern of knowledge and norms through society (Parson and Clark, 1995). Individual 
learning and adaptation is an important foundation for building institutions that promote resilience, 
while collective learning, innovation and expertise increase resilience by building collective social capital 
(Folke et al., 2005). Increased collective social capital may aid adaptive management (Holling, 1978) and 
adaptive governance functions (Dietz et al., 2003); management tools that promote integrating lessons 
learned with policies via continuous evaluation of policy outcomes.
Looking at learning from the perspective of adaptation is not new in managing risks and disasters. 
Although the genesis of centralized, national disaster management during World War II flowed from a 
command and control management structure—via a single authority—some questioned over­
structured, normative crisis coordination and planning: Dynes and Aguirre (1979) recognized the need 
for organizational adaptive management in times of crisis, and the useful role of emergent groups that 
operate under new norms (Table 1.4). Later they expanded their model to propose that in disaster 
planning the goal should be (1) problem-solving rather than chaos-avoiding in other words learning vs. 
avoidance; (2) tapping into the problem solving capacities of existing social units as opposed to treating 
them as the problems themselves in crisis times; (3) following the principles of continuity as opposed to 
chaos. Pre-disaster functions and behaviors of social units to make decisions remain a resource post­
disaster; coordination as opposed to command: loosely pre-planned structure of authority that is 
adaptive and open to improvisation in facilitating the multi-organizational needs of each crisis; and 
cooperation as opposed to control: effective reallocation of human and material resources in
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communities (1994).
Table 1.4 Typology of organized behavior in disasters. Adapted from Dynes and Aguirre (1979).
Tasks Norms
Regular Non- Old New
Organized Behavior in Disasters Regular
1. Established
Established group carrying out regular tasks.
Example: police force engagement at impact zone
2. Expanding
Established group whose functions are only mobilized after the event 
Example: Red Cross shelters
3. Extending
Established group undertaking non-regular tasks.
Example: construction company assisting with debris
4. Emergent
Ad hoc groups coordinating community response activities._________
This shifting trend towards new hazard, disaster and risk management strategies has brought about 
changing functional applications towards a focus on vulnerability, dynamic risks managed by multiple 
actors carrying out situation-specific functions with a moderate to long-term planning outlook taking 
into account diverse perspectives (Jeggle, 2001, p.335). When mixed with adaptive management 
(Holling, 1978) and adaptive governance functions (Dietz et al., 2003), the resulting learning-based, 
participatory management cycle better manages under uncertainty, incorporates knowledge and is 
better situated to overcome inertia where procedural changes are needed (Dietz et al., 2003). 
Traditional command-and-control resource and risk management practices show weakness in operating 
under complex, cross-scale dynamics (Cash et al., 2006). This dissertation approaches learning from a 
resilience and adaptation perspective to uncover the knowledge to action processes that may lead to 
increased community resilience.
X X
X X
X X
X X
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1.4 CONCLUSION
Surprises and crises test the thresholds and adaptive capacity of a system, while they also provide the 
potential for creativity and learning (Gunderson, 2003). In evaluating the social and economic processes 
that create risks, care must be taken to avoid trivializing underlying vulnerabilities and dependencies 
that create institutional inertia against change (Lavell and Maskrey, 2014). Only by more emphasis on 
reducing exposure and vulnerability to the economic, social and territorial processes that construct new 
risks in the first place, may we foster resilience. Having proposed these points as central to this research, 
three chapters follow that examine the processes by which dependencies form, vulnerabilities emerge, 
and nested SES may act to counter risks. These three studies approach learning from a resilience and 
adaptation perspective to uncover the knowledge to action processes that may lead to increased 
community resilience. The findings support the shift towards new hazard, disaster and risk management 
strategies. The shift toward risk management paradigms that focus on moderate to long-term planning 
outlook taking into account diverse perspectives provide such an opportunity (Jeggle, 2001, p.335). 
Adaptive management (Holling, 1978) and adaptive governance (Dietz et al., 2003) built on inclusive, 
learning-based institutions that take into consideration a plurality of knowledge forms potentially 
promote resilience (Lebel et al., 2006). The societal challenges examined in this dissertation and findings 
of the research underscore the need for such adaptive forms of governance that build on long-term, 
multiscale considerations of risks.
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CHAPTER 2: THE DISASTER CHRO N O TO PE: SPATIAL AND TEM PO RA L LEARNING IN GO VERN AN CE 
OF EXTREM E EVEN TS1
Abstract: How does the type of disaster affect the learning among key stakeholder groups? This chapter 
provides a framework of disaster governance through examination of local and global response 
strategies based on the spatial and temporal attributes (or chronotope) of disaster events and related 
discourse. Four case studies build on the concept of "panarchy" in resilience and adaptation sciences to 
reveal the interaction between disasters and the capacity of various stakeholder groups to adjust the 
rules and assumptions that underlie disaster governance. With particular focus on patterns of learning, 
we map our findings in a matrix to reveal disasters as complex social-ecological processes at three 
levels: (1) the small fast-moving local system, (2) the nation-state as the intermediate level in speed and 
size, and (3) the global community of nation-states as the largest, slowest moving social system.
Keywords: disasters, resilience, adaptation, adaptive cycle, learning, panarchy, climate change, 
chronotope
2.1 INTRODUCTION: LEARNING AND DISASTER GOVERNANCE IN A PANARCHY
Research demonstrates that the outcomes of disasters, as well as what qualifies as disaster, are, in part, 
socially constructed (Wisner et al., 2012; Marino, 2012). We argue that any social system's drivers of 
change that impact both human and ecological systems' structures and functions merit a closer look.
1A version of this chapter is published as Blair, B., Lovecraft, A. L., Hum, R. (in press) The Disaster Chronotope: Spatial and 
Temporal Learning in Governance of Extreme Events. In: Bonati. S., Calandra, L. M., and G. Forino (eds.) New Trends fo r  
Governance o f Risks and Disasters: Theory and Practice. Routledge: Abingdon, Oxfordshire, U.K.
Copyright © 2018 From New Trends fo r  Governance o f Risks and Disasters: Theory and Practice by Bonati. S., Calandra, L. M., 
and G. Forino. Reproduced by permission of Taylor and Francis Group, LLC, a division of Informa plc.
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While disasters can be induced by natural phenomena or human negligence, the extent to which human 
populations are affected depends on a mixture of underlying vulnerabilities and resilience. In other 
words, disaster governance is a social activity, a process that can facilitate learning and adaptation to 
mitigate disasters and improve governance. To this end, our work approaches disaster governance as a 
management process via decentralized, diverse and multi-scalar involvement of entities in a globalized 
world where disasters and societal responses blur borders (Tierney, 2012). Still, governance outcomes 
are affected by a multi-scalar hierarchy of social adaptive systems, represented by nested, continuous 
'figure 8' loops as modeled in the panarchy framework (Fig. 2.1).
connectedness/ institutionalization +
Fig 2.1 Stages and traps of the adaptive cycle. Adapted from Holling (2001) and Fath et al.(2015).
The adaptive cycle takes a long-term view of system change, focusing on stages of change cycles: growth 
(r), conservation or equilibrium (K), collapse and release (Q) and reorganization (a) (Gunderson and 
Holling, 2002; Holling, 2001). If the reorganization stage requires such drastic changes that the system 
must undergo a regime shift (i.e. state change), it may exit the adaptive cycle to begin a new state
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governed by different underlying controls, instead of continuing on to the r-stage. From one stage to the 
next, the strengths and flexibility of the system changes, as does the system's resilience. The adaptive 
cycle is relevant to policy because knowing these properties of a system's dynamics inform decisions on 
when and where management interventions are needed, or what type of management might work with 
the feedback loops of the system. As a model of systemic change, the adaptive cycle is fundamental to 
this chapter (and indeed the entire dissertation) because we map risk and disaster response policy onto 
the adaptive cycle model, in order to understand opportunities for learning in social systems. Fath et al. 
(2015) build a social system model of the adaptive cycle based on a modified growth trajectory 
(Burkhard et al., 2011) that is not monotonic (see red squiggly line Fig. 2.1), to propose a version of 
panarchy for social systems.2 Here, a Klim vertical range of tolerance for perturbations and crises marks a 
critical threshold that is not always crossed, but below which the system is propelled towards the 
release and renew stage.
2.1.1 Stages of the adaptive cycle and panarchy
In terms of risks and disasters, the K-stage is a time of pre-disaster stability, the Q stage is a time of 
collapse following an event that overwhelms the system's coping ability, the a-stage is a time of 
reorganization and innovation during disaster response, and the r-stage begins growth and 
development, and signals the post-disaster recovery phase. It is the a-stage where resilience potentially 
peaks as new ideas, exploration of alternatives, and innovation may take place, setting the growth 
trajectory for the r-stage. The a-stage, therefore, is critical in determining whether any emergent 
entities and rules are institutionalized, and how much of "the old" stays in place, but even the r-K
2 Burkhard's model is also rotated at a 45° angle to avoid confusion via increasing abscissa values (increasing capital) in the Q 
quadrat, saving this phenomenon for the reorganization phase. The reader is encouraged to explore their model; however for 
our purposes here the original model adequately approximates transitions between phases and this distinction is not made.
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growth stage holds opportunities for small-scale experimentation and adjustments within the overall 
system trajectory (Fath et al., 2015). Notably however, resilience decreases during this growth stage as 
system complexity and connectivity increases, reaching its least-resilient state during collapse. The Klim 
zone of tolerance is where crises may recur, but available plans and routines may facilitate a return to 
pre-crisis stability. These small-scale events are an opportunity for learning and adjusting plans and 
existing strategies.
There are some notable pathologies that prevent successful navigation of the full adaptive cycle. 
Carpenter and Brock (2008) outlined such traps, while other scholars have extended their model (e.g. 
Fath et al., 2015). Poverty trap can occur when there is insufficient activation energy to initiate growth. 
Social-ecological systems exposed to frequent, recurring disasters experience poverty traps. Rigidity 
traps occur when a system is inflexible and stuck in status quo processes, blocking innovation and 
novelty. Control by corrupt political regimes and rigid class structures are examples of rigidity 
preventing renewal. Dissolution trap refers to inevitable collapse and entry into the omega phase, after 
the adaptive capacity of the system has been surpassed. Vagabond trap refers to the system's inability 
to enter the r-stage due to lack of resources, and underdeveloped relationships between system 
components preventing organized development. The capacities needed to enter and thrive in each 
phase of the adaptive cycle bear importance to disaster learning as detailed later.
Nested adaptive cycles form a panarchy (Fig. 2.2). Panarchy is a system model of cross-scale linkages of
multiple adaptive cycles at multiple levels of organization, and thus provides a conceptualization of slow
and fast changing variables of a nested system that may interact with or trigger stages of the adaptive
cycle in one another (Holling 2001; Gunderson and Holling 2002). Revolt describes a feedback from the
small and fast system, which has resulted from experimentation, testing and innovation that impacts the
status quo of the system above. The larger, slow system, in turn, stabilizes and conserves or
"remembers" accumulated knowledge of system dynamics for systems below.
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Panarchy is, therefore, a useful paradigm to describe and evaluate the learning and adaptive capacity of 
complex systems. The sequence of management actions in disaster governance (mitigation, 
preparedness, response, recovery) occur in various stages of the adaptive cycle (collapse, renewal, 
growth, stability), shedding light on the dynamics between the timing of disaster events and the 
system's capacity to adapt. We illustrate further the components of the adaptive cycle under the results 
section. Table 2.1 summarizes key concepts that are integral to our thesis.
Fig. 2.2 Panarchy. Redrawn from Holling, Gunderson and Peterson (2002, p.75) (2002,
2.1.2 Learning in disaster governance
Dynes and Aguirre (1979) were among the first to question over-structured, normative crisis 
coordination and planning, advocating instead for organizational adaptiveness in times of crisis, and the 
useful role of emergent groups that operate under new norms. Dynes and Aguirre proposed that in the 
coordination of tasks and actors, there is a delicate balance within organizations between coordination 
by plan (pre-established, standardized functions) and by feedback (transmission of new information,
Large and slow
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adjustment of parts). An example of lack of balance is Marino's (2012) discussion of several rural Alaska 
villages in the process of a long struggle over relocation due to rapidly eroding coastlines. Her research 
notes that "established disaster response protocol through government agencies can be antithetical to 
climate change adaptation and preparation" (378). On the other hand, the greater the diversity of 
organizational structures, the greater the propensity to coordinate by feedback (Dynes and Aguirre, 
1979). The greater the difference in power and status within the organization, the greater the emphasis 
on planning. Dynes and Aguirre concluded by remarking that disasters bring uncertainty, 
decentralization and diversity to organizations, while they also have a status-leveling effect. These 
factors increase communication and decrease formalizations, making coordination by feedback more 
likely, and leading to emergent groups operating under new norms carrying out new tasks.
We define learning in this context of disaster governance as the process of identifying and addressing 
error. Our focus is on single- and double-loop learning popularized by Argyris (1976, 2004) (Fig. 2.2). The 
double-loop learning model is well-aligned to the adaptive cycle framework (Holling, 1986), in that each 
model assumes an iterative process of dynamic system change. From the adaptive cycle perspective, 
system change moves through phases of collapse, renewal, growth, and stability. Double-loop learning 
begins by identifying the four phases of single-loop learning: problem identification, planning, 
implementation, and assessment; followed by an assessment of the underlying values, assumptions, and 
objectives embedded in the first loop. 3
3 In our framework we do not propose that the policy cycle, a model for diverse preconditions and factors 
impacting policy outcomes (May and Wildavsky, 1979) lines up with the double loop learning model, or the 
adaptive cycle itself. There are, however, interactions between the learning model, the adaptive cycle, and policy 
change resulting from disaster events, as noted throughout this chapter.
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Fig 2.3 Double-loop and single-loop learning. Source: Adapted from Argyris (1976).
Single-loop learning is task-driven much in the same way traditional command-and-control disaster 
management tends to focus on returning society back to its pre-disaster state. Managing for resilience 
involves a second loop of questioning of what the system should look like after a change event, and 
where to innovate to increase resilience for future events. This means iterative studies with deep 
refection of disaster events, responses, and recoveries are required to review and, where needed, alter 
the evaluation criteria used. Learning from disasters, and ultimately disaster governance, is ongoing with 
no static answer for any one region or disaster type. However, a broad view classification of disasters 
and comparison of outcomes can be made for policy information and management recommendations. 
We pose our results to aid in identifying planning tools that promote strategic flexibility and conflict 
resolution-critical components of disaster governance.
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Table 2.1 Key concepts
Concept References
Adaptive capacity A system's ability to adjust responses to changing internal and external demands 
and drivers.
Holling (1973); 
Carpenter and Brock 
(2008)
Adaptive cycle A long-term view of system dynamics, focusing on the states of change cycles: 
collapse (release), renewal (reorganization), growth (exploitation) and stability 
(equilibrium). The adaptive cycle is visually represented by a continuous 'figure 
8' loop that contains these phases.
Gunderson and 
Holling (2002); Fath et 
al. (2015)
Chronotope Configurations of space-time that provide grounds for human discourse and 
narratives.
Bakhtin (1981)
Dissolution trap Inability to enter the renewal stage following collapse; exiting the adaptive cycle 
at the collapse stage.
Fath et al. (2015)
Learning
organization
A social collective that exhibits adaptive capacity to apply new information 
through recognition of error or success to future policy decisions.
Mahler (1997); 
Busenberg (2001, 
2004)
Panarchy A nested hierarchy of adaptive cycles, panarchy depicts cross-scale relationships 
at multiple levels of organization.
Holling (2001); 
Gunderson and 
Holling (2002)
Poverty trap The system's inability to grow due to insufficient resources or activation energy 
to implement new ideas and plans.
Gunderson and 
Holling (2002)
Resilience A state of dynamic equilibrium punctuated by shocks that may cause the overall 
system to evolve. The system is resilient to shocks that do not overwhelm the 
capacity to adapt while relationships between internal components remain 
stable.
Holling (1973)
Rigidity trap A system is inflexible and stuck in status quo processes blocking innovation and 
novelty during the stability stage.
Gunderson and 
Holling (2002)
Social-ecological
systems
Coupled human systems (people and their relationships, institutions, actions) and 
natural systems (living and non-living components of the environment) that are 
complex and adaptive and have reciprocal feedbacks.
Berkes et al. (1998); 
Gunderson and 
Holling (2002)
Vagabond trap Inability to reorient the components of the system or to reconnect its nodes in 
order to begin growth; being stuck in the renewal stage.
Fath et al. (2015)
Vulnerability A system's susceptibility to experience harm due to exposure to stressors and 
lack of ability to adapt.
Adger (2006)
2.2 METHODS
2.2.1 A typology of disasters
Disasters are fluid and may take on different qualities from one occurrence to the next (Coppola, 2011). 
This poses difficulty for classification and comparison. For analytic purposes, we adopt a typology that 
highlights management-learning dimensions. Table 2.2 shows our typology in three dimensions: local vs
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global scale of impacts, ordinary vs extraordinary duration of impacts, and slow, rapid, or cyclical onset 
of disaster events.
A simplified, binary classification of local vs global impacts is used to distinguish learning processes that 
can be absorbed by sub-governments or nation-states from broader impacts that truly test the capacity 
of the international community to reorganize for "business as usual" after the event. Similarly, in 
ordinary timescale events, recovery time takes place in days, weeks, months, or a few years, while 
extraordinary timescale impacts mean that the disaster event carries the potential to endanger future 
generations. Slow  onset events such as droughts or invasive species allow communities to strategize 
ahead and plan to mitigate and respond. Rapid onset events such as earthquakes or landslides come 
without much warning. Another conceptual model, often used in ecology, frames these differences in 
speed of onset, and length of duration from impacts as short term "press" or long-term "pulse" (Glasby 
and Underwood, 1996). These models are discussed further in the results section.
As depicted in Table 2.2, cyclical disaster events are not broken out on the temporal scale of impacts. 
Their significance lies in a historical pattern of reoccurrence that provides a longitudinal glimpse at ways 
in which individuals and institutions cope with repeated disaster stimuli, sometimes without the chance 
to recover from previous events. Often these types of events occur after many false alarms, or low-level 
impact events before they cross the disaster-threshold. For example, hurricanes may or may not make 
landfall, and their intensity varies greatly. Consider the tragic second landslide in Badakhshan 
Afghanistan that was larger than the first and killed hundreds of rescue workers as they tried to dig out 
victims from the first slide. This is an example of a rapid onset event that is cyclical due to patterns of 
heavy rains; a landslide will not occur each rainy season but does occur routinely. Cyclical disaster 
events have a potential for cumulative impacts, and any vulnerabilities, resilience, or learning that result 
are often a combination of impacts from many false alarms, small-scale crisis events and disasters.
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Table 2.2 A typology of disasters. Selected case studies relate to the examples in bold typeface.
Impact Spatial scale:
Local Global
dimensions: Temporal scale: Ordinary-term Extraordinary-term
Ordinary-
term
Extraordinary-
term
Slow-onset drought coastalerosion
economic
crisis
sea level rise 
diminished sea ice
Type of onset: earthquake*
Rapid-onset duration of impacts considered from the perspective of social 
systems
oil spill megatsunami asteroid impact
Cyclical typhoons heat waves
2.2.2 Selection of case studies
We drew on four case studies to explore how the type of disaster affects the type of learning among key 
stakeholder groups. Cases include the Alaska earthquake (section 2.3.1) and the Exxon Valdez oil spill 
(section 2.3.2), which both have been studied extensively on long-term change and learning in the social 
systems. The Philippine typhoon case (section 2.3.3) was chosen to provide insights into disaster 
learning from a medium-income developing nation's perspective on frequent disasters that galvanize a 
multi-scalar response. In the coastal erosion case (section 2.3.4), we connect the slow-moving disaster 
potential of climate change and the global and local governance processes involved.
2.2.3 Tracing the adaptive cycle
For each case study, we analyze the adaptive cycle to understand how the type of disaster has 
transformed governance and resilience through learning. Our analytic framework is based on Fath et 
al.'s (2015) description of key preparedness features needed in each stage of the adaptive cycle in order 
to navigate onto the next, and traps that may prevent progress—these are highlighted in our results 
(Table 2.4).
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2.2.4 Analysis and interpretation
These case studies present instances of learning in social systems nested within a panarchy of 
interlinked social systems or communities. While communities can exhibit characteristics such as 
cooperation and common sense of identity, they are also an environment of heterogeneity, inequality, 
and competition for power and resources affecting overall disaster resilience in an ecological network of 
social systems (Peacock et al., 1997, p.23). Our criteria for interpreting the findings is based on a social 
system's ability to navigate its adaptive cycle (Fath et al., 2015), the panarchy model (Gunderson and 
Holling, 2002), and a descriptive-interpretive qualitative analysis (Merriam, 1998) of the multiple levels 
of learning in a panarchy. Thus, our research approach introduces the chronotope (space-time) of social 
engagements (Bakhtin, 1981) and learning under globally connected disaster processes. The chronotope 
is the realm of spatial and temporal indicators that reveal relations of power between social systems, 
groups, or individuals.
2.3 ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES AND RESULTS
The four case studies are presented based on the timeline of how each disaster event unfolded, and the 
governance of the impacts through the stages of adaptive cycle following disaster: the collapse, renewal, 
growth, and stability. In our analysis we highlight the role of key resources needed to navigate to the 
next phase of the adaptive cycle as per Fath et al. (2015) with italicized text. Each case study analysis 
ends with a description of observed learning models. Table 2.3 is a summary overview of our findings on 
learning from disasters, while Table 2.4 provides further details on each case.
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2.3.1 The 1964 Alaska Earthquake: Local scale, rapid onset and ordinary-term
On Friday, March 27 1964 an earthquake of magnitude 9.2 struck at the head of Prince William Sound in 
Alaska, the second largest earthquake recorded anywhere. The earth's surface was measurably 
displaced over an area greater than 100,000 square miles in mere minutes, the vibrations from which 
could even be felt atop Seattle's Space Needle 1,400 miles away. Over these few minutes southern 
Alaska lurched 20 meters seaward with a 10-meter uplift, generating a tsunami that devastated the port 
towns of Valdez, Seward, Whittier and several others (West et al., 2014). Overall, 131 deaths occurred 
as a result of the earthquake, with 119 of these attributed to the devastating tsunami waves that 
followed the initial shocks. Alaska's low population density at the time accounted for the comparatively 
low loss of life. In this analysis, we consider the impacts ordinary-term only from the perspective of the 
social system. The geophysical (and some ecological) impacts from the event have had long-term 
impacts in the region.
2.3.1.1 Collapse
Alaska's unique geographic location with its proximity to potential enemy attacks prompted a large 
military presence before the disaster that turned out to be crucial in the immediate aftermath of the 
disaster. This presence translated to a cohesive, well-trained leadership to provide support and 
disseminate information. Hundreds of civilian volunteers organized to help and an ad hoc group met 
within 24 hours to coordinate vital functions in a show of improvised responses that helped reduce fault 
cascades. The event itself was a major shock to the region's SES, resulting in permanent and long-term 
geophysical and ecological shifts. The social system on the other hand rapidly entered the renewal 
phase.
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2.3.1.2 Renewal
In two weeks' time, the emergency relief scaled down and transitioned into recovery (USOCD, n.d.). The 
connected, ready-to-mobilize nodes of leadership and resources resulted in modularity of system 
components, while a $350 million federal financial aid for reconstruction and development provided 
access to stored capital to stimulate growth. Self-organization at the state-level was less of a factor as 
the new State of Alaska was still especially dependent on federal support. Memory of previous California 
quakes in decades prior created great public interest, and together with the Alaska earthquake, acted as 
focusing events for seismic risk reduction policies and investment in research.
2.3.1.3 Growth
Despite calls for a federal flood and earthquake insurance program to systemically aid with the 
economic fallout of natural disasters, a comprehensive insurance program did not materialize. The 1968 
National Flood Insurance Act (NFIA) made available flood insurance to homeowners in participating 
communities. To date, earthquake insurance is available only via the private market where participation 
is low, costs are high and coverage is limited. The opportunity to increase adaptive capacity was mainly 
realized on the science and research front, but investment in these activities waned. Federal and state 
cooperation and bilateral information flow  was efficient enough for the needs of the underdeveloped 
state. Alaska was somewhat of a blank canvas and able to incorporate new guidelines and risk reduction 
strategies in further development. In this sense, the fallout from the disaster created an environment of 
positive feedback ripe for innovation and learning. Crisis response was followed by great growth (i.e. 
rapid infrastructure repair), but some underlying vulnerabilities were not addressed. For example, some 
red seismic zones were reopened for construction in Anchorage, decreasing resilience in the most 
populous city of the state. Emergent leadership was strong in the realm of seismic research, but the 
political will not strong enough to enact federal earthquake insurance legislation.
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2.3.1.4 Stability and signs of rigidity trap
The earthquake became a grand-scale scientific learning experience. By the mid-1970s, a seismic 
network was put in place to monitor the south-central coast. The federal government initiated a series 
of investigations, resulting in an eight-volume comprehensive report (NRC, 1973). Much of this 
information shaped building codes, warning systems, instrumentation, and public awareness, but 
perhaps most profoundly, these large-scale investigations grounded research for decades to come and 
signaled great political will to overcome pressures for short-term returns (West et al., 2014). Over time 
funding and issue salience have decreased; what little political interest remains is mainly focused on 
transportation corridor safety and on-going monitoring through federal support.
Today's network of seismic hazard monitoring stations is behind the times in early warning capabilities 
(Martinson, 2016). Despite frequent small-scale quakes or disturbances, the seismic network has grown 
little since the initial expansion. Crisis response is in a rigidity trap where the road and port system is 
highly vulnerable to disruptions of commerce from earthquake events. The economy and infrastructure 
still lack the functional diversity needed for disaster resilience. Negative feedbacks from geographic 
isolation, a single-resource economy, a vast land area, and lack of transportation impact community 
vulnerability to disasters. In 1964 Alaska had little to no buffer capacity on its own, and things have 
changed little. Alaska still relies on the flow of outside resources for basic livelihood and many 
communities are especially isolated. While individual and community resilience varies greatly across the 
state, as a whole, most people depend on outside (of state or community) flow of goods and services.
2.3.1.5 Learning model analysis: fixated, horizontal, single-loop
The Alaska earthquake of 1964 is an example of ways in which rapid onset events can result in greater 
focus on disaster relief than on mitigation, with a desire to return to pre-disaster norms (Birkland, 
1997). This results in a form of single-loop learning, where pre-disaster methods are applied to post
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disaster conditions, giving the appearance of action without qualitatively changing the system's ability to 
respond to future events. This type of learning tends to fixate on previous ways of knowing; thereby 
stimulating horizontal growth and non-strategic thinking. Novel ideas during renewal may be dismissed 
without considerable public focus on the need for change, especially if recovery is quick and routine 
measures return life to pre-disaster state. This is due, in part, to the brief time period spent in the 
renewal phase when disaster impacts occur on an ordinary-term time scale. During renewal, learning 
can be radical and reforming, while the growth stage promotes slower, incremental learning. Though 
scientific learning was sizeable initially, investments in mitigation decreased significantly on the long 
run.
Intervention by the intermediate, nation-state level in the panarchy aids in the short term, but can 
hinder learning in the long run. Disaster relief as well as undervalued federal flood insurance can have a 
subsidizing effect on risk behaviors. Loss calculations are based on restoring what was; leaving little 
incentive for developers and homeowners to change risky behaviors.
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Table 2.3 The Disaster Chronotope. Linking the construction and types of disasters with social learning models. The cause and effect relationship between disaster 
event and impacts is described as "press" (continuous perturbation) or "pulse" (short-term perturbation) as per Glasby and Underwood (1996). Cyclical disaster 
events are not broken out on the temporal scale due to their typically cumulative impacts.
Impacts:
Onset:
Spatial scale: Local*Global-scale impacts touched upon via linkages with the coastal erosion case study*
Temporal scale: Ordinary-term Extraordinary-term
Case Not covered in chapter Coastal erosion and post-colonialism in Alaska Native villages
Disturbance type Protracted press
Slow Cause Continuous press from multi-scalar risk sources and social 
pathologies
Effect Continued press
Learning model Disordered chronotope
Case 1964 Great Alaska Earthquake Exxon Valdez Oil Spill
Disturbance type Discrete pulse Protracted pulse
Rapid Cause Short-term pulse Short-term pulse
Effect Short-term pulse Continued press
Learning model Fixated, horizontal, single-loop Pinball, potential double-loop
Case Typhoons in the Philippines
Disturbance type Protracted press & pulse from cumulative impacts
Cyclical Cause Recurring short-term pulses coupled with continuous press from social pathologies
Effect Continued press
Learning model Stalled, reactive, vagabonding
2.3.2 The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: local scale, rapid onset and extraordinary-term
On March 24, 1989 the oil tanker, Exxon Valdez, went aground in Alaska's Prince William Sound, spilling 
roughly 260,000 barrels of crude oil. Prior to the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster, which released an 
estimated 4.9 million barrels of crude into the Gulf of Mexico (BOEMRE, 2011), the Exxon Valdez 
accident was the largest single oil spill in U.S. history. Though there were no immediate human 
casualties, four deaths were associated with the cleanup effort and the losses to human livelihood and 
to wildlife were immense (AOSC, 1990). The spill covered about 1,300 miles of coastline and killed an 
estimated 250,000 seabirds, 2,800 sea otters, 300 harbor seals, 250 bald eagles, up to 22 killer whales, 
and billions of salmon and herring eggs (EVOSTC, n.d.). Some of the impacts of the spill remain over 25 
years later. Aside from operator error, major systemic errors, such as a self-regulating industry, were 
identified as responsible for the accident. This event made clear not only that sweeping reforms were 
needed in the tanker industry, but that spill prevention and response regulations were wholly 
inadequate and in need of systems of accountability and citizen oversight.
2.3.2.1 Collapse
In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, there was a lack of cohesive leadership due to confusion 
regarding the role of federal, state and industry entities. Previous legislation, via the 1972 amendments 
to the Clean Water Act (CWA), established monetary liabilities of oil facilities and ship owners, but to 
what extent the federal government can compel the polluter to clean up, and who should command the 
deployment of responding vessels were not clear (Birkland and DeYoung, 2011). Initial response was 
slow to organize and ultimately failed to reduce fault cascade. Worst-case scenario, lack of 
preparedness, and inadequate technologies prevented novel actions or improvisation. Due to the 
manmade nature of the disaster, the CWA preempted the 1988 Stafford Act, preventing a presidential 
declaration of disaster and flow of federal funds. Financial assistance to stakeholders would have to wait
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for negotiations with the responsible parties, or for litigious court processes to conclude. While vital 
functions were maintained in the basic sense of human survival, the scale of disaster caused economic 
devastation for the fishing communities and Alaska Native villages of Prince William Sound (AOSC,
1990).
2.3.2.2 Renewal
The media attention of the spill gripped the nation and was instrumental in the passing of the Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90). OPA 90 established guidelines for spill response that essentially 
federalized the process (Birkland and DeYoung, 2011). Spills "of national significance" are now 
commanded by the federal government via Coast Guard leadership. The government may choose to 
clean up and hold the polluter liable for the cost, or monitor the polluter's efforts until deemed 
complete. The regulations also mandated the exclusive use of double-hull tankers by 2015, and set up a 
trust fund from oil taxes to fund potential cleanup of spills. Improvements have been made to 
operations including regular spill response drills, trained pilots that board tankers entering the sound to 
navigate to port, and stockpiling of containment booms and dispersants. The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill 
Trustee Council was founded, using investment earnings from the civil settlement fund paid to the state 
and federal governments. Its mandate is to oversee research, monitoring, recovery and rehabilitation of 
Prince William Sound wildlife habitat with public input.
The inadequate modularity of relevant expert networks (i.e. under-developed, unprepared nodes that 
were slow to mobilize) was noted as well. Emergent organizations in research, oversight, and advocacy 
soon developed such as the aforementioned Oil Spill Council and Regional Citizen's Advisory Council, 
subsequently showing capacity for self-organization, and supported by access to stored capital from 
state, federal, and settlement resources. Citizen advocacy grew quickly from radical learning, consistent 
with patterns of the renewal stage of the adaptive cycle.
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2.3.2.3 Growth and near-stability
A lack of pre-spill baseline data on the Prince William Sound ecosystem hampered assessment of 
damages and bilateral information flow  to aid disaster management. Positive feedbacks from spillover 
effects to other areas of policy (such as forestalled oil exploration in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge) 
due to emergent leadership among advocacy groups were instrumental in policy change. In terms of 
adaptive capacity, OPA 90, better training of personnel and the emergent advocacy councils have shown 
increased learning among stakeholders.
Of the thirty-two injured resources monitored by the government, only fifteen were listed as recovered 
as of 2014 (EVOSTC, 2014). We may consider the social-ecological system in a hybrid growth-stability 
stage: Some ecological resources and human communities are still recovering, but politically speaking, 
the policy cycle returned to an equilibrium stage long ago. The long-term policy impacts of OPA 90 are 
questionable. Offshore production continued to enjoy a close relationship with regulating agencies and 
a systemic ignorance of lax contingency planning and repeated small-scale blowouts characterized the 
years prior to the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster (Birkland and DeYoung, 2011). These small-scale 
events and low-level crises represent a missed opportunity to evaluate and adjust crisis management 
during times of stability, resulting in a rigidity trap. A sense of complacency may build through frequent 
events not only in industry, but also in communities threatened by frequent storms or small seismic 
tremors as these can create a false sense of resilience.
There is not adequate buffer capacity to prepare for another event like the Exxon spill, although 
changed practices by industry have resulted in some strides toward better mitigation and preparedness. 
Because the settlement took 2 years to reach and 10 years to pay out to aid recovery, negative 
feedbacks from the increased need for, and lack of access to capital, slowed rate of growth. The diversity 
of oversight from interest groups and ongoing monitoring of the recovery has been a long-term
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outcome. For example, the Regional Citizen's Advisory Council reviews spill prevention and response 
practices and policy with a strategic view of the long-term health of the Prince William Sound SES.
2.3.2.4 Learning model analysis: pinball, potential double-loop
The analysis of learning from the Exxon Valdez oil spill case supports previous theories on ways in which 
rapid onset events with extraordinary temporal scale impacts can create the activation energy to 
support pro-change groups (Birkland, 1997). The disaster as a focusing event sets the stage for learning 
and adaptation, but reform attempts may be stalled by special interest pushbacks, as demonstrated by 
the lax oversight of spill contingency that followed the Exxon disaster, and preceded the 2010 
Deepwater Horizon disaster. Due to slow recovery, issues can stay on the agenda for a long time, but 
speed of recovery also slows the testing and re-evaluation of outcomes from policy change to evaluate 
whether things are headed in the right direction. In short, a rapid onset disaster can exacerbate the 
challenges in avoiding scale mismatch and recognizing the plurality of assumptions in decision-making. 
Change can be guided by bridging organizations. Success depends on the system's capacity to act on the 
potential to innovate due to length of time spent in the renewal stage. The process resembles a pinball 
launched with great momentum and potential, entering a competitive playfield in which the trajectory is 
difficult to control and timing is key.
2.3.3 Typhoons in the Philippines: Local scale, cyclical disasters
The Philippines is arguably one of the world's disaster hot spots. Seismic activities aside, typhoons wreak 
havoc annually in this region with an average twenty cyclones moving through and four to six making 
landfall each year (Takagi and Esteban, 2016). While the 2004 typhoon season killed over 1600 people, 
largely blamed on landslides worsened by the effects from illegal logging, the political fallout was short­
lived, mired in corruption and resulted in little change. The devastating 2013 Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda)
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left over 6000 people dead, 28,000 injured and millions displaced. Warnings came in the days and hours 
preceding landfall, but communication of risks to the public was ineffective (Neussner, 2015). The 
effectiveness of the early warning system and relevant institutional arrangements are still under study 
after Haiyan, but lessons from previous disasters suggest that social and political forces, beyond the 
technical and scientific, contributed to community vulnerability.
2.3.3.1 Collapse
Philippine national disaster management leaves the coordination of relief and response to local 
governments. This policy is articulated as self-reliance and mutual assistance among local communities, 
allowing for higher-level assistance only if local resources are exhausted. The planning of emergency 
functions is entirely left to provincial and municipal governments, but many neither have such plans nor 
hold regular training and drills to prepare. This system has resulted in over 40,000 barangay (village), 
1,400 municipal, 113 city, 81 provincial, and 17 regional disaster coordinating councils in addition to the 
national agency. while diversity and modularity can enhance disaster response (Fath et al., 2015), 
inadequate leadership structures can fall apart, as they did after Haiyan: Power, communication and 
access routes to transport aid were inadequate or unavailable in most areas. Hazard maps and early 
warnings were not fully utilized, while the public was confused about the expected severity of the 
impending storm.
When large-scale impacts overwhelm response capacity, maintaining vital functions becomes 
impossible. A reactive management approach built on an ad hoc platform impedes leadership. While 
local risk-sharing networks and NGOs help reduce vulnerability and promote improvisation, the overall 
effect of systemic gaps, irregular disaster drills and ineffective risk communication hamper effective 
reduction of fault cascade.
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2.3.3.2 Renewal
Philippine national disaster management is highly dependent on donor and multilateral institutional 
assistance due to a lack of access to stored capital and suboptimal self-organization. Domestic and 
international humanitarian organizations often find it hard to harmonize their actions within a system 
that is heavily political and out of step with needed response actions (van den Homberg et al., 2014). 
While modularity of system components is desirable during this stage, without a clear chain of 
command, the disaster relief structure is a complex cluster without coordination, involving U.N., 
national, provincial and NGO actors. A prolonged state in renewal without leadership and capacity 
development structures results in a vagabond trap of drifting with important nodes disconnected and 
unavailable to help perform vital tasks (Fath et al., 2015). This delays the growth phase.
The differences between international and local planning time frames, and views on the boundaries 
between emergency relief and recovery, further complicate humanitarian efforts and the transition 
from relief to recovery in the Philippines (Gocotano et al., 2015). The point of transition between the 
two post-disaster phases has important logistical and legal implications that also impact the flow of 
financial and technical assistance. System memory of typhoon disasters may move most effectively 
through NGOs, as they tend to seek root causes of vulnerability and tend to engage local populations as 
a resource (Bankoff and Hilhorst, 2009).
2.3.3.3 Elusive growth and stability
The root causes of vulnerability that worsen disaster impacts are complex. Political corruption, the 
effects of landlessness, and food insecurity force a growing population to move into high-risk zones, 
taking on the risk of seasonal typhoons in a cost-benefit analysis for survival (Gaillard et al., 2007). A 
culture of static-reactive decision-making hampers bilateral information flows and decreases adaptive 
capacity (Fath et al., 2015). This could be said to be true within the Philippine disaster management
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structures, as proposals for policy change often lack activation energy, inhibiting emergent leadership. 
There have been positive recent feedbacks from NGOs and the international community shifting 
paradigms from mostly relief assistance to also aiding with prevention and mitigation.
Following international standards, such as the United Nation's Hyogo and Sendai frameworks, the 
Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010 recognized vulnerability, and 
specifically, poverty reduction as important facets of sustainable development and disaster-risk 
reduction. Yet the scale of disaster hazards faced by the Philippines remains an immense challenge, one 
that continues to challenge institutional capacities and commitment to reform. Often, NGOs and the 
nation state compete for funds and lack trust toward each other (Bankoff and Hilhorst, 2009) creating a 
negative feedback in the adaptive cycle worsened by systemic corruption.
Some communities are taking a proactive stance to increase their disaster resilience. The Provincial 
Government of Albay has integrated disaster risk reduction, environmental protection and development 
planning under a set of comprehensive guidelines as a means to reduce disaster risk. Public-private 
partnerships such as the Philippine Disaster Resilience Foundation, are also active in disaster readiness 
and response in the country, and provide livelihood seeding programs, education, shelter and basic 
needs.
2.3.3.4 Learning model analysis: stalled, reactive, vagabonding
Recurrence of disasters can provide the opportunity to test existing policies and adjust-monitor-evaluate 
with each event. However, the recurrent nature of disaster events, especially in developing countries, is 
a constant strain on the adaptive capacity and related resources of communities. The fast-paced 
learning that is needed in the renewal stage post-disaster is then stalled by lack of resources, leading to 
a vagabond trap of disconnected system components. Effective long-term strategizing depends on the 
ability to reduce fault cascade with each event; relying on accumulated buffer capacity, emergent
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leadership, and adaptive capacity to learn (Fath et al., 2015). These are traits of a stable social system. 
Communities lacking these resources can become locked in path dependency from cycles of disasters 
and extreme poverty, leading to reactive disaster governance.
While there may be a rich vault of memory or lessons learned from past events, especially at the 
national-level (not all Philippine local governments have dealt with repeated events), so too there are 
entrenched practices and norms that may become pathologies if they are resistant to change. The 
intermediate system of the nation state may be preoccupied about its own political sustainability, while 
the largest, global system finds disaster relief, and the stabilizing of small enterprises (e.g. public-private 
livelihood seeding programs) the most feasible route to assist.
2.3.4 Coastal erosion and post-colonialism in Alaska Native villages: Local scale, slow onset and 
extraordinary-term
The cumulative effects of climate change have resulted in drastic changes in the extent and seasonal 
cycle of sea ice in the Bering and Chukchi Seas, leading to increased coastline erosion and shoreline 
flooding in coastal communities (Huggel et al., 2015). Reduced autumn sea ice level has resulted in 
amplified effects from storms since sea ice no longer acts as a barrier between the coast and storm 
surges. Over 6,000 miles of Alaska's coastline is subject to severe erosion and flooding with the majority 
of Alaska Native villages impacted. Thirty-one villages were in imminent danger as of 2009, up from four 
just six years prior (GAO, 2009). Several villages have voted to relocate; some decades ago, but little 
progress has been made due to high-level institutional barriers and the novelty of the hazard and its 
cross-scale linkages (Marino, 2012; Bronen and Chapin, 2013). Residents of some of these villages face 
imminent loss of the current site and its infrastructures, which may have devastating effects on
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economic, social and cultural resources. The situation in these communities is worsened by the legacies 
of 20th century settlement policies that have decreased community resilience.
2.3.4.1 Collapse and renewal
The residents of the Alaska villages of Newtok, Shishmaref and Kivalina are likely to soon become 
climate refugees (Bronen and Chapin, 2013). Historically the ancestors of these villagers moved 
seasonally between summer and winter use areas to procure the subsistence resources available in the 
areas. These seasonal movements largely ended with policies that mandated permanent settlement in 
barge-accessible locations chosen, in many cases, by the federal government and enforced through 
mandatory schooling laws. The consequence resulted in new vulnerabilities and a reliance on 
government to provide services and to respond to environmental changes. Over the past two decades, 
all three communities have faced coastal erosion that threatens damage to infrastructure, and all have 
voted to relocate at various times. To date there is no federal agency set up to coordinate the 
relocation process (Bronen and Chapin, 2013).
Eicken and Lovecraft (2011), Bronen and Chapin (2013), and Marino (2012; 2015) provided extensive 
analysis of the institutional processes that prevent response to the climate-induced disaster faced by 
many Alaska coastal communities. A major barrier to federal assistance is the statutory limitations of the 
Stafford Act in declaring erosion-induced hazards a disaster. With the legal obstacles hampering 
financial support and attribution of responsibility absent, there is no clear cohesive leadership in charge 
of the problem. The diffusion of liability across scales of local-global social-ecological processes hampers 
mitigation and prevents reduction o f fault cascade.
The State of Alaska has created a Climate Change Impact Mitigation Program, and while it funds the 
planning stages of relocation, it does not provide institutional or financial assistance with the 
implementation of the plan. Maintaining vital functions at this point only increases sunk-cost effects of
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delayed relocation, complicating the cost-benefit calculus on the upkeep of current infrastructure. 
Village access to subsistence resources has been hampered by new norms and rules (i.e. land 
management and subsistence policies) superimposed over traditional practices, decreasing the 
availability of, and access to, stored capital. However, the tradition of cooperation in subsistence, 
harvest-sharing and tightly connected households has aided resilience (BurnSilver et al., 2016), creating 
an effective modularity of vital nodes and risk-sharing. While outside help has been slow to materialize, 
traditional knowledge and a strong culture of self-determination contribute to self-organization and 
increasing political will. Newtok's progress is a good example via a boundary organization of federal, 
state, and tribal governmental and nongovernmental entities that formed, following initiative taken by 
the village to relocate on their own. The Newtok Planning Group operates without legal statutes or 
regulations in an intergovernmental learning process built on fund-sharing and pinning down emergent 
roles of each agency.
2.3.4.2 Growth and elusive stability
The large number of stakeholders impacted by climate change globally should, in turn, result in a 
pooling of resources to mitigate impact. The impetus to do so, however, is disincentivized by the 
inequity of impacts and diffusion of liabilities, creating negative feedbacks. Small-scale disturbances, 
such as malfunctioning water infrastructure of rural Alaska villages, further limit adaptive capacity. 
However, the social ties that form around the harvesting and distribution of subsistence foods, and the 
networks that support sharing, act as a buffer that increases the resilience of these communities 
(Kofinas et al., 2010; Haley and Magdanz, 2008). Cumulative impacts from resource development and 
climate change do affect the availability of, access to, and utility of subsistence resources (Ashjian et al., 
2010). Local-scale policies and actions therefore become valuable allies in supporting subsistence: While 
they cannot counter the potential impacts of global risks, it is the availability of local capital, in support
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of adaptive capacity to respond to relocation due to climate change, that most immediately impacts the 
adoption of actionable strategies (Kofinas et al., 2013).
Unsurprisingly, "fate control" has been found to be the single most important index of human well­
being in Arctic communities (Larsen et al., 2010). Increased political prominence increases fate control, 
and positive feedbacks in the political landscape have, in the past, leveraged power such as that 
following the discovery of oil and the 1971 Alaska Native Claim Settlement Act. While emergent 
leadership in the post-1971 tribal governance era increased the number of organized interests, obstacles 
to fate control still occur in mismatch of resource policy and resource system parameters, and in legal 
frameworks that do not incorporate indigenous knowledge in hazard management. Arguably, the 
inequitable distribution of risks from climate change plaguing these communities signals a new wave of 
post-colonialism. To date, there exists no global liability and compensatory platform for climate impacts. 
The Warsaw Loss and Damage Mechanism (UNFCCC, 2013) is a new, international, mostly technical and 
diplomatic forum set up for limited assistance of developing countries. Alaska villages, however closely 
they may resemble villages in developing countries (AFN, 2012), do not meet criteria for participation.
The risk attribution framework (Huggel et al., 2013; 2015) shows promise in establishing liability and 
compensation based on dynamic analyses of risks over time and space. Large-scale science and local, 
indigenous knowledge can partner on this issue and enhance bilateral information flows on risks and 
impacts. Coastal communities of Alaska facing the challenges of coastal erosion and possible relocation 
have shown great adaptive capacity over the years, but cross-scale interactions with state and federal 
systems of governance have created vulnerabilities, the magnitude of which are not currently reflected 
in current disaster legislation.
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2.3.4.3 Learning model analysis: disordered chronotope
Climate change drivers scale far and wide both spatially and temporally, fracturing the chronotope 
between cause and effect, agents of change, and consumers of the impacts. This creates a mismatch 
between management and problem scale across levels of jurisdictions. We at once benefit from the 
compression of space-time (Harvey, 1989, p.260), thanks to, for example, modern communication 
methods; and are paralyzed by systemic vulnerabilities for which our institutions cannot facilitate 
solutions. Assumptions of space and time behind questions to ask, areas to investigate, and explanations 
to formulate no longer scale across the panarchy. This chasm in the reciprocity of levels of social and 
ecological components hampers learning. Local disasters need global solutions, while a global solution is 
hostage to divergent local interests. The legacy of past gains is set to drive the losses of the future, 
threatening the social-ecological system with dissolution.
Slow-moving disasters leave a window of opportunity to prepare, strategize and mitigate, but at the 
same time they may create the perception of lack of urgency. This situation can make it difficult to 
identify the critical threshold between crisis and disaster and to invoke pertinent legislation and 
response. Revolt may scale awareness of collapse upward in the panarchy, but adapting to impacts is 
often more feasible than achieving political and technical solution to source of problems. For local risk 
sources, lasting solutions are possible under learning-based, adaptive institutions. Transformative 
change, such as a significant change in institutional arrangements, is possible if political and economic 
interests align due to post-disaster pressures (forward-looking risk calculation and development: how to 
increase resilience), and if preparedness drills are built on what could happen, as opposed to what can 
be handled with current capacity.
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Table 2.4 Summary analysis of cases
Stages and features of preparedness needed to navigate to 
next stage (based on Fath et al. 2015) 
Parentheses indicate the stage where feature should be 
developed.
Case studies:
Description of actions taken by entities from all levels including from systems above the impacted one 
(stages indicate the impacted system's stage). Shaded areas signal lack of feature due to not having
reached the K-(source) stage.
Key feature 
(and source) Description
Resource examples &
complementary
theories
1964 Alaska 
earthquake Exxon Valdez oil spill
Typhoons in the 
Philippines
Coastal erosion and post­
colonialism in Alaska
Improvisation Suspending prescribed Ability to improvise & Hundreds of civilian Worst-case scenario, Local risk-sharing Novelty of problem and rigid
(a) roles in response to leave old scripts volunteers organized lack of preparedness networks; NGOs focus legal structures hamper
immediate needs behind; Solution- to help. Ad hoc group and inadequate on citizen- based solution-oriented actions.
oriented culture4 met within 24 hours to 
coordinate immediate 
public needs.
technologies 
prevented novel 
actions.
solutions & roots of 
vulnerability; Some 
provinces implement 
disaster-resilience
Increased community 
vulnerability from socio­
economic changes.
Reduce fault Preventing crises from Ability to form tight- Military, Civil Defense Spill prevention & Public disaster drills not Global processes induce fault
cascade (r) spreading through early knit communication & Civil Air Patrol response capacities regular; Communication cascade, socio-economic
detection and channels and feedback mobilized and were inadequate & of risks ineffective; problems prevent response.
organizational structure loops5 coordinated rescue underestimated Public may not Staying is increasingly
0 )aoto
4->
IS)1
a
and initial recovery. needs. understand warnings unhealthy and risky.
Cohesive Key actors to provide Ability to make fast, Civil Defense relayed Confusion over Hierarchical, reactive Legal obstacles hamper
leadership (K) financial support and robust decisions6 information between federal government's management approach financial support. Legal
help disseminate entities, federal role and level of on ad hoc platform attribution of responsibility
information government provided 
$350 million in aid.
control in response 
efforts. No unified 
command system.
without strategic 
framework. Large-scale 
impacts break 
leadership.
absent, complicating matters 
of who should be in charge of 
problem.
Maintain vital Identifying and Ability to prioritize and Ad hoc group of civic Critical window of first Large-scale impacts Sunk-cost effect increases
functions (Q) maintaining functions protect according to & military leaders, 72 hours passed overwhelm response. with delayed relocation.
essential to the vital survival functions7 heads of utility without significant Communication & power
continuity of minimum companies containment of oil. & transport routes are
social utility coordinated 
emergency needs.
issues.
4 Extending and emergent organizational behaviors (Dynes & Aguirre 1979); Tapping into existing social units as a resource (Dynes & Aguirre 1979)
5 Double-loop learning (Argyris 1976); Coordination by feedback (Dynes & Aguirre 1979)
6 Coordinate by feedback (Dynes & Aguirre 1979)
7 Continuity, Coordination & Cooperation (Dynes & Aguirre 1979)
Key feature 
(and source) Description
Resource examples &
complementary
theories
1964 Alaska 
earthquake Exxon Valdez oil spill
Typhoons in the 
Philippines
Coastal erosion and post­
colonialism in Alaska
Modularity (a) Densely connected sets 
of nodes loosely 
connected to other 
subsets; distribution of 
tasks
High modularity of 
system components to 
prevent fault cascade8
National defense 
strategy resulted in 
connected, ready-to- 
mobilize nodes. Low 
population density of 
Alaska helped keep 
casualty low, 
prevented fault 
cascade
Research and expert 
network nodes were 
highly specialized, but 
cleanup crews and 
equipment were slow 
to mobilize
Many nodes, no clear 
chain of command. 
Relief & response 
structure a complex 
cluster of U.N., national, 
provincial & NGO 
systems that need 
coordinated.
Cultural practice of 
subsistence harvest-sharing 
and tightly connected 
households has aided 
resilience.
Self­
organization
(r)
Capacity of system to 
restructure networks 
and develop new 
organizations from 
within
Empowerment from 
above to try new 
unconventional 
routes9
ai00to4->
IS)I
As a new state, 
systems were still 
dependent on federal 
support to reorganize. 
New networks mainly 
in area of research & 
monitoring
New entities in 
research & advocacy: 
Oil Spill Trustee 
Council; Regional 
Citizens' Advisory 
Council
National disaster Economic reliance on
management is highly government increased due to 
dependent on donor and forced settlement and influx 
multilateral institutional of new problems. Strong will & 
assistance activism for self­
determination.
uncr>
Memory (Q) Remembering lessons 
of past crises and 
successes
Ability to analyze root 
causes, useful 
traditions and need for 
alternatives10
California quakes in 
decades prior, plus 
Alaska quake acted as 
focusing events for 
seismic risk reduction 
policies though 
resulted in inadequate 
changes on long run.
Past legislation found 
to be fragmented & 
inadequate; 
Conflicting values of 
oil development (jobs) 
vs. environmental 
health (renewable 
resources) came into 
spotlight
Task-focused culture at 
national level; NGOs 
more flexible to engage 
local populations as 
resource. Culture of 
"living with risks" and a 
history of "vagabond 
trap"
Indigenous knowledge informs 
community affairs. Federal 
Indian policy "pendulum" 
swings between assimilation, 
termination and self­
determination
Access to 
stored capital 
(K)
Access to a diverse 
portfolio of emergency 
resources and capital 
during and after crisis
Means & resources to 
carry out rapid 
prototyping and to set 
direction based on 
new visions11
Massive federal 
resource spent for 
reconstruction and 
development due to 
interest in stimulating 
growth in the new 
state.
State, federal, and 
settlement funds 
stimulated
rehabilitation efforts; 
Political will increased 
for more stringent 
regulations in oil spill 
liability.
Network of local disaster Village access to resources 
coordinating councils hampered by new norms and
inefficient in promoting rules superimposed over 
disaster resilience. traditional practices.
Disaster funds fraction of 
annual disaster costs.
8 Coordination and cooperation (Dynes & Aguirre 1979)
9 Coordination and cooperation (Dynes & Aguirre 1979)
10 Panarchy's "remember" linkages (Gunderson and Holling 2002)
11 Continuity, Coordination & Cooperation (Dynes & Aguirre 1979)
57
Key feature 
(and source)
Description Resource examples &
complementary
theories
1964 Alaska 
earthquake Exxon Valdez oil spill
Typhoons in the 
Philippines
Coastal erosion and post­
colonialism in Alaska
Bilateral 
information 
flows (K)
Information flowing in 
both directions of 
system hierarchy
Seamless cooperation; 
Information can travel 
up the ladder quickly12
Good federal and Lack of baseline data 
state cooperation, on Prince William 
local political Sound ecosystem pre­
representations were spill hampered 
still underdeveloped in assessment of 
the new state. damages.
Static-reactive decision­
making style; State still 
focused on returning to 
pre-disaster norms as 
the goal of recovery.
Slow to develop, tribes fought 
long and hard for political 
inclusion. Large-scale science 
and local, indigenous 
knowledge difficult to make 
mutually salient.
r-s
ta
ge
Positive 
feedbacks (r)
Variable, process or Investments in growth 
signal changes reinforce and diffusion of 
further similar changes innovation; Scalable, 
simple and 
reproducible 
solutions13
As a new & still 
developing state 
Alaska incorporated 
new guidelines, risk 
reduction strategies. 
Some communities 
relocated.
Spillover effects to 
other areas of policy 
(ANWR oil exploration 
forestalled).
International community 
trying to shift from 
mostly relief assistance 
to aiding with prevention 
and mitigation
Discovery of oil brought about 
the Alaska Native Claim 
Settlement Act (1971); 
increased political prominence
Emergent Emergence of new Entrepreneurial 
leadership (Q) organizations and leadership and
collaborations taking on activation energy to 
crisis response tasks tap potential to grow14
Excellent crisis 
response
coordination, followed 
by great growth but 
some underlying 
vulnerabilities were 
not addressed.
Environmental and 
advocacy groups 
gained increased 
prominence in policy 
change.
Proposals to policy 
change lack activation 
energy; Political 
corruption hampers 
long-lasting change to 
decrease community 
vulnerability
Post-1971 tribal governance 
increases as organized entities 
emerge on the state and 
federal political scenes.
Adaptive 
capacity (a)
Recognizing Trying, testing, 
opportunities to learn & innovating; Means to 
adjust behavior promote innovation15
NFIA 1968; NEHRP 
1977; Investment in 
research & network of 
seismic monitoring 
eventually waned. 
Some "red" zones in 
Anchorage reopened 
for construction
1990 Oil Pollution Act; 
Better training of 
personnel; Advocacy; 
Settlement took 2 
years to reach and 10 
years to pay out to aid 
recovery.
Institutional inertia 
against increasing 
disaster resilience & 
reducing poverty; 
Livelihood needs 
continue to force people 
into high-risk behaviors
Village infrastructure and 
economy vulnerable. National 
disaster legislation evolves 
after 1950 with each disaster; 
but could not anticipate future 
needs from impacts of climate 
change.
12 Double-loop learning (Argyris 1976)
13 Coordinate by feedback (Dynes & Aguirre 1979)
14 Poverty trap (Gunderson and Holling 2002); Extending and emergent organizational behaviors (Dynes & Aguirre 1979)
15 Double-loop learning (Argyris 1976)
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Key feature Description Resource examples & 1964 Alaska Exxon Valdez oil spill Typhoons in the Coastal erosion and post­
(and source) complementary
theories
earthquake Philippines** colonialism in Alaska **
Buffer Stored capital and Building of reserves, Fragile infrastructure Still in process of Underlying Villages: vulnerable
capacity (a) redundancies in the redundancies & connectivity; Reliance recovering from 1989 vulnerabilities such as State: Alaska Climate Change
system buffers of on "outside," though spill, leaving little poverty are not Impact Mitigation Program
infrastructure, energy significant scientific buffer capacity to addressed or alleviated. Federal government:
and information16 learning occurred. 
Natural hazard 
insurance schemes are 
inadequate.
handle another. Sectors & regions 
recover at different 
speeds & to varying 
degrees of vulnerability.
mismatch of scale of needs & 
legislation;
Hazard Mitigation Grant 
Program
Maintain Functional diversity of Availability of Well-developed local Great diversity of Shift toward community- Risk source components scale
diversity (K) components and their specialists; Acceptance representation at interest groups and based disaster up to and across the global
relationships of diversity and higher levels but high participants in management not yet community, creating a
ambiguity17 cost to low population 
often diverts funds; 
still dependent on
oversight of region's 
resources, and 
monitoring of
institutionalized; 
paradigm is still 
hierarchical
mismatch between 
management and problem 
scale when negotiating
K-
st
ag
e outside restoration. solutions.
Small-scale Frequency and intensity Scenarios planning to Despite frequent Regional Citizen's Regular disturbances Slow-moving biophysical
disturbances of noncrisis identify limits & small-scale quakes the Advisory Council occur but government processes & political disputes
(0) disturbances thresholds; seismic network has monitors, reviews & efforts are saved for over science of causes, local-
Infrastructure to grown little since the comments on spill disaster relief instead of global linkages, and inequity
implement crisis plans; quake. No early prevention and investment in mitigating of impacts prevent effective,
Knowledge of best warning system. response, industry the root causes of global undertaking of
practices and Investment in practices and vulnerability. mitigation.
standards of crisis technology lags government policy
management14 behind other 
developed nations.
with a strategic, long- 
range view of plans.
Negative Structural Lack of power Geographic isolation, Diverging risk NGOs and state compete Global processes responsible
feedbacks (r) characteristics that struggles; Agility in single-resource perceptions & for funds, lacking trust for climate change make local
determine rate of communication economy, vast land legislative needs of oil toward each other; impact mitigation legally
growth area, lack of 
transportation
industry and locals Government corruption 
weakens resilience; 
props up status quo
difficult and costly. Socio­
economic erosion of villages 
worsens.
16Adaptive Capacity (Gunderson and Holling 2002); Vulnerability (Adger 2006)
17Rigidity trap (Gunderson and Holling 2002)
** Because these systems never quite reached the stability of K-stage, descriptions pertain to features that weren't developed during previous stages (1st column, in 
parentheses). In this way this section lays out the pathologies that are evident in keeping the system "forever young" in the r-stage. Philippines: Local systems (impacted 
communities) and the nation state system as a whole cannot enter the K-stage due to chronic vulnerabilities and traps in the adaptive cycle. Alaska: Impacted villages are 
arguably were still in the r-stage of the adaptive cycle as they transitioned to the collapse stage due to coastal erosion, though the larger national system is indeed in the K-stage.
The four cases of this paper show that focusing events can create the required political capacity to act, 
but usually too late. This is where boundary and bridging organizations can be helpful to promote 
change where traditional processes have failed. Functionally, these types of organizations play an 
important system role because they serve as a conduit for established organizations and institutions to 
re-negotiate and align their end goals collaboratively. This type of interaction potentially creates an 
adaptive learning environment and double-loop learning that can help avoid system collapse, creating 
an alternative path from the growth to the renewal phase of the adaptive cycle, without having to pass 
through a full release. We see this occurring in the relocation efforts of the Newtok Planning Group in 
Alaska.
The global community of nation states is collectively rich in resources to manage disasters. Total climate 
and ecosystem regime shifts provide impetus for mass collaboration, however for now, the most 
severely impacted populations, in terms of demographic scale, are small. This results in a lack of 
adequate attention at the global scale, in addition to (1) cultural differences, (2) competing economic 
interests, and (3) scale and level assumptions that hamper response. Traditional transnational politics 
alone cannot yield the antidote to modern global risks, and the typhoon case study demonstrates this 
frequent disconnect between the realities of local disaster management and international humanitarian 
approaches. Strategic global capital and a global civil society are also needed to transcend uncertainty 
and conflict (Beck, 2005).
Disaster governance and relevant research are active at different scales. Researchers often study 
regional and global biophysical processes, while their results are applied at much lower (national and 
sub-national) levels of policy. Climate change and seismic processes are examples where there is a scale 
mismatch between what is known and what is being managed. There is also a plurality of scale-related
2.3.5 Discussion
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interests (Cash et al., 2006). For example, in the realm of climate change policy, the foci at local levels 
may be on sea ice process changes and related hazards, while on the global levels there is greater 
emphasis on armed conflict, mass migration, economic development and food security. Identifying 
shared meanings over risks that threaten community sustainability at multiple levels; and finding 
overlapping interests between scales of governance are crucial to preparing for and responding to 
disasters of all kinds, and ultimately making progress towards global sustainability. Such is the case in 
northern Alaska, where food security concerns at the global level are leveraged to build knowledge on 
physical processes impacting local level subsistence practices.
This mismatch of scale can occur on a temporal scale as well, as can be seen in the oil spill example, 
where the disaster impacts long outlived political election cycles and any policy change that followed. 
The Exxon spill was a disaster that collapsed the slow-moving ecological system whose transition to 
growth and stability has been arduous. Twenty-five years of research since Exxon Valdez has illuminated 
the long-term effects and chronic damage of the spill (Esler et al., 2015) despite extensive institutional 
and policy change and rehabilitation efforts.
While complex problems, surprises, and crises tested the adaptive capacity of these four systems, in 
some cases they also provided the potential for creativity and learning (Gunderson, 2003). This learning 
can take on a variety of forms. Our case studies show that with rapid onset disasters there is a tendency 
for single-loop learning that can drive quick action by accessing established methods and tools without 
qualitatively increasing adaptive capacity. This type of response can be especially true in cases where 
recovery happens quickly, such as in the case of the social system recovering following the Great Alaska 
Earthquake of 1964. There is, however, a greater likelihood of reevaluation of assumptions and norms in 
disasters with long-lasting impacts. The role of the Newtok Planning Group in responding to local 
impacts of climate change, illustrates how extraordinary-term impact disasters can promote double­
loop learning by allowing time for bridging organizations to form and act.
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There are tradeoffs between taking the time to deliberate on what steps to take and having to act 
immediately, using already available tools and techniques (Birkland, 2006). Dekker and Hansen (2004) 
explain how public scrutiny may help or inhibit organizational learning in the public sector, noting that 
"public bureaucracies are challenged by an arduous paradox: the need for learning is regarded highest 
under circumstances in which it is most difficult to achieve" (211). In other words, a focusing event in 
which political scrutiny is brought to bear on organizational performance can present opportunities for 
learning and change as well as threaten the capacity of an organization to change. Real change in these 
types of situations occurs through a re-questioning of the assumptions, values and beliefs that led to the 
failure of the system in the first place, followed by an adapted set of criteria to assess organizational 
activities —a type of double-loop learning. Such internal reflection is difficult and risky as it threatens 
power structures: Deep reflective learning is threatened by after-the-event evaluation activities that 
may be loaded with political conflict over location of blame and agency responsibility; myriad turf 
battles among administrators, political officials, and policy communities; or even confusion as to what 
sorts of goals an agency really promotes. For example, the paralysis of government in the aftermath of 
hurricane Katrina demonstrated how "seeking culprits makes bad politics" and political scrutiny never 
came to bear on the underlying causes of the disaster, such as crumbling infrastructure and lack of social 
protections for the poor (Young, 2006, p.41).
One factor that may promote constructive change following collapse is the identification of perverse
subsidies that inhibit change (Holling, 2003). In the US context, for example, this could mean reforming
the threshold for federal disaster aid as well as the flood insurance program to incentivize safer building
codes and to discourage the risky behaviors of developers and homeowners. Long-term planning must
aim to prepare for anything that may come via multi-scalar, competitive innovation, and adaptive
management structures moving in unplanned directions (based on the evolution of perspectives,
2.4 CONCLUSIONS
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resources and needs) instead of a single pre-planned vision. To this end, all levels of the panarchy must
take what Beck (2005) called the "quantum leap" towards a cosmopolitan system where a global civil
society creates its sustainable futures.
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CHAPTER 3: A HORIZONTAL SCALING OF RISK AND SUSTAINABILITY PERSPECTIVES: THE ROLE OF 
CONSENSUS IN ARCTIC ALASKA1
Abstract: This article explores the horizontal scalability of sustainability and risk perspectives across two 
Arctic Alaska boroughs. Its focus is a regional-scale cultural consensus analysis of risk to community 
sustainability. Local participants (N = 47) in a series of three community workshops provided input via a 
written survey. Risks to sustainability were evaluated in two phases. In the first phase, an open-ended 
question elicited participant feedback to establish a cultural domain of risks. Textual analysis of written 
responses to the questionnaire provided a set of codes, which were evaluated for common themes. In 
the second phase, participants rated these risk themes based on whether the items posed a risk to 
community sustainability, their impact, level of manageability, and historic change over time. Elements 
of sustainability established by previous research were ranked for relevance to current community 
sustainability. Results show that there is strong regional cultural consensus over what poses risks to 
community sustainability in the region. There is strong agreement as well on the prevailing elements of 
sustainability. The study describes the key drivers of change in the region's social-ecological system as 
understood by participants, and the role of deliberation and adaptive learning in managing risks.
Keywords: risks, Cultural Consensus Analysis, resilience, social-ecological systems, uncertainty, decision 
making, Arctic Alaska
1 Blair, B. Social learning and the role of consensus in Arctic Alaska: A horizontal scaling of risk and sustainability perspectives. 
Prepared for submission in Sustainability science.
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This research builds on a series of participatory scenario workshops in northern Alaska called the 
Northern Alaska Scenarios Project (NASP). Residents from the North Slope Borough (NSB) and the 
Northwest Arctic Borough (NWAB) participated in three workshops in 2015 -  2016 to discuss the future 
of healthy, sustainable communities in the region. The three workshops were hosted in Utqiagvik 
(formerly known as Barrow) in the NSB, in Kotzebue (NWAB), and Anchorage in southcentral Alaska.
The Anchorage workshop was held outside the region of interest, as this last workshop coincided with 
the 2016 Alaska Forum on the Environment in Anchorage, attended by many of our workshop 
participants. The Alaska Forum was used as a platform to report progress on the project to the public, 
and finish the NASP deliberations off-site. In total, 51 participants attended at least one of our 
workshops to deliberate key variables for sustainable Arctic communities in Alaska. Of these 51 
participants, 47 filled out our pre-workshop survey, and 34 filled out both the pre- and the post­
workshop surveys.
Due to growing political and economic interest in the region and impacts of rapid climate change, it is 
increasingly difficult to ensure simultaneously viable, sustainable resource development and optimal 
environmental protection. This study followed the deliberative process of the NASP scenarios 
workshops to assess the scalability of definitions for community sustainability, risks and resilience across 
two boroughs that comprise Arctic Alaska. Though the two boroughs share a vast geographic region and 
social-ecological systems (SES) with many similarities, as well as a common cultural heritage, they also 
differ greatly in available resources, local and regional concerns and pressures from outside sources.
This study considers the following two hypotheses:
H1: NSB and NWAB participants share a cultural consensus view of risks to sustainability, as
measured by Cultural Consensus Analysis (Romney et al. 1986)
3.1 INTRODUCTION
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H2: Participants' awareness of each other's borough-level sustainability goals, and the risks that 
threaten these goals will increase by participation in a workshop
3.1.1 Defining policy problems, finding common ground
There are a myriad of socio-economic conditions afflicting society at any given point in time yet few rise 
to the level of importance that gets governing bodies involved (Weller, 2007; Wood and Doan, 2003). 
Since one of the distinguishing characteristics of policy making is that it is problem-oriented (Lerner and 
Lasswell, 1951), it is not surprising that the process by which issues are identified as 'problems' becomes 
a focus of much critique and deliberation (Baber, 2004; Fischer, 1993; Lebel et al., 2010). There is little 
disagreement that identifying and defining a problem is a highly normative activity (Harding and 
Figueroa, 2013; Schon and Rein, 1995; Vig and Kraft, 2012). Schon and Rein (1995) attribute its 
normative nature to a process that simplifies complex realities, framing information in ways that draws 
attention to some elements of a problem while minimizing others (Layzer, 2011). The process of who 
wins the battle to define what issue comes before decision makers, or who sets the agenda, bears great 
influence on policy outcomes. This type of influence is indirect power, as opposed to the direct power 
wielded by those who make the decisions. Nevertheless it is true power that drives government 
agenda. This underscores the importance of decision making processes, and the membership in those 
processes.
In a coupled social-ecological system (SES), mismanagement can occur when one SES is managed for 
stability at the expense of another SES. (Adger, 2000; Armitage, 2005). The devastating "Dust Bowl" 
drought and dust storms of the 1930s is one such example (Worster, 2004). Farmers in the Great Plains 
turned to deep plowing the top soil to convert the grasslands to cultivated crop land. The unanchored 
soil turned to dust and created devastating dust storms that travelled cross-country, impacting 
communities as far away as the East-Coast (Worster, 2004).
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SES have unique properties and interactions that are not easily parsed for analyses. To generate robust 
decisions there needs to be broad citizen participation and deliberation so that policy reflects the needs 
and perspectives of citizens whose livelihoods are tied to the SES under analysis (Fischer, 1993). Equally 
importantly, deliberation requires that participants share some level of understanding of common 
concepts and knowledge. One implication is the increased need for more efficient and accurate risk 
communication (Buchecker et al., 2013; Norris et al., 2008). This includes creating common meanings 
and shared understandings, and a platform to articulate needs, views, and attitudes. This point 
underscores the importance of platforms that fit the social, political and cultural setting of the SES under 
review.
Scenario development can facilitate a decision process that engages a diverse set of stakeholders and 
their narratives in consideration of future outcomes (Cavana, 2010; Lindgren and Bandhold, 2009; 
Oteros-Rozas et al., 2015; Sheppard et al., 2011). Scenario development serves to help people 
understand the scope of all possible alternative futures, their impacts, and possible responses to 
changes (Duinker and Greig, 2007). Most basically, scenarios are used to talk about possible future 
events and risks in the present and can help identify key drivers of change to monitor, and identify 
important decision points for intervention.
This study describes the Northern Alaska SES as understood by local (NSB and NWAB resident) 
sustainability experts at our workshops. Invited participants with expertise across different sectors 
(education, justice, health, subsistence, youth, Inupiaq values, and business development) deliberated 
healthy, sustainable communities in Arctic Alaska. This study probed the existence of a cultural 
consensus regarding risks among participants, and assessed the learning facilitated by the deliberative 
processes at the workshop.
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3.2 METHODS
3.2.1 Survey instrument and analysis of data
Fig. 3.1 Study area. The highlighted area (in yellow) encompasses the North Slope and Northwest Arctic Boroughs 
3.2.1.1 W orkshop poll
Two survey instruments collected data from workshop participants. The workshop poll (survey #1) was 
administered before and after each workshop to assess demographic information and participant level of 
knowledge about (i) risks that threaten sustainability in their own, as well as the other, borough; (ii) 
sustainability goals of the two boroughs; (iii) perceptions of community resilience in the region; and (iv) 
top five risk priorities in the region as a whole. Section iv builds on data from 47 workshop participants 
who took part in at least one NASP workshop, and filled out a survey before participation. Section iv asked 
the open-ended question, "what are the top five issues that threaten the success of healthy, sustainable 
communities in 2040?". This section sets up the premise for important drivers of change in Northern 
Alaska. Responses collected to this question at the first workshop also played a pivotal role in providing
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cultural domain data for the separate, Cultural Consensus Analysis (CCA) (Romney et al., 1986; Weller, 
2007)survey. The CCA survey was administered at the second and third workshop to a total of 28 
participants. Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistical information about participants in both the workshop 
and CCA surveys.
Analysis o f the workshop poll
Sections i-iii of the workshop poll served the basis for a within-subjects tests of knowledge before and 
after first participation. Of a total N = 47 who were polled, there were n = 36 participants who filled out 
both the before and after workshop surveys. These participants provided the data for a matched-pairs 
sample analysis of workshop effectiveness, based on self-evaluations of issue-awareness before and 
after participation.
To get a picture of the participants' understanding of important components of their SES, and key drivers 
of change, responses to the open-ended question (section iv) about the top five risks were analyzed using 
a grounded theory approach (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). In all, 47 first-time participants were polled 
before their first workshop. Their responses were iteratively coded in Atlas.ti (v.8.0) using a priori codes 
about socioeconomic and biophysical drivers of change that emerged through observations at all three 
workshops, and inductively coding themes that emerged from the written responses. This produced 40 
codes in 7 dominant risk themes: decision making, health and health care, environmental change, cultural 
changes, industrial activities, education, and cost of living (Appendix 3A). Using the network view manager 
of Atlas.ti, the codes were modeled with their co-occurring codes and relationships to produce a heuristic 
model of causal and associative relationships among SES components. The final model was depicted in a 
stylized illustration of drivers of change in the region, as understood by participants (Fig. 3.2).
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Table 3.1 Demographic information by survey instrument
W o rk sh o p  Poll 
N = 4 7
C u ltu ra l C o n s e n s u s  A n a ly s is  S u rv e y  
N = 2 6
nNSB nNWAB % of total nNSB nNWAB % of total
Participants 23 24 1 0 0 12 14 1 0 0
Gender Fe m a le 11 14 53 5 6 42
M ale 12 10 47 7 8 58
Age 1 8 -2 9 8 5 28 5 2 27
3 0 -4 0 6 7 28 3 5 31
4 1 -6 5 9 12 44 4 7 42
Education -  TK* Le a rn e d  T K No data 9 9 69
Education - S e c o n d a ry 8 1 19 5 0 19
Formal w ith /w ith o u t
d ip lo m a
S o m e  c o lle g e 5 5 22 3 1 15
C o lle g e  d e g re e 10 18 59 4 13 65
Affiliation Trib a l 3 2 11 2 1 12
g o v e rn m e n t
Trib a l n o n - 2 6 17 2 4 23
p ro fit, re g io n a l
c o rp .
Trib a l fo r-p ro fit, 2 2 9 2 1 12
re g io n a l c o rp .
Trib a l fo r-p ro fit, 7 1 17 4 0 15
v illa g e  co rp .
B o ro u g h 8 8 34 1 5 23
Fed e ra l 0 1 2 0 1 4
P riv a te  b u sin e ss 0 1 2 0 1 4
S tu d e n t 1 2 6 1 0 4
*TK = Traditional Knowledge
3.2.1.2 The Cultural Consensus Analysis survey
The CCA questionnaire (survey #2) followed recommendations by Weller (2007). CCA is a method for 
deducing culturally correct answers to questions based on informant responses. The answer key is the 
culture, or shared knowledge, and it is estimated mathematically from patterns in data.
The model relies on three basic steps (Dressler et al., 2005):
1) CCA seeks to find cultural models or shared knowledge among groups of informants. The data
analysis uses principal components analysis, with transposed data across participants as 
opposed to responses. Eigenvalues are evaluated to find "culturally appropriate" answers 
(answers that match the shared knowledge-domain of the group), determined by the 
presence of a single factor that explains most of the variation in their responses, with a first
77
to second eigenvalue ratio greater than, or equal to, 3.0.
2) CCA tests each individual informant's level of shared beliefs and perceptions via similarity 
coefficients to see how responses compare among each other; for example a so-called 
"cultural competence score" (CC score)2 of 0.8 means the respondent has an estimated 80% 
command in, or knowledge of, this group-specific domain. Responses are prioritized by level 
of agreement, which is a mean response weighted in favor of competent participants. This 
helps minimize the influence of informant guesses, and enables the researcher to describe 
cultural spaces inhabited by respondents.
3) CCA asks what the culturally correct answers are to survey questions administered to a 
group, assuming "correct" to be what is most commonly held.
The CCA survey built on data collected at the first workshop (workshop poll section iv) and from 
literature (Carothers et al., 2014). This literature served as background information in the assessment of 
shared perceptions related to community sustainability and risks in the Northern Alaska region. Fifteen 
potential risk items in total were presented to 28 participants in the CCA questionnaire, in dichotomous 
true / false format. Of these informants, 21 took the survey at the second (Kotzebue), and 7 at the third 
(Anchorage) workshop; 12 were first-time participants, and 14 were second-time participants. This list of 
risk items was supplemented using previous CCA research (Carothers et al., 2014) of land cover changes 
in Northern Alaska based on observations from elders. While there are inherent limitations in the 
application of this list to North Slope communities due to its emphasis on riverine-based subsistence, 
the list is a useful basis to identify some of the land cover changes that are perceived as universally
2 CCA uses "culture" and "cultural competence" in very context-specific ways. Culture refers to shared sets of 
beliefs among a group of people. Competence is the individual's level of knowledge of this group-specific domain.
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problematic across the two boroughs. The true / false evaluations of these fifteen risk items comprised 
the CCA portion of the survey.
As part of the CCA survey instrument, but not included in consensus analysis, each risk item that was 
deemed "true" (the item is a risk to community sustainability), was further evaluated by informants 
using a three 5-point Likert-type question. These details elicited information about each risk's impact on 
sustainability, level of manageability with locally available resources and direction of change over the 
past 20 years. If an item was not deemed a risk to sustainability, these questions were not asked.
In addition, the survey presented informants with six propositions about elements of sustainability in 
Arctic Alaska, based on research 20 years ago (Kruse et al., 2004). While not a part of the consensus 
analysis, these propositions played a vital role in establishing participant perspectives about common 
themes on sustainability in Northern Alaska communities.
Analysis o f the Cultural Consensus Analysis survey.
CCA data collected at the second and third workshop via the consensus instrument surveyed 15 men and 
13 women from NSB (n = 12) and NWAB (n = 16). Two participants were not included due to too many 
missing responses, beyond the threshold for which the model can be corrected (Weller, 2007). This left 
26 respondents (NSB = 12, NWAB = 14).
The Likert-type survey items that probed perceived risk impacts, local control, and change over time were 
analyzed using descriptive statistical methods. Median values, and interquartile ranges (IQR) were 
calculated by borough of residence for intra-region comparison (Appendix 3C). Similarly, the Likert-type 
propositions about elements of sustainability were evaluated using 5-point Likert-type questions, and 
calculated using median and IQR scores by borough (Table 3.2).
As a first step, it is important to elicit elements of a cultural domain, in order to present culturally
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relevant question items and relations in the CCA questionnaire (Borgatti, 1998). Participants in the first 
workshop in Utqiagvik (N=29, nNSB = 19, nNWAB = 10) provided their perceptions of top five risks to 
sustainability in the region, elicited via the open-ended question (section iv) of the workshop poll. A 
textual analysis of written responses produced a total of 187 observations across the data set. Using 
MAXQDA (v.12.0) observations were sorted using textual content into several distinct risk themes. The 
analysis was further informed by participant observation over the course of the three-day workshop, 
where issues surrounding community sustainability were discussed at length. The result of the analysis 
yielded seven risk themes in the top five position (Table 3.3, items 9-15) based on code frequency.
Survey responses were entered into a matrix with respondent rows and proposition columns. As per 
Weller (2007), steps were taken to eliminate missing cells: One question item (#3, Table 3.3) was 
eliminated due to greater than 10% missing responses, as well as two participants who failed this criterion 
even after item #3 was eliminated. This left a total of 5 missing responses out of 364 (1%), which were 
imputed by random 1s and 0s as determined by a random integer-number generator. The match 
coefficient method of the formal consensus model was used (Romney et al., 1986) in the Ucinet software 
package (Borgatti et al., 2002) to assess agreement and the culturally correct answers. The match 
coefficient method was chosen instead of the covariance method (though either one is appropriate for 
dichotomous items), because the latter is sensitive to the balance of positive (true) and negative (false) 
items. This can lead to a failure to calculate agreement without adequate variance in responses per the 
30-70 rule (Weller, 2007). The 30-70 rule warns that questionnaire items should be constructed to 
carefully balance the expected proportion of "true" responses. One way of achieving this is to alternate 
the positive and negative items to keep the proportion of positive responses between 30% and 70%, or 
inverting (reverse scoring) some of the responses ex post facto. The latter option, using the covariance 
method, gave nearly identical results to the match coefficient method during a trial run.
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3.3.1 Social-ecological system and drivers of change: workshop poll
From the textual analysis of responses to the open-ended question "what are the top five issues that 
threaten the success of healthy, sustainable communities in 2040?" a picture of a complex SES emerged 
with numerous, interconnected drivers of change. We illustrated the elements of the system reported 
to us in Fig. 3.2. Respondents frequently attributed (frequency = 10, of a total 16 references to 
environmental issues; see Appendix 3A) observed environmental changes to climate change, and linked 
its impacts to infrastructure degradation, and changes in subsistence resource availability. Less 
frequently (frequency = 2), respondents mentioned thawing permafrost and coastal erosion, without 
explicitly referencing climate change. An overarching theme implicated decision making, mostly at the 
state and federal levels in excluding local interests from important decisions. Local political processes 
were also indicated in obstructing achieving healthy, sustainable communities. The code divided local 
interests represents remarks such as "disagreements among local governments," "lack of unity in terms 
of what's most important," and "lack of support and collaboration locally." As one participant put it: 
"We are all Inupiaq, not corporation against corporation."
According to respondents, insufficient authority over decisions that impact local conditions affect local 
adaptive capacity. Inadequate access to vocational training and good quality, culturally appropriate 
education that would allow local youth to learn Traditional Knowledge (TK) as well and "walk in both 
worlds;" means that many struggle to participate in subsistence activities and / or wage employment. 
One participant stated that this risk stems from the "challenges to maintaining subsistence activities -  
scheduling, lack of time to learn, high costs, displacement by industry, and the education system not 
really preparing youth for either world." Participants reported that those who leave for education often
3.3 RESULTS
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Fig. 3.2 Model of social-ecological drivers of change and community impacts. Model described by workshop 
participants (N = 47). Solid lines represent reinforcing or positive relationships, dashed lines represent weakening 
or inhibiting relationships between system components. Pluses indicate increasing trends, minuses indicate 
decreasing (or deteriorating) trends. The design concept behind this model draws on Hopping et al. (2016).
do not return to their communities. Others move away for jobs, or as one participant observed, 
"Children are educated to leave."
Wage employment is scarce, and while it provides cash funds to assist with the costs of subsistence 
activities, it reportedly takes time away from it. The high cost of living encourages outmigration, which 
impacts the availability of teachers and funding for education. Respondents admit that industrial 
development often provides jobs, but pointed out that it also affects subsistence resources because of 
noise pollution, air pollution, altering migration patterns and causing hunters to travel longer distances 
to find game. Subsistence activities are vital to food security, but climate change impacts, combined 
with development increasingly impact access, according to participants. Diminishing sea and river ice 
decrease hunter mobility, while the combination of reduced sea ice and industrial activities increase 
marine traffic. The reduced extent of sea ice was also viewed as responsible for coastal erosion, which
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reportedly threatens an already fragile infrastructure. One respondent pointed out that the combination 
of increased marine traffic, inadequate infrastructure, and local, trained personnel decrease emergency 
response capacities. All of these drivers of change are perceived as affecting culture (language, heritage) 
and transmission of traditional knowledge. As culture changes, socioeconomic pressures and conflict 
increase, and community health declines, according to participants.
Informants from both boroughs described aspects of these same processes. Slight differences were 
noted in terms of frequency of emergence, or priorities among these factors. The most frequently 
mentioned risk, ineffective decision making, was the same in both boroughs. The second most frequent 
was health and health care issues. In third was industrial activities tied with environmental changes in 
the NSB group; while cost o f living, and health and health care issues came in second and third 
(respectively) in the NWAB group. A more detailed analysis of the differences and similarities between 
the two boroughs' risk perceptions is discussed in the next section. This cursory analysis of observed 
drivers of change is significant in providing a generalizable picture of a complex and rapidly changing 
Northern Alaska SES.
Perceptions of SES complexity and rate o f changes
To complement the participants' model of their SES in Fig. 3.2, and to parse out the magnitude of 
perceived uncertainty in the SES, a 25-item questionnaire (see Chapter 4, Appendix 4C), asked 
participants for their perceptions of complexity and rate of changes in the North Slope region's social 
and environmental systems. The survey items, administered via the CCA survey (survey #2) in our 
Kotzebue and Anchorage workshops, were evaluated on a seven-point Likert scale from 1 (completely 
disagree) to 7 (completely agree).
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Responses from the two groups (NWAB and NSB participants) were modeled in a coordinate system 
along the dimensions "rate of changes" (x axis) and "complexity" (y axis, see Fig. 3.3). Mid-range 
coordinates (4.0, 4.0) indicate perceptions of continuity in, and foresight of, the system's future states, 
while higher scores indicate a shift toward uncertainty, and decrease ability to control outcomes. The 
two group's initial composite scores (NWAB: Mchanges=4.6, SD=0.8 and Mcompiexity=4.9, SD=0.9), (NSB 
Mchanges=4.6, SD=0.7 and Mcomplexity=4.7, SD=1.3) are modeled using grey symbols labeled "outlook on 
future included" in Fig. 3.3. The two dimensions (complexity and changes) indicate that both groups 
rated their SES in the region of moderate-to-high uncertainty. These results indicate that high levels of 
perceived complexity and rate of changes are indeed factors in uncertainties in the SES. There was no 
significance of association between mean scores and group membership at the p < .05 level.
The calculations were repeated excluding four statements that belonged to a group of items from the 
SES "rate of changes" section. These items asked respondents to consider the future state of their SES, 
and evaluate whether the outlook was positive (i.e. expected prosperity in economic and natural 
resources). These items were originally reverse scored, ranging from a low score of 1 for strong 
agreement (signaling prosperity), to a high score of 7 for strong disagreement. The original rationale 
behind these statements was that an optimistic view of the future (i.e. things are headed in the right 
direction), presupposes continuity of trends, a sense of ability to forecast outcomes to steer the system 
toward desired futures. These are usually traits of low  uncertainty in a system. Therefore, in the 
summative scores, highly negative responses to these questions on future outlook, increased overall 
change scores (towards increased uncertainty); while low scores (translating to a positive viewpoint) 
decreased them.
The "rate of change" scores were recalculated to test the effect of the four "outlook on future" 
statements on overall uncertainty. The idea behind this was to parse out attitudes about future
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uncertainty, from the rest of the statements that evaluate present uncertainties, and to find out
whether scores shift significantly, and if so, in which direction. When recalculating change scores, 
omitting the group of four items on outlook, we see little change in the NWAB group's results (Mchange = 
4.65, SD = 1.0), and a clear increase in the NSB group's (Mchange = 4.9, SD = 0.8). Fig. 3.3 depicts this final 
model for both groups (along with the original) in white, labeled "outlook on future excluded." This new 
model conveys a more positive outlook on the future among NSB participants than that of the NWAB 
group: The NSB group's original (grey diamond) change score was lower with the future outlook items 
included. This implies that the NSB group held a positive view of future prosperity , received low scores 
on the reverse coded scale as a result, which, in turn, decreased their perceived changes scores.
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Fig. 3.3 SES complexity and uncertainty analysis results for the NSB and NWAB groups ( N = 28). The figure 
includes results with and without "outlook on future" question items, and an arrow showing the direction of 
change in scores between these two perspectives. The chart shows different uncertainty types as factors of 
complexity and change levels, adapted from Lindgren and Bandhold (2009, 173).
In the model that excluded these items, the NSB group's perception of speed of changes increased, 
while the NWAB group's did not shift significantly. This suggests that the NWAB group held a somewhat 
neutral view of future prosperity, and therefore these items did not shift their scores significantly in any
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particular direction.
To sum up, there may be slightly different levels of concern between the NSB and NWAB groups, 
regarding the future prosperity of their SES. This difference in futures perspectives may possibly signal 
differences in evaluations of resources, buffers, and thresholds in SES adaptive capacity. Most 
importantly however, the results (depicted in Fig, 3,2 and Fig. 3.3) show that the northern Alaska region 
shares much of the same priorities over uncertainties and drivers of change. Both groups perceive their 
SES as one impacted by rapid, complex changes. These observations are perceived similarly by both 
NWAB and NSB participants, without significant discrepancies between the groups' perceptions of the 
two measured dimensions of uncertainty (rate of changes, complexity). These shared perceptions have 
relevance in discussions about finding consensus, and building a common ground for cross-scale 
strategies in planning sustainable communities.
3.3.2 Elements of sustainability, and a cultural consensus view of risks
3.3.2.1 Elements of sustainability
The Sustainability of Arctic Communities Project (Kruse et al., 2004) worked with residents from 
northern Alaska and Canadian communities in the late 1990s to define important elements of 
sustainability. These elements were identified by community residents as serving an important role in 
supporting vital cultural, ecological, and socioeconomic functions that sustain their communities. The 
items in Table 3.2 are drawn from that research, and served this research as a starting point for defining 
community sustainability. Workshop participants (N = 28) were asked to evaluate whether these goals 
are still applicable for Arctic community sustainability today.
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Table 3.2 Elements of community sustainability propositions (Kruse et al 2004)
N = 28 Median (IQR)*
Use of, and respect for, the land and animals in our homeland are very important to 5 (5-5)
community sustainability.
A cash economy that is compatible with, and supports, continued local use of the land and 5 (4-5)
animals is very important to community sustainability.
Local control, and responsibility for what is done in our village homelands and for what 5 (4-5)
happens to resources used by the community and on our lands are very important to 
community sustainability.
Education of younger people in both traditional knowledge and western science is very 5 (4-5)
important to community sustainability.
Education of the outside world about community goals and ways of living is very 4 (4-5)
important to community sustainability.
A thriving culture that has a clear identity based on time on the land and language, which 5 (4-5)
honors and respects elders, are very important to community sustainability.
* Calculated on a scale where: Strongly Agree =5, Agree =4, Neither Agree nor Disagree =3, Disagree = 2, Strongly Disagree = 1
Likert-type items asked respondents to rate each on a scale of 1 (strong disagreement) to 5 (strong 
agreement). Median results and interquartile ranges are presented in Table 3.2. The results show strong 
agreement on five, and agreement on one item with little variation in the distribution of responses. 
These results confirm the prevailing importance of homelands and resources, of autonomy over 
decisions, and of healthy economies to cultural continuity and community sustainability in the region.
3.3.2.2 The Cultural Consensus Analysis results
The CCA results indicated a good fit to the consensus model with a first to second largest eigenvalue 
ratio of 12.35 (Hypothesis 1). CCA signals a one-culture domain among the informants by evaluating the 
pattern of answers, determining a single dimension exists if this ratio is equal to, or greater than 3.0 
(Weller, 2007). Overall group CC score was high at 0.80, SD= 0.3 (NSB cohort = 0.68, SD= 0.4, NWAB 
cohort = 0.91, SD= 0.1; see Appendix 3B), indicating that as a group, participants on average gave 80% 
correct answers according to the shared cultural domain. There was one negative CC score, signaling 
that the dominant knowledge culture model (shared truths within this group) likely does not fit this 
participant (i.e. this participant does not share the group's insights). However, because the sole negative
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CC score was close to 0 (-0.1), and group average scores were otherwise high, the overall model is 
significant (Weller, 2007). The culturally correct answers (i.e. estimated correct responses based on the 
shared culture within the group) to the propositions and the frequency of response are presented in 
Table 3.3. The consensus analysis revealed that experts from the two boroughs agree about all 
observations about change and risks, and all items pose a risk to sustainability in the region.
Table 3.3 Cultural consensus questions. Created based on free lists of risks to sustainability (items 9-15) and previous 
cultural consensus work in the region by Carothers et al.(2014)-items 1-8. The answer column shows the culturally 
correct (i.e. in line with this group's shared beliefs) answer, and number of correct replies overall and per borough.
Cultural consensus questions 
Is this a risk to com m unity sustainability? True /  False:
N = 26
CC All 
Answ er N = 26
NSB 
n = 12
NWAB 
n = 14
1. Less snow in winter Impacts: food  and water security T  25 10 14
2. Shallow river and lake waters Impacts: fish  migration, food  and water security, 
travel
T  24 10 14
3. High river water events are less common* Impacts: travel * * * *
4. Melting permafrost** increases erosion and drying Impacts: difficult overland 
travel, less lake habitat, more grass habitat
T  26 11 14
5. More wildfires Impacts: respiratory problems from  smoke, changes in subsistence T  20 7 13
6. Vegetation change Impacts: changing migration patterns o f wildlife, food  security, 
invasive species
T  22 9 12
7. Later fall freeze-up; new freeze-thaw cycle Impacts: food  preservation and 
fermentation, travel
T  25 12 12
8. Earlier spring breakup; ice now melts in place Impacts: travel, harvest seasons T  25 11 14
9. Health and health care issues Example: access to care, substance abuse, mental 
health
T  23 9 13
10. Environmental problems Examples: climate change impacts (erosion, less sea 
and river ice, permafrost thaw)
T  26 11 14
11. Education issues: formal schooling Examples: teacher turnover, lack o f local 
teachers
T  25 9 14
12. Education issues: transmission of traditional knowledge Examples: drop in youth- 
elder contact, conflicting school and subsistence schedules
T  27 11 14
13. Ineffective decision making Examples: misguided regulations, divided local 
interests, exclusion o f local communities from  decisions
T  25 10 13
14. Industrial activities, issues from Examples: irresponsible development, pollution, 
inability to mitigate industrial disasters
T  24 8 13
15. Risks to culture Examples: heritage loss, language loss T  25 10 15
*Item #3 was eliminated due to > 10% missing responses. **"Melting" permafrost refers to thawing permafrost: In this survey 
the author adhered to the original wording from the Carothers et al. (2014) study that relied on elder observations, preserving 
the culturally appropriate wording. Throughout this dissertation, when referring to the specific survey item, the phrase 
"melting" is used, while in discussions of the phenomenon as described in scientific literature, "thawing" will be used.
In order to visualize the patterns of responses beyond an array of CC scores, the agreement matrix was 
submitted to non-metric multidimensional scaling (MDS) in Ucinet. The agreement matrix is a respondent-
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by-respondent matrix that calculates the correlation coefficient between all pairs of respondents, and 
plays a role in calculating the culturally correct answers and individual CC scores. The proportion of 
similarities indicated in the agreement matrix can be represented as a pattern of proximities in a 
multidimensional space. Figure 3.4 shows the two dimension scaling solution (stress = 0.035, iterations = 
50). The stress value is the degree of correspondence between the MDS model points, and the original 
matrix input (the distortion that occurs when data is transposed over multiple dimensions), and values 
below 0.1 are considered "excellent" or well-representative of the patterns in the data.(Borgatti, 1997).
Fig. 3.4 Nonmetric multidimensional scaling of agreement. NSB (blue) and NWAB (red) respondents. The letter "A" 
marks the respondent with negative CC score, "B" marks the respondent with similarly low score (0.09). The x and y 
axes do not represent meaningful numeric values beyond communicating relative distance between objects.
The axes do not have any meaningful values in nonmetric MDS. The axes simply anchor the points in 
space, providing coordinates for each object only to the extent that the between-nodes distances remain 
in proportion with the underlying matrix (agreement matrix in this case). The consensus pattern can be 
seen clearly in the tight clustering and overlap of blue and red squares in the upper right of the plot. A
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few red and blue squares are situated a bit off from the main cluster, but are still close in space. The two 
informants who had very low CC scores (A, B), on the other hand, occupy spaces not only distant from the 
cluster, but also from one another. This is due to the fact that even among themselves, they had no 
consensus. Informant B rejected 5 of 7 culturally correct land cover risk propositions, compared with A's 
3 of 7 incorrect answers here; while B incorrectly rejected only 1 of 7 risk items from the mainly socio­
economic risk list (items 9-15, Table 3.3), while A incorrectly (based on consensus) rejected 5 of 7.
Testing for knowledge subgroups
A least squares multiple linear regression in JMP pro (version 11.2.1) tested the effects of six 
independent variables (age, borough of residence, gender, first or second time participant, formal 
education and traditional knowledge) and any potential interactions with CC scores. Gender and 
borough of residence included two, while age and education included three levels (Table 3.1). For the 
purposes of effect testing, the eight-level affiliation was re-coded into a dichotomous tribal and non- 
tribal variable. Though the resulting six-factor interaction model was significant at the p < .05 level (F 9, 16 
= 4.9, p = .0028, r2= 0.73, Adj. r2 = 0.58), only education had statistically significant association with CC 
scores (sig. = .0028). A one-way between subjects ANOVA of scores among the education levels showed 
the between-group to within-group variation increasing greatly to a ratio of 24.9 (Table 3.4).
A post-hoc Tukey-Kramer HSD test confirmed association between membership in the "college degree" 
and "some college" groups, and higher CC scores than those from the "secondary education" group. The 
dominant, shared knowledge culture among our participants, therefore, is associated with higher levels 
of formal education. While age did not show correlation with CC scores, it is perhaps worth noting that 
the two CC score outliers (Fig. 3.4) came from—one each—the youngest (under 22) and oldest (over 60) 
cohorts in the group. It is possible that people at the two ends of the age spectrum comprise their own 
knowledge domains. For example, it may be that these two age groups do not engage in the same social
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Table 3.4 Results from the regression of cultural competence scores by type of education
N = 26
Tests for Knowledge Subgroup by Education:
Formal education Traditional
knowledge
Formal education and 
traditional knowledge
College
degree
Some
college
Secondary
education
TRUE FALSE College
degree
Some
college
Secondary
education
Members n = 17 4 5 0000 T—1 10 5 3
Avg. age = 45.05 32.75 32.0 39.2 43.9 43.6 32.75 34.75
Women n = 8 3 0 8 3 5 3 0
NSB n = 4 3 5 9 3 2 3 4
CC score Mean = 0.94 0.84 0.31 0.76 0.89 0.95 0.84 0.22
SD = 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.34 0.15 0.05 0.08 0.08
Test statistic: CC F 2, 23 = 24.9 F 1, 24 = F 2, 15 = 29.4
score by r2 = 0.68 1.03 r2 = 0.80
knowledge group Adj. r2 = 0.66 Adj. r2 = 0.77
p-value p = .0001 p = .319 p = .0001
Post-hoc College degree -  Secondary --- College degree -  Secondary
Tukey-Kramer HSD sig. = .0001 sig. = .0001
Some college -  Secondary Some college -  Secondary
sig. = .0005 sig. = .0002
learning activities as the 25-55 age group. Because the results otherwise did not show significance of 
association between age and CC scores, these points remain speculative suggestions. The two 
participants in question were both NSB residents, explaining this group's lower average score compared 
with NWAB scores.
Taking a cursory look at descriptive statistics related to TK (Table 3.4), we can see that those who had TK 
(M = 0.76) and those who didn't (M = 0.89) both had high CC scores. This confirms that TK education is 
not a factor in the variance in the group's CC scores. However, the within-group CC score variation in the 
TK-educated group is double that in the non-TK group, indicating a somewhat less-homogenous cohort in 
terms of sharing the consensus view. Because of this variance, as a next step, the effect of formal 
education on CC scores within the TK-educated group was examined. Table 3.4 shows the significance test 
and post hoc analysis for this group (n = 18) who had both types of education. Between-group (levels of 
education) variance, as well as the coefficient of determination increased, indicating that formal 
education explains 80% of the variability in responses in the traditional knowledge (TK) educated group.
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This means that not only is formal education strongly associated with a participant's level of sharing the 
dominant group's knowledge, but that this association is even stronger in the TK-educated group. The 
majority (69%) learned TK while growing up, and a large majority (80%) had either a college degree or 
some years of college education, making this a highly educated cohort of participants with a plurality of 
worldviews.
Due to the function of the workshop (the focus on a northern Alaska-resident, expert cohort) it was 
expected that the group would be highly educated in both traditional and formal knowledge The results 
of the CCA showed via correlation between high levels of formal education and high CC scores, that the 
shared cultural domain is likely influenced by formal education. While there was no significance of 
association between TK education and CC scores, we cannot exclude that the two types of education 
(formal and TK) together formed the shared knowledge domain of the group. For example, because TK 
education was measured by a dichotomous Yes / No question, as opposed to a spectrum of levels as was 
the case with formal education, the question remains as to what extent varying degrees or levels of TK 
education may have shaped the shared domain of the group. A lack of negative correlation between TK 
education and CC scores indicates that the shared domain of the group is likely not antithetical to TK 
values.
Among respondents from the two boroughs, there seems to be consensus over important drivers of 
change. This result is reflected in the strong consensus and high competence scores of participants. The 
number of outliers in the group, in terms of CC scores, was quite small, and group-level CC scores 
correlated with formal education. These results indicate that this small, outlier subgroup is not from the 
same epistemic community as the majority of participants. For example, they may not have had access 
to the scientific information, or the tools to interpret them that is shared by the majority. In sum, the 
CCA results indicate that consensus on perceived risks to sustainability can be found in spite of diversity
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in a number of factors (age, gender, borough of residence, affiliation). An important factor in this 
group's common knowledge domain seemed to be a common epistemic background (i.e. participants 
have had similar access to science and TK), resulting in multiple ways of knowing that are shared.
Risk dimensions: impacts, control and change
Following the consensus analysis, each risk proposition was analyzed for respondent input along three 
risk dimensions: impact, control and change (Appendix 3C). For any risk proposition the informant found 
true, they were asked to rate its impact on sustainability, the extent to which they agree that it is being 
managed or controlled locally, and any change in intensity over the past two decades. This part of the 
study was not designed for consensus analysis, for two reasons: First, it was not expected that the two 
boroughs, situated in a vast and diverse land area, would perceive identical risk conditions and 
capacities to handle them in the region. Second, in this part of the study the differences between 
perceptions of the residents of these two boroughs, as opposed to similarities, is of greater interest. 
Which risks does each group perceive as having increased in the region, which ones are not manageable 
with local resources, and which ones exert greater impacts on sustainability?
Fig. 3.5 depicts these observation trends in both groups. Along the dimension of risk change, the NSB 
group either agrees or agrees strongly with all risk items having increased in recent years. The NWAB 
group rated two risk items as having stayed the same (ineffective decision making, and education issues: 
formal schooling), on the other hand they agreed with the NSB group that thawing permafrost increased 
greatly, as well as later fall freeze-up, and earlier spring breakup. The control dimension revealed that 
the NSB group is neutral on the local manageability of most risk items, except later fall freeze-up, 
education issues: traditional knowledge, and risks to culture; all of which they consider manageable. 
Conversely, the NWAB group disagrees with the local controllability of most items, except for education 
issues: formal schooling, and risks to culture.
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Fig. 3.5 Trends in three dimensions of risk propositions. Impacts, control, change as observed by participants by 
borough of residence. Responses were solicited by the following prompts using a 5-point Likert-type response: 
IMPACTS "Impacts from this risk on community sustainability are:" (high, moderate, low). CONTROL "Northern 
Alaska communities are currently managing or controlling this risk by adapting to, eliminating, lessening, avoiding 
it:" (agree, neutral, disagree). CHANGE "Over the past two decades this risk has:" (increased, stayed the same, 
decreased). The numbered risk propositions (abbreviated in this chart) refer to the list of risks in Table 3.3.
The NSB group found impacts from all risk items high or very high (except wildfires), with agreement 
from the NWAB group on all items (except wildfires, which the NWAB group did rate as high-impact). 
Three risk items found stronger agreement on impacts (very high) from the NSB group, compared with 
the NWAB group's high rating; these were ineffective decision making, industrial activities, and risks to 
culture.
Overall, it was the control dimension that indicated the greatest departure in trend between the two 
groups. The NSB group did not have strong opinions about a lack of ability to manage these risks. The 
NWAB group on the other hand indicated a lack of capacity to control or mitigate, or adapt to the
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impacts of most risks. This could convey a difference between the two boroughs in terms of available 
resources to address one risk and not the other.
3.3.3 Workshop poll: participant evaluations of workshop learning
Up to this point, reported findings have focused on the scalability of SES risk perceptions across two, 
same-level administrative units (boroughs in this case) that share a geographic region, rather than the 
scenario workshop process itself. This part of the study was designed to gauge the extent to which a 
diverse group of locals, each with a background in some aspect of community sustainability, but residing 
in separate boroughs, agree on risks that threaten community sustainability. A constraint that this study 
had to overcome was the fact that of the 26 participants who ultimately provided the data for the CCA 
survey, 12 took it before their first, and 14 before their second participation in a workshop. This 
sequence had the potential to introduce effects from workshop deliberation into the consensus model. 
The results, however, showed no correlation between new and return participants' cultural competence 
scores. A trial CCA run separately on these two groups (nfirst time = 12, nreturn= 14) confirmed no significant 
change in the consensus model when considered as separate cohorts. First to second eigenvalue ratios 
were 4.15 and 7.5 (respectively), suggesting a one-culture model, with no negative competence scores 
in the first group (M = 0.89 , SD = 0.14 ), and one negative competence score, and one very low score in 
the second group from the same participants as the original model (M = 0.73, SD = 0.38). In sum, results 
suggest that the cultural knowledge domain of risks and sustainability, and the consensus model 
provided by informant input come from a knowledge space that the participants formed prior to the 
workshops.
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Iterative cycles of reflection, joint exploration, diverse storylines and deliberation lead to social learning 
help to expand community-based adaptation repertoires" (Tschakert et al., 2014). This section presents 
the self-evaluations of participants before and after participation in their first workshop, to measure 
their perceptions of learning about sustainability issues. Six evaluative statements prompted input about 
perceptions of community resilience, the value of the boroughs working together, community goals, and 
risks that threaten those goals in each borough (Table 3.5). The goal was to check shifts that may occur 
in these views after the experience, especially with respect of one borough's familiarity with issues of 
the other borough. A total of 36 first-time participants filled out both the before- and after-workshop 
poll, providing dependent samples data to test for effects. As a first step the group as a whole was 
evaluated without distinction for place of residence. The before (t0) and after (t1) workshop scores from 
single proposition items were assessed with nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for significance. 
Two evaluative statements served as a proxy for community resilience, prompting participants to 
consider whether the region has the capacity to thrive in challenging economic and environmental 
times. The composite score calculated from the mean responses to these two questions comprised a 
"resilience score." A two-tailed t-test confirmed significance (significant at p < .05) between t0 and t1, as 
agreement with the resilience propositions increased significantly after participation. . Awareness of NSB 
goals and risks median scores changed significantly: goals scores went from neutral to agreement, while 
NSB risks stayed at agreement level, with significant shift occurring in IQR values, away from 
disagreement and toward strong agreement. The working together proposition (Table 3.5) started and 
ended at strong agreement with no significant change.
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Table 3.5 Evaluative statements. Results from before (t0) and after (t1) first participation
Proposition
N = 36
Level of agreement with propositions before (t0) and after (t1) 
first participation
Resilience
My community is prepared to face future economic and environmental challenges.
My community is prepared to prosper even in turbulent times.
Mean* (SD)
t0 3.11 (1.13)
t1 3.6 (0.90)
Sig. t (34) = 3.82 p = .0005
W orking together
Northern Alaska can benefit more from  the two boroughs working together, instead o f separately
Median* (IQR)
t0 5.0 (4.0 -  5.0)
t1 5.0 (4.0 -  5.0)
Sig. --
I am aware o f  Northwest Arctic Borough goals considered most important to the communities o f the
Northwest Arctic Borough Median* (IQR)
t0 4.0 (3.0 -  4.0)
t1 4.0 (3.0 -  4.0)
Sig. --
I am aware o f  Northwest Arctic Borough risks - challenges that m ay threaten these goals 
Median* (IQR)
t0 4.0 (3.0 -  5.0)
t1 4.0 (3.25 -  5.0)
Sig. --
I am aware o f  North Slope Borough goals considered most important to the communities o f the North Slope
Borough. Median* (IQR)
t0 3.0 (2.0 -  4.0)
t1 4.0 (4.0 -  5.0)
Sig. W = -89 p = .0001
I am aware o f  North Slope Borough risks - challenges that m ay threaten these goals
Median* (IQR)
t0 4.0 (2.0 -  4.75)
t1 4.0 (3.25 -  5.0)
Sig. W = 77.00 p = .0009
*Calculated on a scale where 5 = Very True, 4 = Somewhat True, 3 = Neutral, 2 = Somewhat Untrue, 1 = Untrue
These trends indicate that participants' view of their own awareness of community goals, risks to 
sustainability, and community resilience shows improvement following workshop deliberations 
(Hypothesis 2). Participants may have felt encouraged by their participation and synergies found with 
other viewpoints. While NWAB goals and risk awareness did not change, participants indicated a high- 
level baseline awareness in the beginning. This is unlike the NSB goals and risks propositions, which 
exhibit low scores (2.0 in both cases) at the 25th percentile mark before the workshop. In comparison, 
the 25th percentile of the after workshop scores (NSB goals = 4.0, NSB risk = 3.25) show great
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improvement.
In order to detect significant differences that may exist in the extent to which awareness of issues 
changed during the workshop, NWAB and NSB participants were separately evaluated (Fig 3.6). A 
separate calculation was done to create groups by location: workshop 1 (in Utqiagvik) versus workshops 
2 and 3 (Kotzebue and Anchorage), to check for differences in learning in different settings and with 
different workshop components. The numeric scale responses to propositions at t0 were deducted from 
each participant's response at t1. The resulting integer values, either positive or negative, denote the 
direction each participant's' self-evaluation shifted. The average (median value, denoted by a white X 
symbol) and variation (IQR, denoted by boxes) of these values were calculated per proposition. The
Fig. 3.6 Difference in levels of agreement. Propositions evaluated before (t0) and after (t1) first participation: The 
zero change level is denoted with red lines, and the X symbol indicates median change. The boxplots indicate the 
IQR (spread between the 25th and 75th percentile). The analysis shows between borough and between workshop 
results. Anchorage (our 3rd workshop in the series) data were combined with Kotzebue (2nd in the series) as only 3 
first-time participants were polled in Anchorage.
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resulting boxplots convey this movement in relation to the 0 (no change) mark. When the boxplot sits 
above the red line, it means the group exhibited a trend towards increased values (agreement with 
propositions) at t1.
While in Table 3.5 the median values conveyed a lack of a learning curve in propositions NWAB goals 
and risks, Figure 3.5 6 tells of a NSB subgroup who did report greater awareness after the workshop on 
these points (Hypothesis 2). These trends mirror the Utqiagvik group's trends. This suggests that the first 
workshop in the NSB was informative for participants on NWAB issues. We see a similar trend under 
NSB goals and NSB risks. It is the NWAB group who reports greater awareness along these lines, 
although we do see NSB participants themselves feeling increased awareness at t1. Working together 
remains virtually unchanged in all assessment, and reflects high agreement independent of workshop 
effects. Perceptions of resilience scores were impacted positively in all respondent groups.
3.4 DISCUSSION
Environmental risks are often incalculable (Beck, 1992; Burgman, 2005). Consequently, public discourse 
frequently focuses on the acceptability of the outcome and not the probability of occurrence. Risk 
management processes, therefore, are inherently political and need to incorporate scientific as well as 
cultural perspectives on risk. This study approached the culture of risk from a test case of consensus 
analysis of experts from two Alaska boroughs. It aimed to assess whether a diverse group of experts 
coming together to workshop about the region's future and sustainability, have a unifying concept of 
risk (to sustainable communities) that transcends differences in agendas and policy subsystems.
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The strong consensus found over risk concepts confirmed that although these boroughs operate in 
different parts of the Arctic and are based on different resources, contingents, pressure groups, and 
challenges, the overarching risks to sustainability are of a one-culture risk concept. The participants of 
this study were all experts in some area of community sustainability, and were educated both in the 
formal school system and in TK. Their diverse backgrounds ensure that the shared cultural domain is 
inclusive of diverse sustainability perspectives (e.g. subsistence, health, business development). The 
one-culture risk model that has resulted from CCA is representative of this demographic. In other words, 
the shared risk culture is likely scalable in the region, holding true for any mixed group of practitioners in 
education, subsistence, community health, criminal justice, government and the region's youth when 
considering their communities' sustainable futures (Hypothesis 1). This does not mean, however, that 
this group universally represents the collective perspective of all residents of northern Alaska. There 
may be multiple cultural domains about the meaning of community sustainability and the risks that 
threaten sustainability. When examining risk dimensions (Appendix 3C), it appears that NSB residents 
have a wider range of opinion on most local control issues than NWAB residents, based on the 
interquartile range of responses. On the other hand, NWAB residents feel much less control over 
resource development, environment and community health, than do NSB residents. This supports a 
picture of a heterogeneous region in terms of available resources that can be mobilized to respond to 
vulnerabilities (or level of control over risks), impacting how risks may be prioritized during decision 
making. Identifying vulnerabilities that are not shared (at least not to the same degree) between the 
two boroughs can help locate surplus resources (assets, networks, social capital) in one borough, to 
share with the other borough and increase its buffer capacity. As such, the significance of the particular 
cultural domain uncovered in this chapter lies in its potential to facilitate "horizontal networks" that
3.4.1 Consensus, risk perceptions and their significance in Arctic Alaska
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stimulate collective social learning, and increase adaptive capacity (Adger et al., 2005). In vulnerable SES 
impacted by climate change and disaster risks, adaptations including "self-mobilization in civil society 
and private corporations (...) and the promotion of strong local cohesion and mechanisms for collective 
action have all enhanced resilience" (Adger et al., 2005, p.1038). Agreement over sustainability issues, 
such as those that threaten sustainable futures, makes possible collective action. Without some 
common ground on what the issues are, it is unlikely that strong local cohesion and self-mobilization 
develops into actionable strategies.
The participants' model of the region's SES (Fig. 3.2 and Fig. 3.3) tells of mutually reinforcing feedbacks 
between social and environmental shifts, and ever-increasing complexities and changes. These 
feedbacks, and cascading effects can increase uncertainty, and decrease adaptive capacity (Adger et al., 
2005). Decision making under uncertainty demands the ability to anticipate, and prepare for, future risks 
and issues that may emerge (e.g. Stacey, 2007; Tschakert et al., 2014). When uncertainty is high and 
consensus is low; traditional risk management approaches do not work, and new, innovative solutions 
are needed (Cavana, 2010). The Stacey Matrix (Fig 3.7) is a good approximation of the general 
circumstances created at the crux of (un)certainty and consensus. Though its usability is limited by the 
necessary distortions that occur between abstract, stylized models of complex systems and their real-life 
evolution in the human sphere, it still is a helpful visual for the complexities of decision making. In the 
Stacey model, uncertainty tends to force decisions towards the "edge of chaos" where there is great 
uncertainty about outcomes, and no consensus on what to do. The less we speak in terms of uncertainty 
(ambiguity), the more we move toward risks management and rational decision making. Not all risks are 
calculable of course, but in the case of many risks, past precedent provides for calculus of likelihood of 
occurrence and potential magnitude of impacts. In the case of known outcomes, and consensus on how 
to handle them, Stacey considers deliberations rational decision making. Far from consensus but with
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Fig. 3.7 Stacey Matrix. Adapted from Stacey (2007).
some level of certainty about outcomes creates conditions for complex decision making. This is an area 
of decision making with relevance to our study. If northern Alaska stakeholders identify high uncertainty 
in the SES, but there are issues over which they may form agreement (consensus), they may remain 
within the complex decision making zone, and away from chaos (or little to no control over outcomes).
Fath and colleagues (2015) noted some of the key features needed to avoid chaos, and sudden SES 
collapse (see Chapter 2, Table 2.4). These key features include availability of specialists (experts in a 
diverse array of system components), diversity of knowledge forms, and knowledge of limits and 
thresholds in the system (Fath et al., 2015). Local experts who are familiar with various sustainability 
sectors are such specialists, with a diverse knowledge base who can help identify thresholds in the 
system that are indicative of vulnerabilities and potential crises. Based on the Stacey matrix (2007) and 
Fath's and colleagues' (2015) recommendations, the northern Alaska region can benefit from pooling 
resources to advocate for common goals. Finding the baseline for common goals, and the risks that
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threaten their success, can be achieved through participatory processes in planning and deliberation 
(Baber, 2004; Gutmann and Thompson, 2009; Lebel et al., 2010; Tschakert et al., 2014).
3.4.2 Workshops, deliberation and learning
While the main research focus of this dissertation is on the sustainability and risk perceptions of NSB 
and NWAB resident experts, the participatory scenarios workshop setting, in which the data was 
collected, comes into focus briefly in this discussion. The series of workshops provided a highly 
participatory and deliberative environment for the participants. It was beyond the scope of this research 
to evaluate the consensus-building potential of participatory scenarios workshops. However, the 
workshop's potential to increase individual participant awareness of sustainability issues was assessed.
The results from workshop learning (section 3.3.3) indicate that deliberation can increase understanding 
and awareness of issues among stakeholders. Participants' awareness of their neighboring borough's 
sustainability goals and risks increased (Fig. 3.6). In the case of the NSB group, participant awareness of 
these issues in their own borough increased as well.
These learning shifts speak to the role of process in collaboration, in particular the importance of 
participation and the plurality of knowledge included in deliberation. By extension, collaboration and 
deliberation may increase consensus as well: Underlying the concept of deliberation is the cooperative 
search for agreement. Deliberation can change opinions as participants gain knowledge (Muhlberger 
and Weber, 2006; Tschakert et al., 2014). Policy subsystems benefit from deliberation as the outcomes 
produced by deliberation are more likely to be the least unsatisfactory ones, albeit not always the most 
just or perfect (Gutmann and Thompson, 2009). Deliberation and the inclusion of a plurality of 
knowledge forms has become a staple topic in climate change and adaptation inquiry (e.g.Brunner and
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Lynch, 2013; Haley et al., 2011; Tompkins and Adger, 2004) Participatory vulnerability and adaptation 
assessments are an example of the acknowledged role of legitimacy, agency, and coproduction of 
nonscientific inquiry in making decisions under uncertainty (Tschakert et al., 2014).
3.4.3 A note on scenarios and their potential in decision making under uncertainty
Up to this point, the scenarios-building component of the NASP workshops has only been mentioned in 
passing in this chapter. This brief discussion is intended to bring into focus ways in which participatory 
scenarios exercises may fill the void that exists at the "edge of chaos" (Stacey, 2007), by providing a 
decision making platform that can operate under uncertainty, and plurality of opinions. Scenarios 
enhance deliberations by bringing together a diverse set of stakeholders who share information with 
one another and deliberate on shared values, and possible indicators by which future decision points 
can be gauged. Scenarios can help groups at various levels develop robust strategies for the future, as 
the process can be an effective learning tool (Lindgren and Bandhold, 2009). At a time when multiple 
stresses from environmental change and human development create a complex environment for 
decision-making, a lack of consensus about what to do, and high levels of uncertainty about the future, 
scenarios may enable subsystems to explore risks and sensitivities (Lindgren and Bandhold, 2009). By 
stimulating thinking about (1) possible future outcomes, (2) their consequences, and (3) the repertoire 
of possible responses (without said situation having occurred), the process enables strategic thinking in 
anticipation of emerging problems.
Scenarios can reveal where the uncertainty lies within models (Walker et al., 2006). Scenarios planning 
can compensate for common decision-making mistakes, such as over- and underestimating changes and 
their consequences, pushing planning towards a middle ground by shifting focus away from what is
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most likely to occur, towards what the consequences and appropriate responses may be of various 
circumstances (Duinker and Greig, 2007). These types of benefits of scenarios planning have great 
relevance for decision makers in rapidly changing SES.
3.5 CONCLUSION
Global sustainability targets in times of extreme events from climate change, growing energy demands, 
water and food insecurity, and biodiversity loss demand multi-scalar collaboration. Resource 
development goals, however, often create high-stakes, low-consensus policy processes. Because 
knowledge is held and perceived differently at different levels, there is a political economy unique to the 
multi-stakeholder risk (cost/benefit) calculus in sustainable development, climate change adaptation 
and disaster resilience. Areas of consensus in sustainability and risk perceptions that scale across 
administrative jurisdictions, and diverse SES, are important components of collaborative planning, and 
capacity-building. The changing perceptions of workshop participants on their levels of issue- and risk- 
awareness before and after deliberations, suggest that investments made in optimizing collaborative, 
participatory processes, have payoff in learning. By increasing collective learning via deliberations, 
indeed we may better facilitate strategic futures thinking. Risk issues, that scale horizontally between 
same-level (e.g. borough) systems, can provide context for large-scale participatory learning and pooling 
of resources. These can act as buffers in the SES against emerging risks, and increase the capacity of 
social systems to respond, to take action. When lower jurisdictional level-systems (e.g. boroughs) 
engage in such collaboration, they increase their potential to (1) manage the SES toward mutually 
desirable futures, and (2) increase their political capacity to engage with dominant, higher level 
jurisdictions (e.g. state and federal governing bodies) and advocate for, or deliberate over, salient local 
issues. Ultimately, this may pave the way for the formation, and movement of, collective risk
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perceptions across and within scales and levels of governance, and enhance the plurality of knowledge
that is fundamental for managing SES for resilience.
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3.7 APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 3A
Codebook
Table 3A-1 Textual analysis of top 5 risks. Open-ended question results
N = 47 
Code
Groundedness
(frequency)
Density 
(links with 
other codes)
Interaction 
(which other codes linked with)
DECISION-MAKING 42
G e n e ra l, u n sp e c ifie d 1 1 fo o d  se c u r ity
R isk  m a n a g e m e n t 6 1 a d a p ta b ility
E x c lu s io n  o f  lo ca ls
6 2
in d u str ia l a ctiv ity , 
a llo c a t io n  o f  p u b lic  fu n d s
A llo c a tio n  o f  p u b lic  fu n d s
5 2
e x c lu s io n  o f  lo ca ls, 
c o s t  o f  liv in g
T rib a l s o v e re ig n ty  -re g u la tio n s
1 4
s u b s ta n c e  a b u se , 
s u b s is te n c e  re so u rc e s : a v a ila b ility , 
fo o d  s e cu r ity , 
la nd  m a n a g e m e n t
S u b s is te n c e  re g u la tio n s
3 3
s u b s is te n c e  re s o u rc e s : a v a ila b ility , 
fo o d  s e cu r ity , 
la nd  m a n a g e m e n t
La n d  m a n a g e m e n t
2 1
trib a l s o v e re ig n ty , 
s u b s is te n c e  re g u la tio n s
D iv id e d  lo ca l in te re sts  an d  le a d e rsh ip
12 2
c ro s s -c u ltu ra l issu e s, 
c o n flic t
C ro s s -c u ltu ra l issu e s
6 3
ca sh  e c o n o m y , 
d iv id e d  lo ca l in te re sts , 
c o n flic t
SUBSISTENCE RESOURCES: AVAILABILITY 6
G e n e ra l (u n s p e c if ie d )
5 7
c lim a te  c h a n g e ,  
in d u str ia l a ct iv it ie s ,  
co s t  o f  liv in g, 
fo o d  s e cu r ity , 
s u b s is te n c e  re g u la tio n s , 
trib a l s o v e re ig n ty , 
t ra n sm iss io n  o f  T K
M o b ility , a c c e s s  to
1 2
e ro sio n  & p e rm a fro s t  th a w ,  
se a  & r iv e r ice  c h a n g e s
FOOD SECURITY 5
G e n e ra l, u n sp e c ifie d
5 4
trib a l s o v e re ig n ty , 
s u b s is te n c e  re g u la tio n s , 
s u b s is te n c e  re s o u rc e s : a v a ila b ility , 
c o s t  o f  liv in g
ENVIRONM ENTAL CHANGE 16
G e n e ra l, u n sp e c ifie d 3 0
C lim a te  c h a n g e
10 3
sea & r iv er ic e  c h a n g e s,  
e ro sio n  & p e rm a fro s t  th a w ,  
su b s is te n c e  re so u rc e s : a v a ila b ility
E ro sio n  a n d  p e rm a fro st  th a w
(w ith o u t  e x p lic it  re fe re n c e  to  c lim a te  c h a n g e )
2 3
c lim a te  c h a n g e ,  
m o b ility  & a c c e s s  to  s u b s is te n c e  
r e s o u rc e s : a v a ila b ility , 
in fra s tru c tu re  & h o u s in g
S e a  a n d  r iv e r ic e  c h a n g e s
1 4
c lim a te  c h a n g e ,  
m a rin e  tra ffic ,  
m o b ility  & a c c e s s  to  s u b s is te n c e  
re so u rc e s : a v a ila b ility
INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITIES 11
G e n e ra l, u n sp e c ifie d
5 2
e x c lu s io n  o f  lo ca ls, 
s u b s is te n c e  re so u rc e s : a v a ila b ility
In d u stria l a c c e s s  ro a d s 1 1 s u b s is te n c e  re so u rc e s : a v a ila b ility
In d u stria l a c c id e n ts , p o llu t io n 3 1 h e a lth  & h e a lth  ca re
In c re a se d  m a rin e  tra n s p o rt , tra ffic 1 2 se a  & r iv er ice  c h a n g e s
Oil sp ill 1 3 h e a lth  & h e a lth  ca re ,
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fo rm a l & v o c a tio n a l t ra in in g ,  
in fra s tru c tu re  & h o u s in g
H E A L T H  A N D  H E A L T H  C A R E  S Y S T E M 23
G e n e ra l, u n sp e c ifie d
5
2 a c c id e n ts  /  p o llu t io n , 
o il sp ills
S u ic id e  rates
2 2
a c c e ss  to  h e a lth  s e rv ice s , 
s u b s ta n c e  a b u se , 
cu ltu ra l ch a n g e s
S u b s ta n c e  a b u s e  an d  re la te d  so c ia l 
c h a lle n g e s
10 5
a c c e ss  to  h e a lth  s e rv ice s , 
trib a l s o v e re ig n ty , 
cu ltu ra l ch a n g e ,  
p o v e rty , 
c o n flic t
A c c e ss  to  q u a lity  h e a lth  se rv ic e s
6 3
su ic id e  & m e n ta l h e a lth , 
s u b s ta n c e  a b u se , 
c o n flic t
E D U C A T IO N 12
G e n e ra l, u n sp e c ifie d 7 0
T ra n s m is s io n  o f  t ra d it io n a l k n o w le d g e
1
a d a p ta b ility , 
s u b s is te n c e  re so u rc e s : a v a ila b ility
F o rm a l e d u ca tio n , v o c a tio n a l tra in in g : 
a v a ila b ility , q u a lity
4 2
o u tm ig ra t io n ,  
oil sp ill (a b ility  to  re sp o n d )
C U L T U R A L  C H A N G E S
12
E ro sio n  o f  la n g u a g e  an d  tra d it io n s
12 5
o u tm ig ra t io n ,  
ca sh  e c o n o m y , 
c o n flic t , 
s u b s ta n c e  a b u se , 
su ic id e  an d  m e n ta l he a lth
C A S H  E C O N O M Y 13
G e n e ra l, u n sp e c ifie d
1 1
c ro s s -c u ltu ra l issu e s , 
cu ltu ra l ch a n g e ,  
c o s t  o f  liv in g
W a g e  jo b s
-a v a ila b ility  fo r  lo ca l w o rk fo rc e
6 1
o u tm ig ra tio n
S in g le -re s o u rc e  e c o n o m y 3 1 c o s t  o f  liv in g
P o v e rty 3 1 s u b s ta n c e  a b u se
C O S T  O F  L IV IN G 17
G e n e ra l, u n sp e c ifie d
8 5
a llo c a t io n  o f  p u b lic  fu n d s , 
s in g le -re s o u rc e  e c o n o m y , 
s u b s is te n c e  re so u rc e s : a v a ila b ility , 
fo o d  s e cu r ity , 
c a sh  e c o n o m y
T ra n sp o rta t io n 3 0
E n e rg y  an d  fue l 4 0
In fra stru c tu re , h o u s in g  
- c o s t ,  q u a lity  an d  a v a ila b ility
2 2
e ro sio n  & p e rm a fro s t  th a w , 
oil sp ill (a b ility  to  re sp o n d )
O U T M IG R A T IO N 5
O u tm ig ra tio n
5 3
cu ltu ra l ch a n g e ,  
w a g e  jo b s, 
fo rm a l e d u c a tio n  & tra in in g
C O N F L IC T
3
C o n flic t  (p o lit ic a l c o n flic t  & c r im e  /  v io le n c e )
3 5
d iv id e d  lo ca l in te re sts , 
c u ltu ra l c h a n g e s, 
c ro s s -c u ltu ra l issu e s, 
s u b s ta n c e  a b u se ,  
a c c e ss  to  h e a lth  ca re
A D A P T A B IL IT Y 2
A d a p ta b ility  (a d a p tin g  to  c h a n g e )
2 2
risk  m a n a g e m e n t,  
t ra n sm iss io n  o f  T K
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Appendix 3B
Cultural Consensus Analysis data
Table 3B-1 Whole-group CC scores Table 3B-2 CC scores by borough
Participant CC score NWAB NSB
C C  sc o re s C C  s co re s
1 0.999
0.999 0.999
2 0.999
0.999 0.746
3 0.727
0.727 0.873
4 0.999
0.999 0.584
5 0.999
0.999 0.999
6 0.746
0.722 0.999
7 0.999
0.999 -0.104
8 0.722
0.999 0.999
9 0.873
0.999 0.301
10 0.999
0.999 0.999
11 0.999
0.853 0.701
12 0.584
0.999 0.09
13 0.999
0.733 Avg. 0.68
14 0.999
0.693
15 0.853
Avg. 0.91
16 0.999
17 0.999
18 0.999
19 0.733
20 -0.104
21 0.999
22 0.301
23 0.999
24 0.693
25 0.701
26 0.09
Avg. 0.80
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APPENDIX 3C
Risk survey results
Table 3C-1 Land Cover Changes as risks. Results: North Slope and Northwest Arctic Borough Experts and Opinion Leaders (number of replies & median values)*
N(NSB)=12
N(NWAB)=16
RISK 
"This is a risk"
True False
IMPACT 
"Im pacts from this risk are:"
High Moderate Low
CONTROL 
"NS comm unities are currently 
managing this risk"
Agree Neither Disagree
CHANGE
"Over the past two decades this risk 
has:"
Increased Stayed Decreased
LCC #1 Less snow in winter
NSB participants 10 1 8 2 0 4 3 3 9 0 0
**Median (IQR) -- -- 4(3.75-5) 3 (2-4) 5(4-5)
NWAB participants 14 0 11 4 0 2 5 8 15 0 0
**Median (IQR) -- -- 4 (3-4) 2.5 (2-3) 4(4-5)
LCC #2 Shallow  river and lake waters
NSB participants 10 2 6 4 0 2 6 3 8 1 0
**Median (IQR) -- -- 4(3-5) 3 (2-3.25) 4(4-5)
NWAB participants 14 0 11 3 0 2 3 9 13 1 0
**Median (IQR) -- -- 4(3.75-4) 2(1.75-3) 4 (4-4.25)
LCC #3 High river w ater events are less common
NSB participants 6 4 1 5 1 3 1 3 5 2 0
**Median (IQR) -- -- 3(3-3) 3 (2-4) 4(3-5)
NWAB participants 8 3 5 3 1 0 5 4 6 3 0
**Median (IQR) -- -- 4 (3-4) 3(2-3) 4 (3-4)
LCC #4 Melting perm afrost increases erosion and drying
NSB participants 11 1
**Median (IQR) -- --
NWAB participants 14 0
**Median (IQR) -- --
10
15
1
5(4-5) 
0
5(4-5)
3
3 (2-4) 
0
2(1-4)
5
11
10
14
0
5(4-5) 
1
5(4-5)
LCC #5 More wildfires
NSB participants 7 3 2 5 0 3 3 1 5 1 1
**Median (IQR) -- -- 3(3-5) 3 (3-4) 4(3-5)
NWAB participants 13 1 8 5 1 4 1 9 11 3 0
**Median (IQR) -- -- 4 (3-4) 2 (2-4) 4 (3.75-4.25)
LCC #6 Vegetation change
NSB participants 9 3 5 4 0 4 5 0 6 2 0
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**Median (IQR) -- -- 4(3-5) 3 (3-4) 4(3-5)
NWAB participants 12 1 8 5 0 3 3 7 12 1 0
**Median (IQR) -- -- 4 (3-4) 2(2-3.75) 4(4-4.75)
LCC #7 Later fall freeze-up; new freeze-thaw cycle
NSB participants 12 0 9 3 0 7 2 3 8 3 0
**Median (IQR) -- -- 5 (3.25-5) 4 (2.25-4) 4.5 (3.25-5)
NWAB participants 12 2 10 4 0 3 4 7 13 0 1
**Median (IQR) -- -- 4(3-5) 2(1-3.5) 5(4-5)
LCC #8 Earlier spring breakup; ice now melts in place
NSB participants 11 1 9 1 1 5 3 3 9 1 0
**Median (IQR) -- -- 5(4-5) 3 (2-4) 4.5 (4-5)
NWAB participants 14 0 11 3 0 2 4 8 14 0 0
**Median (IQR) -- -- 4 (3.75-4.25) 2(1-3) 5(4-5)
Respondents choosing "False" --as in the item is not a risk— did not answer impact, control and change questions. 
Table only shows agreement / disagreement and mid-point values:
High = High + Very High;
Low = Low + Very Low;
Agree = Agree + Strongly Agree;
Disagree = Disagree + Strongly Disagree;
Increased = Increased + Greatly Increased;
Decreased = Decreased + Greatly Decreased.
Calculated on a 5-point scale where:
Very High = 5 Strongly Agree =5 Greatly Increased = 5
High = 4 Agree =4 Increased = 4
Moderate = 3 Neither Agree nor Disagree Stayed the Same = 3
Low = 2 =3 Decreased = 2
Very Low = 1 Disagree = 2 Greatly Decreased = 1
Strongly Disagree = 1
List of land cover changes were drawn from the work of Carothers et al. (2014)
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Table 3C-2 Socioeonomic risks to sustainability. Results: North Slope and Northwest Arctic Borough Experts and Opinion Leaders (number of replies & median
values)*
N(NSB)=12
N(NWAB)=16
RISK 
"This is a risk"
True False
IMPACT 
"Im pacts from this risk are:
High Moderate Low
CONTROL 
"NS com m unities are currently 
managing this risk"
Agree Neither Disagree
CHANGE 
"O ver the past tw o decades this 
risk has:"
DecreaseIncreased Stayed d
Risk #1 Com m unity health and health services problems
NSB participants 9 3
**Median (IQR) -- --
NWAB participants 13 1
^M edian  (IQR)
9 0
5(4.5-5) 
3
5(4-5)
11
4 1 4
3 (1.5-4.5)
4 2 8
2(1-4)
7 1 0
5 (4.25-5)
9 3 1
4(3-5)
Risk #2 Environmental problems
NSB participants 11 1
**Median (IQR) -- --
NWAB participants 14 0
**Median (IQR) -- --
10
14
1
5(4-5) 
1
5(4-5)
4 2 5
3(2-4)
0 4 10
2 (1.5-2.5)
10
14
0
5(4.75-5) 
0
4(4-5)
Risk #3 Problems with education from issues in the school system
NSB participants 9 3 8 1 0 4 3 2 5 3 0
**Median (IQR) -- -- 4(4-5) 3(2-5) 4(3-5)
NWAB participants 14 0 11 4 1 8 0 6 5 8 0
**Median (IQR) -- -- 4(3-5) 4(2-4) 3 (3-4)
Risk #4 Challenges to the transmission of traditional knowledge
NSB participants 11 1 9 1 1
**Median (IQR) -- -- 4 (4-5)
NWAB participants 14 0 10 4 2
**Median (IQR) -- -- 4 (3-4)
4
4(3-5)
4
3.5 (2.75-4)
3
5(3-5) 
6
4 (3-4)
Risk #5 Problems with effective decision-m aking
NSB participants 10 2
**Median (IQR) -- --
NWAB participants 13 1
**Median (IQR) -- --
8 2
5(3.75-5) 
4
4(3-4)
11
4 2 
3 (2.75-4.25)
5 5 
3(2-3.5)
2
5(3.5-5) 
8
3 (3-4)
Risk #6 Problems with issues with industrial and resource development
NSB participants 8 3
^M edian  (IQR)
7 1
5 (4.25-5)
0
3(1-4)
1
5(4-5)
0
0
0 4 7 0
0 5 5 1
0 4 4 6 0
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Respondents choosing "False" --as in the item is not a risk— did not answer impact, control and change questions. 
Table only shows agreement / disagreement and mid-point values:
High = High + Very High;
Low = Low + Very Low;
Agree = Agree + Strongly Agree;
Disagree = Disagree + Strongly Disagree; 
Increased = Increased + Greatly Increased; 
Decreased = Decreased + Greatly Decreased. 
Calculated on a 5-point scale where:
Very High = 5 
High = 4 
Moderate = 3 
Low = 2 
Very Low = 1
Strongly Agree =5 
Agree =4
Neither Agree nor Disagree =3 
Disagree = 2 
Strongly Disagree = 1
Greatly Increased = 5 
Increased = 4 
Stayed the Same = 3 
Decreased = 2 
Greatly Decreased = 1
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CHAPTER 4: CO M PARIN G  VERTICA L SCALES OF RISK PERCEPTION S AM ON G NORTH SLOPE TR IBA L 
LEADERS AND ALASKA STATE AND US FEDERAL EXPERTS1
Abstract: This study explores the vertical scalability of risk perspectives between North Slope (Alaska) 
Inupiat tribal leaders and state and federal employees charged with monitoring, researching, and or 
managing the region's resources, but who do not reside in the region. Participants were asked a series of 
questions about North Slope land cover changes and risks to North Slope community sustainability, as well 
as perspectives on the complexity of North Slope social and environmental systems. Five of the eight 
North Slope village tribal councils, totaling 29 participants, and 32 state and federal employees 
participated in our survey. Likert-type question items were analyzed using descriptive and inferential 
statistics, and exploratory factor analysis. Risk items were mapped in a heat map based on three risk 
dimensions (impact, control, change), while open-ended questions were analyzed thematically using 
qualitative content analysis. Results show that while risk impacts are assessed similarly between the two 
groups, there are important differences in how risks are prioritized, conceptualized, and perceived to 
interact with community resilience.
Keywords: adaptive capacity, risk perception, social-ecological systems, resilience, North Slope, Alaska, 
Inupiaq villages
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Community sustainability in Arctic Alaska has been at the center of research efforts for over two decades 
(e.g. Berman et al., 2004; Kruse et al., 2004; Larsen et al., 2010). Studies have been motivated by rapid 
changes resulting from biophysical (e.g. land cover, sea ice quality and extent, hydrological regime,
1 Blair, B. Comparing scales of risk perceptions among North Slope tribal leaders and Alaska State and US Federal experts. 
Prepared for submission in Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment.
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seasonality), and socioeconomic (e.g. demographic, economic, health, development infrastructure) drivers 
(Andrew, 2014). These rapid changes increasingly stress North Slope social systems, including subsistence 
activities (Eicken, 2010; Lynch and Brunner, 2007; Oswald et al., 2014). Ecosystems have, in the past, 
adapted to large changes in climate, however, the predicted rate of change that is set to occur in the 
coming century is as much as 50 times faster than the warming from the previous ice age (Dessler, 2015). 
Because the warming trend is expected to continue, increased attention has been paid to adaptive 
capacity and the social limits of adaptation to climate change impacts—such as the decision-making 
processes that underpin adaptation (Adger et al., 2009; Arctic_Council, 2016; Berman et al., 2004).
Many North Slope (NS), Alaska communities are concurrently affected by rapid climate change and rapid 
industrial development (Raynolds et al., 2014; Walker et al., 1987). The cumulative impacts from rapid 
changes and local control over decisions and outcomes are at the crosshairs of local entities advocating a 
strong role in governance of resources and Inupiat ways of life. As noted by the Alaska Native Science 
Commission's response to the Bureau of Land Management's Social Science Plan for the National 
Petroleum Reserve-Alaska (NPR-A):
"Community discourse, cohesion, consensus building, and decision making should be studied to 
better understand internal practices and their relationship to the practices and timelines of 
external agencies. (...) Individual and community sense of control over events and activities that 
affect them should be evaluated (...) such an evaluation should examine perceptions as well as 
records of past decisions" (ANSC, 2009, p.21).
This study brings prominence to the North Slope village tribal perspective on rapid changes, risks, and 
control in a comparison with the perspective of external agencies. Tribal perspectives on risks and 
sustainability are important, because tribes are influential entities with an indigenous view of life and 
ancestral ties to the lands. This perspective is sometimes lost when combined with other perspectives.
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The goal of this analysis is to examine how NS tribal leaders perceive risks to community sustainability, 
what factors are most prominent in forming these perceptions, and how these points compare to those of 
U.S. federal and State of Alaska experts.
A community-level survey was administered to interview NS village tribal council members and state and 
federal employees who monitor, research, or manage or NS resources, but do not reside in the region. The 
interview posed questions about land cover changes, as well as socioeconomic issues to evaluate each as a 
potential risk to sustainability. Further questions probed the perceived complexity and rate of changes of 
local social-ecological systems (SES), and overall community resilience. To provide context for sustainable 
communities, the study also re-evaluated a set of sustainability elements defined twenty years ago among 
Arctic Alaska communities, to see whether these still proved significant today (Kruse et al., 2004). This 
work examines several hypotheses:
H1: A pattern can be identified in perceptions of uncertainty that is distinct to each group.
H2: A pattern can be identified in perceptions of risks that is distinct to each group.
H3: Elements of sustainability relevant two decades ago are still important today.
H4: Perceptions of risks and uncertainty correlate with community resilience2 in both subject 
groups.
4.2. STATE OF KNOWLEDGE AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
4.2.1 Risks and vulnerabilities
Uncertainty, risk, vulnerability and resilience have synergistic relationships (Chapin III et al., 2009). 
Uncertainties may arise from imperfect knowledge or the inherent variability of complex systems. The
2 See this chapter's working definition for resilience in section 4.2.1
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extent of uncertainty, or the level of uncertainty can vary from statistically describable, to so-called 
recognized ignorance—uncertainty surrounding the functional relationships under study (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1982; Walker et al., 2003). The difference between uncertainty and risk is that while risk can, in 
some contexts, be quantified statistically based on past precedent, uncertainty is not easily quantifiable 
(Gooch, 2007). For example, statistics on seatbelt use and associated reduction in transportation fatalities 
over time, facilitate rational decision making (low uncertainty and high agreement) on whether or not to 
enact mandatory use laws. Risks are, in some contexts, considered a measurable uncertainty (Knight, 
2012), although this perspective is not universally shared (Samson et al., 2009). Vulnerability is the degree 
of likely harm a system is to experience due to the system's exposure to the harm and its sensitivity to 
specific stresses or hazards (e.g. Turner et al., 2003). Resilience is the capacity of a system to adapt to 
change without transforming the internal feedbacks and relationships of the system. Resilience is tied with 
adaptive capacity and the system's threshold of adaptability (e.g Chapin III et al., 2009; Walker et al.,
2004). Social-ecological systems often demonstrate cycles of change, called the adaptive cycle 
(Gunderson and Holling, 2002) including process of navigating change in the availability of resources, and 
evolving components and their relationships (Holling, 1986). The resources needed by humans to navigate 
the adaptive cycle and limit unwanted changes or risks, compete, and often conflict, at different levels of 
social systems (Adger, 2000; Armitage, 2005).
In this study I focus on social resilience, defined as the ability of social systems to cope with stresses as a 
result of social, political and environmental change (Adger, 2000, p.347). However, while resilience can be 
a unifying concept in uncertain times by allowing the assessment of multiple risks and their SES impacts, it 
is critical to also consider systemic vulnerabilities (i.e. poverty, skewed development) to avoid the traps of 
rigid social pathologies (Mitchell and Harris, 2012). Approaches to reducing vulnerability include: (1) 
mitigation by reducing exposure to stressors; (2) sustaining natural capital and well-being in order to 
reduce sensitivities; and (3) increasing adaptive capacity (Turner et al., 2003).
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Risks are perceived differently by people depending on a variety of human factors such as epistemic and 
cultural backgrounds and moral values, as well as circumstantial factors such as novelty (unfamiliar risk) 
and voluntariness (self-imposed exposure—such as smoking—or not) (Fischhoff et al., 1978). Risk 
perception, in essence, is formed from individual and group-level biases that drives emergent risk 
attitudes, behaviors and coping strategies under changing socioeconomic and environmental conditions 
(Dake, 1991; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Kahan, 2012; Slovic, 1995; Slovic, 1992; Wildavsky and Dake, 
1990). Decisions, on the other hand, are based on which risks rise to the forefront of public interest, and 
which ones are ignored (Fischhoff et al., 1978; Kasperson et al., 1988; Sjoberg, 2000). In other words, the 
processes by which risk priorities are set at all levels, be they individual, group, or policy level, hold great 
relevance for responding to risks (i.e. risk management), and therefore for SES resilience.
A helpful visual for understanding the role of risk perception in the adaptive capacity of SES, is the risk 
triangle (Crichton, 1999). In this model risk is depicted as the intersection of vulnerability, exposure and 
hazard—in other words, the sensitivity to, and contact with, stressors (Fig. 4.1). In this adaptation, 
vulnerability is depicted in greater detail than in the original risk triangle, as the intersection of exposure 
and sensitivity to hazards (or potential impacts from stressors), and adaptive capacity (ability to cope), as 
consistent with the climate change adaptation, and vulnerability assessment frameworks (e.g. Parry, 
2007).
Whatever strategy is used to manage risks—be it mitigation, avoidance, or adaptation—people must first 
have awareness of their potential vulnerabilities, including their exposure, sensitivities to hazards, and 
adaptive capacity limitations. Perception is a fundamental component of risk awareness, and therefore of 
risk management, and by extension, of the adaptive capacity of SES.
4.2.2 The links between risk perception and adaptive capacity
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Fig. 4.1 The risk triangle. Adapted from Crichton (1999), with vulnerability depicted in relation to adaptive capacity, 
exposure and sensitivity.
The uncertainties surrounding many risks, be they uncertainty about the probability of occurrence or the 
magnitude and acceptability of outcome, make risk management a complex endeavor (Beck, 1992). When 
conventional management systems cannot handle complex issues within the realm of rational decision- 
making—where outcomes are known and there is consensus on how to handle them—new, innovative 
approaches are needed to explore risks and sensitivities (Cardona et al., 2012; Vis et al., 2003). An 
important aspect of managing for SES resilience is the inclusion of a plurality of perspectives and 
knowledge forms in decisions (Berkes et al., 1998; Cash et al., 2006; Fath et al., 2015). Resilience-based 
risk management approaches, such as adaptive co-management for social-ecological complexity (Armitage 
et al., 2008), emphasize the importance of adaptation and collaboration at each phase of the knowledge 
pipeline as an effective strategy to manage uncertainty, build trust and promote institutional development 
and social learning (Argyris, 2004; Armitage et al., 2008; Tschakert et al., 2014).
This chapter examines perceptions of risks to NS community sustainability, among NS indigenous tribal 
leaders, and state and federal resource experts, in order to evaluate the extent these groups share an 
understanding of some of the region's pressing sustainability issues. Such inquiry is important because 
reducing vulnerability demands the reduction of exposure to stressors; the sustaining of natural capital
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and well-being, and increasing adaptive capacity3 (Turner et al., 2003). Perspectives on exposure, 
vulnerabilities, and well-being in the SES become relevant in decision making processes. Significant 
differences in perspectives decrease cross-scale collaboration, which in turn decreases the capital (or 
resources) required to respond and to take action in the SES against emerging risks (Fath et al., 2015). Fig.
4.2 depicts the links between exposure to complex changes in the SES, risk perceptions and adaptive 
capacity.
Fig. 4.2 Perceived social-ecological system changes, complexity, and risks. Diagram shows links with community 
adaptive capacity and resilience.
4.3 STUDY AREA AND PARTICIPANTS
Alaska's North Slope Borough (NSB) covers a vast land area at nearly 90 thousand square miles 
(approximately 233 thousand square kilometers). It is home to eight villages whose population is 
predominately Inupiat (Fig. 4.3). The NSB receives tax revenue from oil and gas properties, and depends on 
these cash resources for providing basic services and maintaining village infrastructure. As well, much of
; Turner (2003) referred to adaptive capacity as being synonymous with resilience
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the employment in villages is derived from NSB revenue sources (Kofinas et al., 2016). Subsistence 
hunting, fishing and gathering are important activities to NSB residents, as processes by which they draw 
resources from the environment and maintain their culture and wellbeing (Haley and Magdanz, 2008). 
Subsistence species (terrestrial and marine plants and animals) vary by location.
The political status of Alaska Natives and scope of tribal powers are influential factors in determining 
interaction between local, regional and global entities. Numerous legal and legislative initiatives establish 
tribal status. The 1934 Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) established federal recognition of Alaska Native 
villages as tribal entities, and as a result, each NS village has an elected tribal council. An especially 
important milestone was the 1994 Tribal List Act, which gave Congressional recognition of 229 tribes in 
Alaska and eligibility for federal aid (Bodin et al., 2016), however, scope of tribal powers remains an 
evolving issue (Case and Voluck, 2012). Tribes possess the powers of self-government with some
Fig. 4.3 Study area location: Villages of North Slope Borough, Alaska
limitations as superseded by acts of Congress. An elected tribal council has the authority to represent the 
tribe in negotiations with federal, state, and local governments (Case and Voluck, 2012). The Inupiat
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Community of the Arctic Slope is the regional IRA tribal entity representing NS villages, while the Alaska 
Federation of Natives is a prominent, statewide tribal organization of all Alaska Native villages.
Economically, most Alaska Native villages are dependent on federal funds, and uniform federal contracts 
applied across regions via corporations set up via the 1972 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA). 
The ANCSA village and regional corporations perform a wide variety of services, from delivering important 
community services in health, and education, to managing natural resources and generating revenue for 
their shareholders. Alaska Native tribes do not recognize ANCSA corporations as tribal government. 
However, the federal government, in its legal and political definitions of for-profit corporations, recognizes 
them as "tribes," and "governing bodies" for certain purposes (Case and Voluck, 2012, p.336).
As a result, community involvement in decision-making occurs through many organizations and at multiple 
levels, in a conglomeration of village-to-borough-level governing structures, including native corporations, 
tribal governments, city governments, and other groups (e.g. subsistence advisory councils) representing 
specific interests. There is often a political fragmentation of interests with stakeholders representing 
multiple, at times conflicting, interests. For example, individuals may have a stake in, and act on behalf of, 
multiple political and economic entities (borough government, tribal government, Native corporations).
This study is focused on the tribal government perspectives of NS villages through focus on elected tribal 
council members. In an effort to compare the sustainability perspectives of formal governing bodies in the 
political hierarchy, perspectives within the local, traditional, indigenous government are compared with 
state and federal agency managers. As such, the results reflect the risk perceptions of NS tribal council 
members, which may be similar to, or different from, board members of ANCSA corporations. Since tribal 
council members in some cases sit on the board of directors of ANCSA corporations, and municipal or 
borough-level government councils, their views may incorporate the diversity of knowledge, opinions and 
perceptions that impact decision making. Choosing tribal councils as the unit of analysis to gauge local
125
perspectives frames this research in recognition of the prominence of Indigenous Knowledge (IK), self­
government, and elected representatives.
Five of the eight village tribal councils agreed to participate in this study. In observance of the wishes of 
some of these councils, the village-level results are not reported, with each council represented with a 
randomly assigned alphabetical letter as code. The tribal council cohort is referred to as "council group" 
throughout this study.
Thirty-two state and federal employees, who are experts in NS resources, but reside outside the region, 
participated in the survey. This group is referred to as the "manager" group. This terminology is a 
shorthand reference, as not all participants make decisions over resources, some partaking in monitoring 
and research. Collectively, however, this group's expertise bears significance for management decisions by 
informing policy makers and the public on the findings of science, and in some cases, directly advising 
decision makers. The manager group is affiliated with four state, and four federal agencies, representing a 
broad range of expert perspectives from the natural and social sciences. These agencies manage natural 
resources in the state.
A limitation to this study may arise from the sole focus on tribal councils as well as the absence of input 
from specifically social services-oriented branches of government, such as the Alaska Department of 
Health and Social Services. However, though this may seem to tip the balance of expertise toward the 
ecological system, most respondents hold positions at the intersection of social and ecological issues 
(drinking water, solid waste, subsistence, sociocultural issues, community liaison) requiring some 
knowledge of NS social systems as well. Table 4.1 contains details on affiliations in both groups. Each 
tribal council has seven seats total; in all but one case six members were able to participate.
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Table 4.1 Participants
Number of participants
Council Group N =29
n = 6 
n = 6 
n = 6 
n = 6 
n = 5 
N =32 
n = 6 
n = 2 
n = 5 
n = 6 
n = 3 
n = 5 
n = 4 
n = 1
Village A 
Village B 
Village C 
Village D 
Village E
Resource Manager Group
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation 
Alaska Department of Fish and Game 
Alaska Department of Transportation 
Alaska Department of Natural Resources 
U.S. Bureau of Land Management 
U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Management Service 
U.S. National Park Service
4.4 METHODS
Prior to recruitment and data collection, the research procedures were approved for use with human 
subjects (University of Alaska Fairbanks IRB# 764745-5, Appendix 4A) and informed consent was obtained 
from all participants.
4.4.1 The instrument
Via a custom survey instrument, this study employed qualitative content analysis, and multivariate statistics 
to measure participants' risk perceptions. The survey instrument design was based on (i) previous research 
on elements of sustainability in Arctic Alaska communities (Kruse et al., 2004), (ii) data gathered at a 
participatory scenarios workshop held in Barrow, Alaska in February 2015, (iii) previous research on shared 
perceptions about land cover changes in Northern Alaska using cultural consensus analysis of observations 
from elders (Carothers et al., 2014), and (iv) complexity and uncertainty analysis (Lindgren and Bandhold, 
2009). The data gathered from these approaches yielded the following survey sections (respectively):
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(i) ELEMENTS OF COMMUNITY SUSTAINABILITY: Six propositions based on results from the 
Sustainability of Arctic Communities Project (Kruse et al 2004) identified elements of community 
sustainability in Arctic Alaska 20 years ago. The council group was presented with 5-point Likert 
items to evaluate if the statements stand true today (Table 4.8). This approach was used to 
establish what sustainability means in their communities and make the term operational in our 
research.
(ii) SOCIOECONOMIC RISKS: Seven potential risks to NS community sustainability were used to ask 
our participants to confirm whether each item was indeed a risk (true/false). Each risk item was 
followed by three, 5-point Likert-type question items about impacts to sustainability, level of 
manageability with locally available resources, and direction of change over the past 20 years (see 
Table 4.2). These questions were only asked if the item was deemed a risk to community 
sustainability. Evaluations of these comprised the risk dimensions impact, control, and change.
The list of seven risk items was a product of a community workshop held in in Utqiagvik (formerly 
known as Barrow), in February, 2015 (see Appendix 4B).
(iii) LAND COVER CHANGES AS RISKS: A list of eight potential land cover change risks was used to ask 
our participants to confirm whether each item was indeed a risk to NS community sustainability 
(true/false. Each risk item was followed by three, 5-point Likert-type question items about impacts 
to sustainability, level of manageability with locally available resources, and direction of change 
over the past 20 years (Table 4.2). While there are inherent limitations in the application of this 
list to North Slope communities due to its emphasis on riverine-based subsistence (and lack of 
data from marine-based),the list provides a useful basis to identify those land cover changes that 
are universally problematic across diverse regions of Arctic Alaska.
(iv) CROSS-IMPACT ANALYSIS: A twenty-five-item, 7-point Likert scale questionnaire probed 
perceptions of complexity and speed of changes in NS social and ecological environments (see
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Appendix 4C). Because not all risks are foreseeable or easily framed, this section was intended to 
map conditions that complicate risk assessment and related decision-making.
An open-ended question was also presented at the beginning of the survey to generate 
undirected data on respondents' risk perceptions:
(v) FREE LIST / RISKS AND READINESS: At the beginning of the survey, respondents were asked the 
open-ended question, "What are the five things that pose the greatest risk to the creation of 
healthy, sustainable communities in Northern Alaska?"
(vi) RESILIENCE: At the end of the survey, respondents were asked to evaluate the resilience of NS 
communities (i.e., readiness of community to cope with possible futures) via two propositions 
with a Likert-type response format:
(a) "Northern Alaska communities are prepared to face future economic and environmental 
challenges" and (b) "Northern Alaska communities are prepared to prosper even in turbulent 
times" The entire survey protocol is presented in Appendix 4C.
4.4.2 Construct validity and reliability of scales
The risks of land cover change (LCC) and socioeconomic (SECON) change were initially evaluated by 
participants, based on whether or not they were seen as posing a risk to community sustainability. For 
each item that respondents considered a risk, they were then asked three questions about its i) impacts, 
ii) local control, and iii) changes in intensity over time. Items that were not considered to pose a risk by at 
least 70% of council group participants (LCC risk 3) or items that had a significance of association with 
place of residence (LCC risks 2,5,6) were eliminated from further group-level analyses. These item-level 
results can be found in Appendix 4E. Four LCC items were considered a risk by these criteria, and were
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analyzed based on impacts, controllability, and direction of change. The 5-point Likert-type item results 
were aggregated, using the arithmetic means across all items to provide overall composite scores for LCC 
and SECON risks based on these three dimensions. Items in the cross-impact analysis (Lindgren and 
Bandhold, 2009), were modified to measure perceptions of uncertainty about Northern Alaska's SES. Table
4.2 provides information about the scales and reliability measures. Cronbach's alpha value of 0.7 is 
recommended for social science research, 0.8 is desirable (George and Mallery, 2003). All scales met these 
criteria.
For individual items, median results and non-parametric tests of significance, such as Mann-Whitney U- 
test, are reported to aid between-group, item-wise comparisons (Appendix 4E). When examining overall 
LCC and SECON risk dimensions using summative scores, such as average risk impacts, results are reported 
using mean and standard deviation, and tested with independent samples t-test. This is also true in the 
case of the cross-impact analysis built on a 7-point response format, comprising of two Likert scales with 
13 and 12 items for system complexity and changes (respectively). It has been argued that Likert-type
Table 4.2 Scale information and internal consistency reliability.
LCC risks Scale Items Cronbach's a
1.Less snow in winter
2.Melting* permafrost increases erosion and drying
3.Later fall freeze-up
4.Earlier spring break-up
Impact
Control
Change
4
4
4
0.77
0.71
0.79
SECON risks
1 Ineffective decision-making
2 Community health and health services problems
3 Environmental problems Impact 7 0.75
4 Education: school system Control 7 0.86
Education: transmission of traditional knowledge Change 7 0.76
5. Problems from industrial and resource development
Risks to culture
Cross-impact analysis (itemized description in Appendix 4C)
Social-ecological systems complexity Complexity 13 0.77
Social-ecological systems rate of changes Change 12 0.77
Community resilience (itemized description in Appendix 4C)
Resilience 2 0.8
***"Melting" permafrost refers to thawing permafrost: In this survey the author adhered to the original culturally- 
appropriate wording from the Carothers et al. (2014) study that relied on elder observations.
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question items yield ordinal data that are not appropriate for parametric statistics (Kampen and 
Swyngedouw, 2000; Kuzon Jr et al., 1996), consequently median and interquartile range are the proper 
path to a measure of central tendency (Jamieson, 2004). However, the robustness of parametric statistics 
performed on data from multi-item, proper Likert-scales (Likert, 1932), has been established (e.g. Carifio 
and Perla, 2008; Carifio and Perla, 2007). Furthermore, the robustness of parametric tests performed on 
individual Likert-type questions have also been proven to show superior performance than non- 
parametric ones (Norman, 2010).
4.5 RESULTS
The presentation of survey results follows the schematics of Fig. 4.2. First, the results of the cross-impact 
analysis scales measuring perceptions of SES changes and complexity are discussed to gauge observations 
of systemic uncertainty between the two participant groups. The results are further evaluated based on 
exploratory factor analysis to identify underlying dimensions that explain variations in the perceptions of 
the two groups. Next LCC and SECON risk results are presented to convey risk trends observed by 
participants. To complement this section, results from the open-ended risk question are reported as well. 
The third section presents findings related to elements of community sustainability in Arctic Alaska 
building on research by Kruse et al. (2004), and links between specific risks identified by our respondents 
and these elements. Finally, we discuss the synergies between adaptive capacity, decision-making and 
resilience. This discussion is framed by the context from our respondents' views on community resilience.
4.5.1 Cross-impact analysis: Perceptions of uncertainty
The 25-item uncertainty analysis gives an overview of perceptions of complexity and rate of changes in the 
North Slope region's social and environmental systems. Initially, scores were derived from 12 statements 
concerning changes, and 13 statements concerning the complexity of SES components, which were
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evaluated on a seven-point Likert scale from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). Mid-range 
coordinates (4.0, 4.0) indicate perceptions of continuity in, and foresight of, the system's future states, 
while higher scores indicate a shift toward uncertainty, and decreased ability to control outcomes. The 
council group's initial composite scores (M c h a n g e s =4.8, SD=0.71 and Mc o m p l e x i t y =5.3, SD=0.69), and the 
manager group's scores (Mc h a n g e s =4.5, SD=0.57 and Mc o m p l e x i t y =4.6, SD=0.81) are modeled using grey 
symbols labeled "outlook on future included" in Fig. 4.4. These two dimensions indicated the council 
group falling closer towards the region of uncertainty than managers. While the two groups rated changes 
similarly, along the complexity dimension the difference between results increases to a statistically 
significant mean difference of 0.72; t(59)=3.7, p= .001. The results seemed to suggest that regardless of 
group membership, participants consider the rate of changes in the SES to be moderately high, while in 
the case of complexity membership shows a significance of association with higher scores in the council 
group.
4.5.1.1 Factor analysis
Next, the cross-impact questionnaire was evaluated using exploratory factor analysis (EFA) in order to 
uncover latent factors that may explain group-specific trends in how participants related to question 
items. In simple terms, factors refer to groupings of similar variables into common dimensions that explain 
their variations. The goal was to examine each cluster to identify emergent themes. For example, whether 
certain patterns emerge in the complexity model that are different from ones under changes. Such 
analysis helped to observe differences in the organizing principles between the two groups' perceptions. 
Furthermore, factors identified can later be analyzed in terms of any potential correlations with LCC and 
SOCECON risk dimensions (impacts, control and change). Though sample sizes were small here, 
satisfactory factor recovery was possible under such conditions. De Winter found that with a sample size N 
= 17-21, recovery can be successful at factor loadings A = 0.8, number of factors f= 3-4, and number of 
variables p = 6-12 (de Winter et al., 2009).
132
Variables were derived from the cross-impact questionnaire, preserving the grouping of 12 change and 13 
complexity items, which were separately subjected to EFA. Initially, factorability of items was examined in 
both the council and manager groups. All items correlated at least .3 with at least one other item, with the 
exception of 2 change items in the councils group, suggesting reasonable factorability. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
measure of sampling adequacy in our final models was above the recommended value of .5 (Kaiser, 1974), 
the diagonals of the anti-image correlation matrix were also above 0.5, and Bartlett's test of sphericity was 
significant in all cases (Appendix 4D).
Principal axis factoring with oblique (promax) rotation was chosen to extract the factors. For social science 
studies, principal axis factoring is often preferred because it makes no assumptions about data 
distribution, while oblique rotation is preferred because it creates a solution that leaves room for factors 
to be correlated (Baglin, 2014). We retained factors based on the Kaiser Criterion, Scree test and 
cumulative percent of variance, in order to retain meaningful factors with satisfactory eigenvalues. Using A 
factor loadings -the degree of association each observed variable has with the underlying latent factor- 
cross-loadings of items were examined to find items with significant correlation with multiple factors. 
Variables with A below 0.3 were eliminated one at a time and the factor extraction repeated. Final models 
were chosen based on (i) the leveling off of eigenvalues on the scree plot, (ii) difficulty of interpreting 
subsequent factors (insufficient A values, heavy cross-loadings), and (iii) final factor correlation matrix with 
all correlations less than 0.6. Variables eliminated based on these criteria are indicated along with final 
results in Table 4.3.
The factors were given descriptive labels based on interpretations of common themes and relationships
between the variables. In naming the clusters, attention was paid to the A values. Any factor loading above
0.6 is considered a strong association, and above 0.4 is considered moderate (Comrey and Lee, 1992;
Matsunaga, 2015). Based on these, the relative prominence of variables in addition to their theme played
a role in the chosen labels. Where possible and applicable, identical names were given to factors in the
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Table 4.3 Exploratory factor analysis results. Social-ecological system changes and complexity models shown. 
Variable names: SC = social system change, EC = environmental system change, SX = social system complexity, EX = 
environmental system complexity. *Reverse coded variables: Items worded positively, where higher scores indicate 
less uncertainty in the environment, and ability to forecast future trends, were reverse scored in order to keep them 
on the same scale as the rest of the variables.
SES changes factors:
Council Group X
Unpredictable risks
EC_6 The sustainability of Northern Alaska communities 0.77
is highly influenced by unpredictable environmental 
challenges.
SC_3 The two boroughs are constantly having to cope 0.75
with risks that are changing
EC_5 Environmental research and monitoring needs in 0.56
Northern Alaska are constantly changing
Shifting social and political capital
SC_4 The regulatory environment is continually changing 0.84
SC_5 Social values in society are continually changing 0.81
Negative outlook
revEC_1* The future of Northern Alaska's environment 0.81
looks positive in the coming years.
revEC_2* Northern Alaska's environment will support 0.50
the sustainability goals of its communities in the coming 
years.
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure: .63
Bartlett's Test -  Sig. .001
Eliminated variables: EC_3, EC_4, SC_1, SC_2, SC_6
SES complexity factors:
Council Group X
Global-local links
EX_2 The Arctic environment is very complex with 0.90
many unclear factors and relationships influencing 
the two boroughs.
SX_3 Actions taken at the Pan-Arctic level affect lives 0.60 
strongly in the two boroughs.
EX_4 New and unpredictable environmental changes 0.43 
are constantly occurring.
Unpredictable policies
SX_6 The sustainability of Northern Alaska 0.79
communities is highly influenced by unpredictable 
public policies
EX_5 The two borough's environment is highly 0.71
influenced by unpredictable public policies.
Changing economy & environment
SX_2 The business environment is very complex with 0.86 
many unclear factors and relationships affecting the 
two boroughs
EX_1 Environmental changes in the northern region 0.42 
of Alaska will affect the state and region strongly
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure: .63
Bartlett's Test -  Sig. .02
Eliminated: EX_6, SX_1, SX_3, SX_4, SX_5, SX_7
Manager Group X
Negative outlook
revEC_1* The future of Northern Alaska's 0.84
environment looks positive in the coming years. 
revEC_2* Northern Alaska's environment will 0.73
support the sustainability goals of its communities in 
the coming years.
revSC_2* Opportunities for the two boroughs look 0.72
good for the next few years
revSC_1* Regional and global markets will grow for 0.68
several years in ways that support sustainability in 
the two boroughs.
Shifting knowledge demands
SC_6 There is high demand placed on Northern 0.87
Alaska communities having to innovate because of 
new rules and regulations
SC_4 The regulatory environment is continually 0.63
changing
EC_5 Environmental research and monitoring needs 0.58
in Northern Alaska are constantly changing 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure: .59
Bartlett's Test -  Sig. .001
Eliminated variables: EC_3, EC_4, EC_6, SC-3, SC_5
Manager Group X
Unpredictable environmental changes
EX_6 The sustainability of Northern Alaska 0.94
communities is highly influenced by unpredictable 
environmental challenges
EX_4 New and unpredictable environmental changes 0.69
are constantly occurring
EX_1 Environmental changes in the northern region 0.65
of Alaska will affect the state and region strongly 
EX_2 The Arctic environment is very complex with 0.56
many unclear factors and relationships influencing 
the two boroughs.
SX_7 There are many unexpected threats that the 0.51
two boroughs have to cope with.
Unpredictable policies
SX_6 The sustainability of Northern Alaska 0.94
communities is highly influenced by unpredictable 
public policies
EX_5 The two borough's environment is highly 0.77
influenced by unpredictable public policies.
SX_4 New and unpredictable economic and political 0.50
events and interests in the Arctic are constantly 
occurring
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure: .70
Bartlett's Test -  Sig. .001
Eliminated: EX_3, SX_1, SX_2, SX_3, SX_5
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council and manager groups if the combination of variables expressed identical themes, even if the exact 
combination of items was different.
In the council group's SES changes model, three factors accounted for a cumulative variance of 75%; with 
each explaining 38%, 22%, and 15%, respectively (percent values correspond to the order in which factors 
appear in tables). In the manager group, two factors explained a total of 66% variance, at 39% and 27% 
each. In the SES complexity model, three factors explained 33%, 23%, and 15% of an overall 71% 
cumulative variance in the council group; while in the manager group two factors explained 47%, and 17% 
of variance each, for a total of 64%. As a final step, composite scores were created for each of the factors, 
based on the mean of the items in each, ignoring A values (Table 4.4). DiStefano et al. (2009) noted that 
this unrefined method has been established as appropriate for exploratory research (Hair et al., 2009; 
Tabachnick et al., 2001). Because this study aims to simplify complex and dynamic human perceptions, but 
without claiming to predict them, EFA and unrefined factor scores produce adequate basis for such initial 
analyses.
Table 4.4 Factor scores
Council Group Factor score SD
SES Changes
1. Unpredictable risks 5.3 1.3
2. Shifting social and political capital 5.3 1.2
3. Negative outlook 3.4 1.4
SES Complexity
1. Global-local links 5.7 1.2
2. Unpredictable policies 5.1 1.5
3. Changing economy and environment 5.0 1.3
Manager Group
SES Changes
1. Negative outlook 4.4 1.2
2. Shifting knowledge demands 4.4 1.2
SES Complexity
1. Unpredictable environmental changes 4.9 1.1
2. Unpredictable policies 4.2 1.2
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The factor negative outlook (Table 4.3) appeared in both groups' SES changes model. In the manager 
group, this factor includes both social and environmental system variables. In the council group, this factor 
is comprised of only environmental system variables, indicating prominence over social ones in explaining 
total variance. The variables in question (EC_1, EC_2, SC_1, SC_2) belonged to a group of 4 items that 
asked respondents to consider the future state of their SES, and evaluate whether the outlook was good 
or bad. The rationale behind this area of inquiry was that an optimistic view of the future (i.e. the stance 
that things are headed in the right direction), presupposes continuity of current trends, a sense of control, 
and the ability to project outcomes to steer the system toward desired futures. These are usually traits of 
low uncertainty in a system (Stacey, 2007; Tschakert et al., 2014). Therefore, in the summative scores, 
highly negative responses to these questions increased overall change scores (towards increased 
uncertainty), while low scores (translating to a positive viewpoint) decreased them.
When examining results further, it became clear that assumptions regarding a negative correlation 
between future outlook and perceptions of change do not hold up to scrutiny in the council group. The 
factor score (Table 4.4) for negative outlook on the council group's side (M = 3.4) sharply deviates from 
the other two factors in the model, unpredictable risks (M = 5.3) and shifting social and political capital (M 
=5.3). These two dimensions communicate high rates of changes, or tendency to move to the right of the 
mid-point in Figure 4.4 toward uncertainty, while the council's low score on negative outlook shifts to the 
left of the 4.0 mid-point. The council group's less negative outlook was also statistically significant from 
the manager group's (M = 4.4, SD = 1.2); t(59) = 3.2, p = .002. This showed that there were underlying 
differences between the two groups in terms of future projections, causing the inclusion of "outlook on 
future" question items with the other change items to skew results. This ended up muting the otherwise 
high perception of change in the council cohort. High complexity, rate of changes, and uncertainty do not 
preclude a positive outlook in the council group (Hypothesis 1).
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Fig.4.4 SES complexity and uncertainty analysis results for the council and manager groups. The figure includes 
results with and without "outlook on future" items (these are the same item that, when reverse scored, make up the 
negative outlook factor in Table 4.3), and direction of change in scores. The chart shows different uncertainty types 
as factors of complexity and change levels, adapted from Lindgren and Bandhold (2009, 173).
When recalculating cross-impact change scores, omitting the group of four items on future outlook, we 
see a sharp increase in the council group's results (M = 5.4, SD = 1.0), and a decrease in the manager 
group's (M = 4.2, SD = 0.87); and this time, change scores also have a strong correlation with membership; 
t(59) = 4.03, p = .001. Fig. 4.4 depicts this final model for both groups along with the initial one in white, 
labeled "outlook on future excluded." This new model shows that the council group rates both changes 
and complexity much higher than the manager group.
Tellingly, under the manager group, shifting knowledge demands is based on concerns regarding a 
constantly changing regulatory and research environments. Of its variables, EC_5, speaking to ever- 
changing research and monitoring needs in Northern Alaska, had the highest central tendency (M = 4.8, SD 
= 1.4), suggesting that the experts involved in the management and monitoring in the region, recognize 
the challenges posed by changing research demands. Unpredictable policies in the SES complexity model 
are also a testament to a volatile regulatory environment, however, the overall factor score (M =4.2)
137
suggests a close to neutral stance. On the council group side, the top complexity factor is global-local links. 
The variables under this dimension speak to the complex relationships between the local and regional and 
global environments, and decisions from outside that bring about change. On the managers' side, 
unpredictable environmental changes is most prominent.
Overall, council members' perception of uncertainty was most influenced by the unpredictability of 
changes that are occurring, and by the complexity of global connections in the region's SES. (Table 4.4). 
This perceived uncertainty is compounded by a difficult regulatory environment, but mitigated by a 
somewhat positive outlook on the future, that is independent of change and complexity. This situation is 
due, perhaps, to a sense of resilience. In the manager group, rapid environmental changes are a most 
prominent factor in an otherwise moderate sense of uncertainty, and these correspond with a somewhat 
negative outlook on future sustainability in the region.
4.5.2 Perceptions of risk
Following the analysis of changes and complexity in the SES, the study turns to what participants identify 
as observed risks to community sustainability. Four out of eight LCC items (Table 4.2), and all seven SECON 
items were identified risks by the councils group by at least a 7/10 consensus ratio using true / false 
question format. For each confirmed risk item, respondents were asked to rate three dimensions using a 
5-point Likert-type response: impact on sustainability (5 = very high, 3 = moderate, 1 = very low); 
agreement on existing local capacity to control risk (5 = strong agreement, 3 = neutral, 1 = strong 
disagreement); and change in risk (5 = increased greatly, 3 = stayed the same, 1 = decreased greatly).
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Initially, the three dimensions were evaluated by taking the arithmetic mean of responses across all LCC 
risks, and all SECON risks. These cumulative results (Table 4.5) are depicted in the risk heat matrix in Fig.
4.5 with the two axes representing impact and change dimensions, while the size of the symbols indicate 
either existing control (decreased risk, smaller size) or no control (increased risk, larger size). Heat maps
4.5.2.1 Analysis of cumulative risk
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Fig.4.5 Risk heat map. Map shows perceptions of land cover changes and socioeconomic issues as risks to 
sustainability among North Slope tribal councils and resource managers who do not reside in the NS region.
are color-coded cross-impact cluster analyses that provide a glimpse into a system's risk profile, aiming to 
aid the prioritizing of risks. Management decisions can be made based on the positioning of items in the 
matrix. For example, by dividing the matrix into action-quadrants one can indicate appropriate treatment 
plans based on which items to ignore or monitor, and which items need urgent attention. From the 
positioning of items, we may conclude that both groups perceive LCC and SECON risks to be highly 
impactful on sustainability, and having increased in intensity in the past 20 years.
Cumulative risk control scores did not yield significant results in the case of LCC risks. The council cohort's
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mean score of M =3.35 (SD = 0.75), and the manager group's M =3.0 (SD=0.70) speaks to both groups 
trending around a neutral mid-point. In the case of SECON risks however, the council group's mean score 
of 3.60 against the manager group's 3.10 showed significance at the p < .05 level. In this case, council 
members, but not managers, lean towards agreement about local capacity to control these risks. LCC 
impact, and SECON impact and change were evaluated by the council group slightly higher than the 
manager group with significance at the p < .5 level (Table 4.5).
Table 4.5 LCC and SECON risk scales. Mean (SD) and test of significance results.
LCC risks Impact Control Change
Tribal Councils 4.16 ( 0.55) 3.35 (0.75) 4.42 (0.59)
Resource Managers 3.67 (0.77)** 3.0 (0.70) 4.3 (0.54)
Sig. t(57)=2.79, p= .007 - -
SECON risks
Tribal Councils 4.36 (0.47) 3.62 (0.87) 4.3 (0.46)
Resource Managers 3.97 (0.57)** 3.1 (0.73)* 3.89 (0.47)**
Sig. t(59)=2.9, p= .005 t(58)=2.5, p= .015 t(59)=3.3, p= .002
4.5.2.2 Analysis of individual risk items
Subsequently each risk item was assessed individually to see if any significant differences in the two 
groups may have been lost at the aggregate level. Appendix 4E contains all descriptive and inferential 
statistical analysis of the LCC and SECON risk items. For increased readability, we created a visualization 
(Table 4.6) similar to heat map 4.x to aid in the cursory examination of results. Colors correspond to 
numbers as shown in the legend beneath the diagram. The colored cells communicate the median and 
interquartile range (IQR) of the two participant groups; for each risk's impact, control, and change 
dimension. The graduation of color corresponds to the IQR, with the middle color corresponding to the 
median value. For example, see LCC#1 under impact; the council group median value of 4 is conveyed by 
the red mid-point, while the IQR of 3-5 is conveyed by the graduation from orange (3) to deep red (5). IQR
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Table 4.6 Heat map showing itemized risk observations. Color coding is based on median and interquartile ranges 
with red (green) indicating higher (lower) impacts, incapacity (capacity) to control, and increase (decrease) in risk 
over the past two decades.
Im pact
Very low (1) 
Very high (5)
Lo ca l Control
Currently capable of (1) 
Currently uncapable of (5)
C h an ge
Decreased greatly (1) 
Increased greatly (5)
LCC_1 L e s s  snow  in w inter
Tribal Councils U 4 (3-5) I 3 (2-3) 5 (4-5)
Resource Managers 3 (3-4) 3 (2.75-3.25) 4 (4-5)
LC C _ 4  M elting perm afrost in cre a se s  erosion and drying
Tribal Councils U 4 (3.75-5) 2.5 (2-3) 4.5 (4-5)
Resource Managers 4 (3-5) 3 (2-4) 4 (4-5)
LC C _ 7  Later fall freeze-up; new  freeze-thaw  cycle
Tribal Councils U 4 (4-5) 1 3 (2-3) 5 (4-5)
Resource Managers 4 (3-4) 3 (2-4) 4 (4-5)
LC C _ 8  Earlier spring breakup; ice now  m elts in place
Tribal Councils d 5 (4-5) I 3 (2-3) 5 (4-5)
Resource Managers 4 (3-4) 3 (2-4) 4 (4-5)
SECO N _1 C om m unity health and health se rv ice s  problem s
Tribal Councils | | 5 (4-5) 1 2 (2-4) 5 (4-5)
Resource Managers 4 (4-5) 3 (2-4) 4 (3-4)
S ECO N _2 Environm ental problem s
Tribal Councils U 5 (4-5) | 2.5 (2-3) 5 (4-5)
Resource Managers 4 (3-5) 3 (3-4) 4.5 (4-5)
S ECO N _3 P rob lem s with education from issu es in the school system
Tribal Councils 
Resource Managers
S EC O N _ 4 C h a lle n g e s  to the transm ission of traditional know ledge
Tribal Councils 
Resource Managers
S ECO N _5 Ineffective d ecision-m aking
Tribal Councils 
Resource Managers
S ECO N _6 P rob lem s from industrial and resource developm ent
2 (2-3)
3 (2-4)
4 (4-5) 2 (2-3) 4 (4-5)
4 (4-4.25) 2 (2-3) 4 (3.5-5)
2 (2-3)
3 (2-4)
Tribal Councils 
Resource Managers
5 (4-5) 2 (1-3) 5 (4-5)
4 (3-4.25) 2 (2-3) 4 (3-4)
S E C O N  7 R isks to culture
Tribal Councils | 5 (4-5) 2 (1-2.5) 4 (4-5)
Resource Managers 4 (3-4) 2 (2-3) 4 (3.5-5)
Lege nd 1 2 3 4 5
scores enrich our understanding of patterns between the two groups, by communicating variability of 
feedback, or the middle 50% of statistical dispersion. If the observer approaches the diagram with the 
understanding that green and yellow mean "good" (low perceived risk), while red means "bad" (high 
perceived risk), some of these patterns become immediately apparent.
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In this interpretation of results, control scores were reverse coded: High scores on this item originally 
corresponded with greater control, and therefore decreased risk. However, in the color coded heat map, 
higher values (and therefore more red) represent greater risks. The reverse coded control dimension is 
now represented on the same scale with impact and change, where low scores equal less risk, and less 
red.
Under the change dimension, LCC change results are similar between the two groups, with both noting 
risks as increased (manager group) or greatly increased (council group). Looking further down under 
SECON risks, these differences increase further, with the manager group's low quartile IQR values 
dropping to 3 (risk stayed the same). LCC control IQR scores indicate a slightly positive attitude from the 
council group towards capacity to control risks. Capacity to control all seven SECON items was also 
affirmed by the council group, with the manager group concurring in three cases. Checking under the 
impact dimension, LCC 1 "less snow in winter" stands out as the only item that received a score below 4.0 
(high impact); ending up with a 3.0 for "moderate" with the manager group.
4.5.2.3 Free-listing of perceived risks: mental models
Responses to the open-ended risk question: "What are the five things that pose the greatest risk to the 
creation of healthy, sustainable communities in Northern Alaska?" yielded additional, complementary 
insights to group-level risk models. A textual content analysis of 61 written responses produced a total of 
248 observations across the data set. Using MAXQDA (v.12.0), observations were sorted using textual 
content into several distinct risk themes using a code system (Appendix 4F). The result of the analysis 
yielded ten risk themes, shown in Table 4.7. For high-frequency themes, top sub-categories are indicated 
in cases where the risk theme was further delineated. Based on code frequency, the top three threats to 
sustainability on the council group's side were: risks from industrial development, ineffective decision 
making, and community health and health system issues. On the manager group's side struggling cash
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economy, and environmental issues were in the top two spots, while ineffective decision making, and 
community health and health system issues were the third highest. Notably, the manager group's greatest 
perceived risk for communities, cash economy, emerged in first place by a large margin in the council 
group, with a code frequency nearly double that of second-place environmental issues. Environmental 
issues were identified as risks to sustainability, with near identical frequency by both groups, and linked to 
climate change in most cases. In most cases, industrial development as a risk was reported by the council 
group as referring to ongoing heavy air pollution from onshore activities, and risks from offshore 
accidents. Ineffective decision making ranked high in both groups; unsurprising in a highly complex SES.
Table 4.7 Coded risks: frequency results (see code book in Appendix 4F)
Frequency
Top-level theme Council Group Mai
Struggling cash economy 8 32e
High cost of living 6 6
Risks to culture 17 8
Ineffective decision making 23a 16b
Risks from industrial development 25d 6
Education issues 6 7
Environmental issues (separate 19c 18cfrom industrial development)
Community health and health 22f 16fsystem issues
Risks to subsistence 1 2
Demographic changes 1 9
Top sub-categories: a misguided regulations; b divided local interests; c climate change; d air pollution, offshore 
accidents; e single-resource economy; f substance abuse. These were the most frequently cited risk items under these 
overarching themes (Appendix 4F).
4.5.3 Elements of community sustainability
Next, the study turns to identifying elements of sustainability that contribute to community adaptive 
capacity (Fig. 4.2). The Sustainability of Arctic Communities project (Kruse et al. (2004) worked with
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residents from five arctic communities of Alaska and Canada in the late 1990s to define sustainability, 
looking for common ground among Arctic Alaska communities. The project identified common elements 
of sustainability, which were used in this study as listed in Table 4.8. We presented this list to participants 
from the council cohort and asked if these goals are applicable to their community today. Likert-type 
items asked respondents to rate each on a scale of 1 (strong disagreement) to 5 (strong agreement). 
Median results and interquartile ranges are presented. The results show strong agreement on four, and 
agreement on two items with little to no variation in the distribution of responses (Hypothesis 3).
Table 4.8 Elements of community sustainability propositions: Council cohort only
Use of, and respect for, the land and animals in our homeland are very important to 
community sustainability.
A cash economy that is compatible with, and supports, continued local use of the land 
and animals is very important to community sustainability.
Local control, and responsibility for what is done in our village homelands and for what 
happens to resources used by the community and on our lands are very important to 
community sustainability.
Education of younger people in both traditional knowledge and western science is very 
important to community sustainability.
Education of the outside world about community goals and ways of living is very 
important to community sustainability.
A thriving culture that has a clear identity based on time on the land and language, which 
honors and respects elders, are very important to community sustainability.
* Calculated on a scale where: Strongly Agree =5, Agree =4, Neither Agree nor Disagree =3, Disagree = 2, Strongly 
Disagree = 1
4.5.4 Perceptions of community resilience
In Fig. 4.2, following elements of sustainability and adaptive capacity, the model branches off into distinct 
futures via decision points. Resilience in the SES is a possible outcome. In order to gauge how the two 
participant groups perceive future resilience in NS communities, two questions asked participants to 
consider whether North Slope communities are prepared to thrive in times of economic and 
environmental challenges. Calculated on a 5-point scale where 5 = strong agreement, 3 = neutral, 1 = 
strong disagreement, the composite score from these questions provides the basis for comparison of the
Median (IQR)* 
5 (5-5)
4(4-5)
5 (5-5)
5 (4-5)
4(4-5)
5 (5-5)
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two groups' perceptions of community resilience. An independent-samples t-test was conducted to 
compare scores. There was a significant difference in the scores in the council group mean scores (M = 3.7, 
SD = 1.1), and the manager group (M = 2.3, SC= 0.99); t(58) = 5.1, p = .001. Median (IQR) values of central 
tendency and Mann-Whitney test confirm these same results with a composite score of Mdn = 4 (3.25-4.5) 
in the council group, and Mdn = 2 (1.6-3.0) in the manager group, U = 155.5, p = .001.
To test the final hypothesis of this research, results of cumulative risk (Table 4.5) were first checked for 
potential correlation between factors that emerged in the SES models (Table 4.3). The heuristic models in 
Fig. 4.6 and Fig. 4.7 capture the risk perception formation process in the context of uncertainty, impacts, 
control and change. The council group's model shows the only relationship between SES complexity 
factors and risk dimensions was found in the positive correlation between global-local links and LCC 
change. This finding provides further evidence of how large-scale processes are perceived to affect local 
environmental changes and create uncertainty for the future.
In Fig. 4.6, the SES change model shows that negative outlook had a negative correlation with the control 
dimension of LCC and SECON risks. Greater control correlated with less negative (positive) attitudes. In 
Table 4.6 we see that control values for the council group's IQR ranged between agreement and the 
neutral mid-point for LCC and SECON risk items. Negative outlook also had a negative correlation with 
resilience, supporting a model where less negative outlook correlates with higher sense of resilience. 
Ultimately there wasn't a clear path to resilience from observed LCC and SECON risk items, with future 
outlook playing the only significant role.
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Fig. 4.6 Council Group: Heuristic path model. Model represents social-ecological system complexity and change 
construct formation, and relationships with observed risk and resilience variables.
The manager group's model (Fig. 4.7) shows correlation between several variables. Most notably, negative 
outlook in the SES changes model interacts only with LCC risks, but with all three dimensions. Negative 
views increase with increased impacts and changes, and decrease with increased control. This model 
suggests that the manager group's views on the future are linked with LCC risks, but not SECON risks, at 
least as it concerns the specific list of items presented on the survey. Counterintuitively perhaps, the 
factor unpredictable policies shows a positive correlation with control. Most notably however, both LCC 
and SECON risk dimensions show correlation with perceptions of resilience. This suggests that in the case 
of the manager group, North Slope community resilience can be understood in terms of, and modeled by, 
risk concepts (Hypothesis 4). An interesting point to note, and a possible area for future research, is the 
degree to which levels of government (state versus federal) diverge in their respective perceptions of 
sustainability, risks and resilience. A cursive examination of these subgroups in the manager cohort 
indicates that there may be identifiable patterns. At the p < .05 level, there was a statistically significant
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decrease in resilience scores among federal employees (M = 1.9, SD = 1.0) compared with state employees 
(M = 2.6, SD = 0.88); increase in LCC change scores in the federal (M = 4.6, SD = 0.41) compared to state 
(M = 4.1, SD = 0.51) group; and again increase in negative outlook scores in the federal (M = 5.1, SD = 1.2) 
compared to state (M = 3.99, SD = 0.92) employees.
Fig. 4.7 Manager Group: Heuristic path model. Model represents social-ecological system complexity and change 
construct formation, and relationships with observed risk and resilience variables.
4.6 DISCUSSION
The results of the cross-impact analysis (section 4.5.1) suggest that the council group perceives higher rate 
of changes and greater complexity in their SES than the manager group (Hypothesis 1). The results of 
exploratory factor analysis (Tables 4.3 and 4.4) enhanced highlighted this point by revealing significant 
differences between how the council and manager groups viewed the future of NS community
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sustainability: The council group had an overall positive view of the future, despite perceiving greater 
uncertainties (change, complexity) in the SES than the manager group. The manager group on the other 
hand had an overall negative view of future sustainability in the NS region, despite perceiving less 
uncertainty in the SES (Hypothesis 1). These differences may signal a perception of resilience in the council 
group that is not rooted in calculations on the extent of complexity and change in the SES (Hypothesis 4). 
Such perception of resilience may, in part, be an artifact of history where local people have endured many 
externally imposed changes in the past and managed to sustain their lifeways in spite of those changes.
Section 4.5.2 presents results on risk perception analyses, pointing to subtle, yet clear distinctions in how 
risks are conceptualized by the two groups (Hypothesis 2). In the case of cumulative risks (Table 4.5), there 
was statistical significance in higher impact (LCC and SECON risks), change (SECON risks only) and control 
(SECON risks only) scores in the council group. Higher control scores in the council group suggest they 
have greater confidence-com pared with the manager group—in community capacity to manage risks. 
This positive view of risk control underscores findings about perceptions of high resilience among the 
council group (Hypothesis 4).
In the analysis of individual risk items (Table 4.6) this same trend was observed in the council group: High
impacts scores, and change scores were observed, along with mainly neutral to neutral-high control
scores. As much as one may have expected to find that perceptions of high impacts, and increases in risks
evokes a feeling of loss of control, this is not true in the council group (Hypothesis 2). There may be
several reasons why this isn't so. One possibility is that the concept of risk control is more abstract, and
therefore more difficult to evaluate, than impact and change. This would prompt more participants to
choose the neutral midpoint value 3.0. Another point to consider is that there may be a hesitance to think
of diminishing control as a lack of capacity; as this could be perceived as a desire for outside intervention,
the legacies of which have had detrimental results on Alaska indigenous communities in the past (Evans-
Campbell, 2008). Finally, it is possible that the same sense of resilience that was implied in the cross-
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impact analysis, prompts participants to focus on the history of successful adaptation and resilience that 
has allowed their communities to manage risks and thrive under adverse conditions (Hypothesis 4).
The fact that risk impacts and changes were perceived similarly by both groups suggests that the sharing 
of knowledge across-scales has successfully communicated basic risk perspectives from the local to higher 
jurisdictional levels. On the other hand, differences exist in the way risks and adaptive capacity are 
conceptualized and prioritized. The open-ended risk question results showed differences in the way the 
two groups conceptualize and prioritize risks (Hypothesis 2). The council group identified outside 
interference such as detrimental effects of industrial development, and unpredictable or misguided 
policies as most prominent threats. This view conveys threats to their vibrant subsistence economy, 
community health, and tribal sovereignty as priorities. The manager group perceived a struggling cash 
economy as most threatening to sustainability. This could result in differences in how the two groups 
approach solutions and managing risks. It may be that the council group sees sovereignty to make 
decisions and to govern resources as most vital to sustainability, with other risks manageable so long as 
this is achieved. The manager cohort, on the other hand, clearly sees economic growth, wage jobs, and 
improved infrastructure as requiring the most urgent attention.
In section 4.5.3, the importance of six elements of community sustainability (Table 4.8) were confirmed by 
the council group. This clearly underscores the prevailing importance of lands and resources, control over 
decisions relating to each, and healthy economies and cultural continuity to community sustainability. In 
turn, these elements underscore the importance of perceived risks (vulnerabilities, hazards, exposure), in 
managing the SES for resilience, and agency (control) over risk decisions.
Perceptions of resilience results (section 4.5.4) indicate that the council group (Fig. 4.6) had a higher level 
of confidence in their communities' capacity to thrive, while the manager group had less confidence. This 
complements previous findings regarding sense of control over risks, and positive future outlook in the
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council group. A sense of control, or of adaptability, resilience, and hope for the future seem to be linked 
in the council group. The sparsely correlated relationships between variables is notable in the council 
group. This could mean that risk items not represented on the survey play influential roles in the model.
Or, more likely, this means that the worldview underlying resilience in the council group, cannot be 
captured by a model whose boundaries are defined in terms of risks. In case of the manager group (Fig. 
4.7), NS community resilience was more readily modeled by risk concepts, as evidenced by the numerous 
correlations between risk dimensions (Hypothesis 4).
Considering these results when retracing the components of Fig. 4.2, decision points emerge where 
participatory, inclusive decision processes become vital in bridging the knowledge divide (i.e. diverging risk 
perspectives, opinions on what action to take, plurality of knowledge forms). Perceptions of risk are 
formed via a complex process determined by individual traits, social and cultural influences, and lived 
experiences (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Fischhoff et al., 1978; Kasperson et al., 1988; Slovic, 1992). 
Consequently, and by extension, there are diverse perspectives and attitudes toward vulnerabilities, 
hazards and exposure. These attitudes, in turn, shape behavior such as adaptive action taken in response 
to risks. The council group is comprised of NS residents who are in close physical, cultural and historical 
proximity to lands and resources. Stakeholders with such deep connections with their SES tend to perceive 
risks and vulnerabilities differently from other stakeholder groups, who lack similar ties (e.g. Beck, 1992). 
As a consequence, local knowledge (such as awareness of risks, vulnerabilities and adaptive capacity), 
become pertinent in expert judgments of risks: These are decision processes that are embedded in social 
practices, norms and institutions, and therefore benefit from a plurality of opinions (Jasanoff, 2004, p. 3).
The findings of this research underscore that scales and levels of meaning often correspond to the scale of
decision-making bodies. If this is so, then scales and levels of risk meanings, or risk perspectives, impact
decisions and actions. Because in complex, rapidly changing SES there is a risk for managing one level at
the expense of another (Adger, 2000; Armitage, 2005), the findings of this study confirm that care must be
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taken at decision points to consider cross-scale risks, and risk perspectives. While the specific perspectives 
represented by the groups involved in this research may not represent the perspectives of all NS village 
residents, or all state and federal experts, they are representative of the types of diversity that underlies 
complex, adaptive social processes such as risk perception (Blair et al., 2014).
4.7 Conclusion
The challenges of social-ecological governance are not confined to the problem of quantifying risk 
probabilities and magnitude of impact. Decision makers are tasked with navigating highly complex risks 
spread across equally complex systems. The prevailing consensus among proponents of systemic, or 
holistic approaches to risk assessment is that we can no longer settle for a linear risk management model 
and top-down solutions (Klinke and Renn, 2002), but must opt instead for collaborative and flexible, 
adaptive models.
This study presented a comparison of these perceptions to identify levels of meaning in North Slope tribal 
council and manager groups. The results showed that these two groups have unique mental models of 
risks and resilience. This analysis is important because scale choices are a form of inclusion or exclusion: 
Power is reflected in the capacity to define the problem, and ultimately, capture resources, from different 
levels (Lebel et al., 2005). As the Alaska Native Science Commission states: "The degree to which 
community-based processes and externally based processes are not compatible may help illuminate 
causes of ineffective participation by communities in various public forums" (ANSC, 2009, p.21). Because 
risk attitudes and behaviors impact what types of resources are employed to mitigate current risks, and 
buffer against future risks in the adaptive cycle (Fath et al., 2015), risk perception plays a prominent role in 
the adaptive capacity of social-ecological systems.
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APPENDIX 4B
Method of data analysis 
Data analysis yielding the list of top 5 risks (in Table 4.2) presented to participants
Resident experts (n=29) from the North Slope (n=19) and Northwest Arctic Boroughs (n=10) (Alaska, USA) 
participating in a Barrow, Alaska workshop (February 2015) organized under the "Northern Alaska 
Scenarios Project" (funded by the National Science Foundation -ArcSEES Program#1263850 ) answered 
the question "what are the top five issues that threaten the success of healthy, sustainable communities 
in 2040?' before (n=29) and after (n=26) the workshop. The workshop provided a convenience sample of 
local perspectives on risks to sustainability in the Northern Alaska region.
A textual analysis of 55 written responses (before and after workshop surveys combined) produced a total 
of 187 observations across the data set. Using MAXQDA (version12) observations were sorted using 
textual content into several distinct risk themes. The analysis was further informed by participant 
observation over the course of the three-day workshop, where issues surrounding community 
sustainability were discussed at length. The result of the analysis yielded six risk themes in the top five 
position (Table 2, SECON risks) based on code frequency; and this list was presented to our participants 
in this study for further evaluation.
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APPENDIX 4C
Interview  protocol
OPEN-ENDED RISK QUESTION: Briefly, what are the five things that pose the greatest risk to the 
creation of healthy, sustainable communities in Northern Alaska?
TRUE / FALSE QUESTIONS: This is a risk to North Slope community sustainability. True /  False 
(see Appendix 4E for detailed list of risk items)
DIMENSIONS OF RISK QUESTIONS (where risk=true):
• IMPACTS: Impacts from this risk on community sustainability are: Very high, High, Moderate, 
Low, Very Low.
• CONTROL: North Slope communities are currently capable of managing or controlling this risk 
(adapting to, eliminating, lessening, avoiding): Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree/ nor 
disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree.
• CHANGE: Over the past two decades this risk has: Increased greatly, Increased somewhat, 
Stayed the same, Decreased somewhat, Decreased greatly.
RESILIENCE QUESTIONS: Very true, Somewhat true, Neutral, Somewhat Untrue, Not true.
a. Northern Alaska communities are prepared to face future economic and environmental 
challenges
b. Northern Alaska communities are prepared to prosper even in turbulent times
SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY QUESTIONS: Completely disagree (1)--- Completely agree (7)
a) SOCIAL COMPLEXITY INDEX:
SX_1 Actions taken by and in the two boroughs affect the State of Alaska and region strongly.
SX_2 The business environment is very complex with many unclear factors and relationships 
affecting the two boroughs
SX_3 Actions taken at the Pan-Arctic level affect lives strongly in the two boroughs.
SX_4 New and unpredictable economic and political events and interests in the Arctic are constantly 
occurring
SX_5 It is very difficult to foresee and anticipate future changes in Northern Alaska.
SX_6 The sustainability of Northern Alaska communities is highly influenced by unpredictable public 
policies
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SX_7 There are many unexpected threats that the two boroughs have to cope with.
b) ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLEXITY INDEX:
EX_1 Environmental changes in the northern region of Alaska will affect the state and region 
strongly
EX_2 The Arctic environment is very complex with many unclear factors and relationships 
influencing the two boroughs.
EX_3 It is very difficult to foresee environmental change
EX_4 New and unpredictable environmental changes are constantly occurring
EX_5 The two borough's environment is highly influenced by unpredictable public policies.
EX_6 The sustainability of Northern Alaska communities is highly influenced by unpredictable 
environmental challenges.
c) SOCIAL SPEED OF CHANGES INDEX:
SC_1 (reverse scored) Regional and global markets will grow for several years in ways that support 
sustainability in the two boroughs.
SC_2 (reverse scored) Opportunities for the two boroughs look good for the next few years.
SC_3 The two boroughs are constantly having to cope with risks that are changing.
SC_4 The regulatory environment is continually changing.
SC_5 Social values in society are continually changing.
SC_6 There is high demand placed on Northern Alaska communities having to innovate because of 
new rules and regulations.
d) ENVIRONMENTAL SPEED OF CHANGES INDEX:
EC_1 (reverse scored) The future of Northern Alaska's environment looks positive in the coming 
years.
EC_2 (reverse scored) Northern Alaska's environment will support the sustainability goals of its 
communities in the coming years.
EC_3 There is high demand placed on northern Alaska's environment to provide resources to meet 
demands from users.
EC_4 Social values outside our Northern Alaska region toward the environment are continually 
changing
EC_5 Environmental research and monitoring needs in Northern Alaska are constantly 
changing.
EC_6 The rate of innovation in environmental research and stewardship is high.
162
ELEMENTS OF SUSTAINABILITY QUESTIONS: Strongly Agree, Agree, Neither Agree nor disagree, 
Disagree, Strongly Disagree
I believe that:
1. Use of, and respect for, the land and animals in our homeland are very important to community 
sustainability.
2. A cash economy that is compatible with, and supports, continued local use of the land and 
animals is very important to community sustainability.
3. Local control, and responsibility for what is done in village homelands and for what happens to 
resources used by the community and on our lands are very important to community 
sustainability.
4. Education of younger people in both traditional knowledge and western science is very 
important to community sustainability.
5. Education of the outside world about community goals and ways of living is very important to 
community sustainability.
6. A thriving culture that has a clear identity based on time on the land and language, which 
honors and respects elders, are very important to community sustainability.
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APPENDIX 4D
Exploratory factor analysis raw results from  SPSS
Council group matrix results: SES changes
Council Group: SES Changes 
Pattern Matrixa
Factor
1 2 3
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES #6 (Q12) 
SOCIAL CHANGES #3 (Q10) 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES #5 (Q11) 
SOCIAL CHANGES #4 (Q11)
SOCIAL CHANGES #5 (Q12) 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES #1 (Q7) 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES #2 (Q8)
.796
.754
.563
.845
.813
.811
.498
Factor loadings below 0.3 are suppressed.
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization^ 
a. Rotation converged in 4 iterations.
Council Group SES Changes: KMO and Bartlett's Test
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .625
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 52.071
df 21
Sig. .000
Council Group: SES Changes: Anti-image Matrices
EC #1 (Q7) EC #2 (Q8) EC #5 (Q11) EC #6 (Q12) SC #3 (Q10) SC #4 (Q11) SC #5 (Q12)
Anti-image EC #1 (Q7) .491a -.256 -.212 .303 -.337 .117 -.305
Correlation EC #2 (Q8) -.256 .623a .138 .127 -.105 .240 -.104
EC #5 (Q11) -.212 .138 .791a -.296 -.153 -.073 -.078
EC #6 (Q12) .303 .127 -.296 .633a -.429 -.148 .069
SC #3 (Q10) -.337 -.105 -.153 -.429 .654a -.172 .099
SC #4 (Q11) .117 .240 -.073 -.148 -.172 .625a -.634
SC #5 (Q12) -.305 -.104 -.078 .069 .099 -.634 .563a
a. Measures of Sampling Adequacy(MSA)
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Council Group: SES Changes: Correlation Matrix
EC #1 (Q7) EC #2 (Q8) EC #5 (Q11) EC #6 (Q12) SC #3 (Q10) SC #4 (Q11) SC #5 (Q12)
Correlation EC #1 (Q7) 1.000 .323 .221 -.142 .306 .101 .361
EC #2 (Q8) .323 1.000 -.180 -.298 -.013 -.269 .002
EC #5 (Q11) .221 -.180 1.000 .452 .440 .377 .292
EC #6 (Q12) -.142 -.298 .452 1.000 .492 .366 .099
SC #3 (Q10) .306 -.013 .440 .492 1.000 .350 .220
SC #4 (Q11) .101 -.269 .377 .366 .350 1.000 .636
SC #5 (Q12) .361 .002 .292 .099 .220 .636 1.000
Council group matrix results: SES complexity
Council Group: SES Complexity: Pattern Matrixa
1
Factor
2 3
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLEXITY #2 .896
SOCIAL COMPLEXITY #3 .603
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLEXITY #4 .432
SOCIAL COMPLEXITY #6 .793
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLEXITY #5 .714
SOCIAL COMPLEXITY #2 .860
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLEXITY #1 .423
Factor loadings below 0.3 are suppressed.
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalizations 
a. Rotation converged in 4 iterations.
Council Group: SES Complexity: KMO and Bartlett's Test
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .627
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 36.406
df 21
Sig. .020
99
1
Council Group: SES Complexity: Anti-image Matrices
EX #1 EX #2 EX #4 EX #5 SX #2 SX #3 SX #6
Anti-image EX #1 .705a -.100 -.118 -.055 -.382 -.172 -.148
Correlation EX #2 -.100 .581a -.356 .092 .044 -.465 .041
EX #4 -.118 -.356 .674a .041 -.093 .038 -.064
EX #5 -.055 .092 .041 .611a -.097 -.039 -.515
SX #2 -.382 .044 -.093 -.097 .618a .189 -.091
SX #3 -.172 -.465 .038 -.039 .189 .582a -.115
SX #6 -.148 .041 -.064 -.515 -.091 -.115 .637a
a. Measures of Sampling Adequacy(MSA)
Council Group: SE S  Complexity: Correlation Matrix
EX #1 EX #2 EX #4 EX #5 SX #2 SX #3 SX #6
Correlation EX #1 1.000 .237 .265 .245 .421 .251 .332
EX #2 .237 1.000 .415 -.057 -.021 .520 .044
EX #4 .265 .415 1.000 .025 .151 .202 .125
EX #5 .245 -.057 .025 1.000 .248 .076 .569
SX #2 .421 -.021 .151 .248 1.000 -.081 .267
SX #3 .251 .520 .202 .076 -.081 1.000 .168
SX #6 .332 .044 .125 .569 .267 .168 1.000
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Manager group matrix results: SES changes
Manager Group SES Changes: Pattern Matrixa
Factor
1 2
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES #1 (Q7) .843
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES #2 (Q8) .732
SOCIAL CHANGES #2 (Q9) .721
SOCIAL CHANGES #1 (Q8) .677
SOCIAL CHANGES #6 (Q13) .865
SOCIAL CHANGES #4 (Q11) .629
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES #5 (Q11) .576
Factor loadings below 0.3 are suppressed.
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization^ 
a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.
Manager Group SES Changes: KMO and Bartlett's Test
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .588
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 75.469
df 21
Sig. .000
Manager Group SES Changes: Anti-image Matrices
EC #1 (Q7) EC #2 (Q8) EC #5 (Q11) SC #1 (Q8) SC #2 (Q9) SC #4 (Q11) SC #6 (Q13)
Anti-image EC #1 (Q7) .559a -.722 .170 .168 -.434 .090 -.322
Correlation EC #2 (Q8) -.722 .554a -.235 -.333 .202 .059 .298
EC #5 (Q11) .170 -.235 .587a .023 .133 -.182 -.429
SC #1 (Q8) .168 -.333 .023 .657a -.563 .018 -.032
SC #2 (Q9) -.434 .202 .133 -.563 .618a -.147 .041
SC #4 (Q11) .090 .059 -.182 .018 -.147 .685a -.385
SC #6 (Q13) -.322 .298 -.429 -.032 .041 -.385 .512a
a. Measures of Sampling Adequacy(MSA)
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Manager Group SES Changes Correlation Matrix
EC #1 (Q7) EC #2 (Q8) EC #5 (Q11) SC #1 (Q8) SC #2 (Q9) SC #4 (Q11) SC #6 (Q13)
Correlation EC #1 (Q7) 1.000 .750 -.092 .445 .576 -.088 .070
EC #2 (Q8) .750 1.000 -.034 .489 .402 -.185 -.134
EC #5 (Q11) -.092 -.034 1.000 -.115 -.181 .384 .502
SC #1 (Q8) .445 .489 -.115 1.000 .650 -.045 -.049
SC #2 (Q9) .576 .402 -.181 .650 1.000 .031 .013
SC #4 (Q11) -.088 -.185 .384 -.045 .031 1.000 .526
SC #6 (Q13) .070 -.134 .502 -.049 .013 .526 1.000
Manager group matrix results: SES complexity 
______________ Manager Group SES Complexity: Pattern Matrixa
Factor
1 2
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLEXITY #6 .941
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLEXITY #4 .686
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLEXITY #1 .650
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLEXITY #2 .556
SOCIAL COMPLEXITY #7 
SOCIAL COMPLEXITY #6
.513 .335
.935
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLEXITY #5 .771
SOCIAL COMPLEXITY #4 .495
Factor loadings below 0.3 are suppressed 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization^ 
a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.
Manager Group SES Complexity: KMO and Bartlett's Test
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square
.695
107.043
df 28
Sig. .000
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Manager Group SES Complexity: Anti-image Matrices
SX #4 SX #6 SX #7 EX #1 EX #2 EX #4 EX #5 EX #6
Anti-image SX #4 .760a -.181 -.325 -.209 -.041 -.059 -.199 .195
Correlation SX #6 -.181 .591a -.086 .119 .292 .361 -.526 -.351
SX #7 -.325 -.086 .839a .174 .010 -.173 .064 -.367
EX #1 -.209 .119 .174 .748a -.133 -.027 .118 -.311
EX #2 -.041 .292 .010 -.133 .565a .395 -.216 -.513
EX #4 -.059 .361 -.173 -.027 .395 .656a -.233 -.613
EX #5 -.199 -.526 .064 .118 -.216 -.233 .749a .001
EX #6 .195 -.351 -.367 -.311 -.513 -.613 .001 .673a
a. Measures of Sampling Adequacy(MSA)
Manager Group SES Complexity: Correlation Matrix
SX #4 SX #6 SX #7 EX #1 EX #2 EX #4 EX #5 EX #6
Correlation SX #4 1.000 .415 .462 .211 .166 .288 .446 .318
SX #6 .415 1.000 .406 .028 .105 .203 .643 .406
SX #7 .462 .406 1.000 .249 .321 .623 .435 .709
EX #1 .211 .028 .249 1.000 .395 .360 .114 .490
EX #2 .166 .105 .321 .395 1.000 .238 .286 .553
EX #4 .288 .203 .623 .360 .238 1.000 .402 .755
EX #5 .446 .643 .435 .114 .286 .402 1.000 .490
EX #6 .318 .406 .709 .490 .553 .755 .490 1.000
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APPENDIX 4E
Risk survey results
Table 4E-1 Land cover changes as risks
Land Cover Changes as Risk to Sustainability Among North Slope Tribal Councils and Non-local Experts (% & Median)* Orange highlight denotes items where Fisher's Exact 
Test showed statistical significance between the two groups' responses at the p< .05 level. In cases where there was a within group significance of association in responses, 
median values are denoted for each subgroup in the cell beneath the group results. Land cover changes #2, #5 and #6 showed a statistical significance of association with place 
of residence (p, .05) and are marked in red; statistics shown only for councils where risk = true. No such associations were found in the T/F questions in the resource manager 
group based on membership (state v. federal agency).
N(tribal council)=29 "This is a risk" 
N(state & federal expert)=34
True False
IMPACT 
"Impacts from this risk are:"
High Moderate Low
CONTROL 
"Our communities are currently 
managing this risk"
Agree Neither Disagree
CHANGE
"Over the past two decades this risk has:"
Increased Stayed Decreased
LCC #1 Less snow in winter
Tribal Council Group 72 28 52 21 0 28 31 14 72 0 0
**Median (IQR) -- -- 4 (3-5) 3 (3-4) 5 (4-5)1
Resource Manager Group 82 12 38 35 9 18 44 18 68 6 3
**Median (IQR) -- -- 3 (3-4) 3 (3-3) 4 (4-5)1
LCC #2 Shallow river and lake watersa
True for T ribal Councils C & D 9 2  0 
(n=12)
75 17 0 33 50 8 92 0 0
**Median (IQR) -- -- 5 (4-5) 3 (3-4) 5 (4-5)
Resource Manager Group 71 21 41 18 12 26 26 15 50 18 0
**Median (IQR) -- -- 4 (3-4) 3 (3-4) 4 (3-5)
LCC #3 High river water events are less common (hinders waterways transportation)
Tribal Council Group 28 62 False False False
**Median (IQR) -- --
Resource Manager Group 32 59 False False False
**Median (IQR) -- --
LCC #4 Melting permafrost increases erosion and drying
Tribal Council Group 90 10 69 17 3 45 31 14 83 7 0
**Median (IQR) -- -- 4 (3.75-5) 3.5 (3-5) 4.5 (4-5)
Resource Manager Group 91 6 59 18 12 35 21 29 82 6 0
**Median (IQR) -- -- 4 (3-5) 3 (2-4) 4 (4-5) STATE=4 FEDERAL=5
171
LCC #5 More wildfiresb
True for tribal Councils A & C 
& E (n=17) 77 23 47 29 0 23 35 18 65 12 0
""M edian (IQR) -- -- 4 (3-5) 4 (2.5-4) 4 (4-5)
Resource Manager Group 71 24 29 21 21 12 24 32 68 3 0
""M edian (IQR) -- -- 3 (2-4.75) 3 (2-3) 4 (4-5)
LCC # 6  Vegetation changec
True for tribal Councils C & D 
only (n=12) 83 17 58 25 0 25 33 25 83 0 0
""M edian (IQR) -- -- 4 (3-5)2 3 (2-4) 5 (4-5)3
Resource Manager Group 76 18 32 29 15 26 18 29 59 18 0
""M edian (IQR) -- -- 3 (3-4) 3 (2-4) 4 (3.5-4.25)
LCC #7 Later fall freeze-up; new freeze-thaw cycle
Tribal Council Group 93 7
""M edian (IQR) -- -­
Resource Manager Group 85 9
""M edian (IQR) -- --
72 21
4 (4-5) 
53 29
4 (3-4)
41
35
31 
3 (3-4) 
21
3 (2-4)
21
26
76 14 3
5(4-5)
82 3 0
4(4-5)
STATE=4 FEDERAL=5
LCC # 8  Earlier spring breakup; ice now melts in place
Tribal Council Group 83 17 69 14 0
""M edian (IQR) -- -- 5 (4-5)
Resource Manager Group 79 15 53 21 6
""M edian (IQR) -- -- 4 (3-4)
41
21
24 17
4 (2-4)
21 35
3 (2-4)
83 0 0
5(4-5)
79 0 0
4(4-5)
STATE=4 FEDERAL=5
"Percent values may not add up to 100% due to missing values, most commonly from participants who marked FALSE on the risk.
Table only shows agreement / disagreement and mid-point values: High = High + Very High; Low = Low + Very Low; Agree = Agree + Strongly Agree; Disagree = Disagree + 
Strongly Disagree; Increased = Increased + Greatly Increased; Decreased = Decreased + Greatly Decreased.
""Calculated on a scale where:
Very High = 5 
High = 4 
Moderate = 3 
Low = 2 
Very Low = 1
Strongly Agree =5 
Agree =4
Neither Agree nor Disagree =3 
Disagree = 2 
Strongly Disagree = 1
Greatly Increased = 5 
Increased = 4 
Stayed the Same = 3 
Decreased = 2 
Greatly Decreased = 1
At the p=0.05 significance level a Kruskal-Wallis Test indicated that:
1The tribal council group's rating of this attribute was statistically significantly higher than the resource manager group's, Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared=6.9488, df=1, p=.0084
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2 The tribal council group's rating of this attribute was statistically significantly higher than the resource manager group's, Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared=5.7078, df=1, p=.0169
3 The tribal council group's rating of this attribute was statistically significantly higher than the resource manager group's, Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared=4.4265, df=1, p=.0354 
a Land cover change #2: True/False answer showed significance of association with place of residence: Fisher's Exact Test p = .0131
b Land cover change #5: True/False answered showed significance of association with place of residence: Fisher's Exact Test .0316 
c Land cover change #2: True/False answer showed significance of association with place of residence: Fisher's Exact Test .0131 
List of land cover changes were drawn from the work of Carothers et al. (2014)
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Table 4E-2 Socioeconomic risks to sustainability
Perceptions of Risks to Sustainability Among North Slope Tribal Councils and Non-local Experts (% & Median)* Orange highlight denotes items where 
Fisher's Exact Test showed statistical significance between the two groups' responses at the p< .05 level. In cases where there was a within group significance 
of association in responses, the median values are denoted for each subgroup in the cell beneath the group results.
N(tribal council)=29 "This is a risk" IMPACT CONTROL CHANGE
N(state & federal expert)=34 "Impacts from this risk are:" "Our communities are currently "Over the past two decades this risk
managing this risk" has:"
True False High Moderate Low Agree Neither Disagree Increased Stayed Decreased
Risk #1 Community health and health services problems
Tribal Council Group 90 10 83 7 0 44 14 28 86 4 0
**Median (IQR) -- -- 5 (4-5) 4 (2-4) 5 (4-5)1COUNCILSA=3.5 B&D=3 E&C=4
Resource Manager Group 8 8 6 71 12 3 30 18 35 50 24 9
**Median (IQR) -- -- 4 (4-5) 3 (2-4) 4 (3-4)1
Risk #2 Environmental problems
Tribal Council Group 76 24 52 17 7 48 17 10 45 21 10
**Median (IQR) -- -- 4 (3-5) 4 (3-4.25)6 4 (3-5)
Resource Manager Group 74 15 59 15 0 29 9 32 32 29 6
**Median (IQR) -- -- 4 (4-5) 3 (2-4) 3 (3-4)
Risk # 6  Problems with industrial / resource development
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Tribal Council Group 76 24
**Median (IQR) -- -­
Resource Manager Group 65 29
**Median (IQR) -- --
69 7 0 38 24 10
5 (4-5)7 4 (3-5)
35 21 9 32 18 12
4 (3-4.25) 4 (3-4)
79 7 0 65 7 14
5 (4-5)9 4 (3.5-5)
56 26 3 50 18 15
4 (3-4) 4 (3-4)
69
41
7
5 (4-5)8 
12 
4 (3-4)
Risk #7 Risks to culture
Tribal Council Group 8 6
**Median (IQR) -­
Resource Manager Group 85
**Median (IQR) --
14 83
65
3
4 (4-5)10
21 
4(3.5-4)
*Percent values may not add up to 100% due to missing values, most commonly from participants who marked FALSE on the risk.
Table only shows agreement / disagreement and mid-point values: High = High + Very High; Low = Low + Very Low; Agree = Agree + Strongly Agree; Disagree = 
Disagree + Strongly Disagree; Increased = Increased + Greatly Increased; Decreased = Decreased + Greatly Decreased.
** Calculated on a scale where:
Very High = 5 
High = 4 
Moderate = 3 
Low = 2 
Very Low = 1
Strongly Agree =5 
Agree =4
Neither Agree nor Disagree =3 
Disagree = 2 
Strongly Disagree = 1
Greatly Increased = 5 
Increased = 4 
Stayed the Same = 3 
Decreased = 2 
Greatly Decreased = 1
At the p=0.05 significance level a Kruskal-Wallis Test indicated that:
1The tribal council group's rating of this attribute was statistically significantly higher than the resource manager group's, Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared=11.4329, df=1, p=.0007.
2 The tribal council group's rating of this attribute was statistically significantly higher than the resource manager group's, Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared=4.6453, df=1, p=.0311.
3 The tribal council group's rating of this attribute was statistically significantly higher than the resource manager group's, Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared=4.6598, df=1, p=.0309.
4 The tribal council group's rating of this attribute was statistically significantly higher than the resource manager group's, Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared=4.889, df=1, p=.0341.
5 The tribal council group's rating of this attribute was statistically significantly higher than the resource manager group's, Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared=11.551, df=1, p=.007.
6 The tribal council group's rating of this attribute was statistically significantly higher than the resource manager group's, Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared=4.1774, df=1, p=.0410.
7 The tribal council group's rating of this attribute was statistically significantly higher than the resource manager group's, Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared=10.7739, df=1, p=.001.
8 The tribal council group's rating of this attribute was statistically significantly higher than the resource manager group's, Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared=8.6771, df=1, p=.0032.
9 The tribal council group's rating of this attribute was statistically significantly higher than the resource manager group's, Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared=9.2221, df=1, p=.0024.
10 The tribal council group's rating of this attribute was statistically significantly higher than the resource manager group's, Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared=10.9299, df=1, p=.0009.
0
6 0
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APPENDIX 4F
CODEBOOK
Table F-1 Content Analysis Codebook. Sub-codes that have their own sub-codes are noted in italic typeface, and the definition provides details on points of 
distinction for further granularity
Code and total code 
frequency Sub-code Definition
Struggling cash 
economy
Lack of wage employment 
Single-resource economy
Concerns raised regarding wage employment opportunities.
Heavy reliance on a single industrial sector for revenue, lack of development leading to unsustainable economies
High cost of living Energy, housing, transportation costs due to isolated geographic location
Risks to Culture Eroding traditions and loss of Alaska Native languages
Ineffective decision 
making
Divided local interests
Inclusion
Regulation
Cross-cultural issues
Disagreements among local entities, and governments 
Inclusion of local communities in higher-level decision-making
Regulatory issues such as effectiveness, or transparency of, policies concerning for example (i) subsistence, (ii) tribal 
sovereignty.
Misunderstanding of local needs by outside decision makers
Risks from industrial 
development
Education issues
Industrial accidents 
Offshore
Increased marine traffic
Problems from negative externalities of industrial development; Industrial disaster as risk to sustainability 
Offshore oil development as a potential risk to sustainability
Risks from increased marine traffic, dated regulations not up-to-date with opening of routes 
Issues with the quality of the local school system, such as high turnover or lack of local teachers.
Environmental issues Climate change impacts 
Erosion, permafrost thaw - 
without explicit reference to 
climate change
Respondent specifically mentions climate change impacts as a community concern.
Permafrost thaw, erosion and other land cover changes, but without explicit reference to climate change as the risk 
source.
Community health and 
health system issues
General
Services
Substance abuse 
Suicide
Unspecified concern for community health
Concern over access to, and quality of, care; the portfolio of services available such as health education, preventative 
services, behavioral health, long-term care; and whether said services are culturally appropriate 
Concern over rates of substance abuse in communities 
Concern over suicide rates in communities
Risks to subsistence ------- Concern about the health of subsistence economy: access to resources, transmission of traditional knowledge
Demographic changes ------ Concern over aspects of in- or outmigration impacting the cultural pillars of communities
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5.1 MANAGING THE UNAVOIDABLE TO AVOID THE UNMANAGABLE
The complexity of environmental and political factors that define challenges of sustainability in Alaska 
holds great relevance globally. Potential regime shifts and related risks that are diffused across local and 
global systems have made the Arctic a laboratory for understanding the process of change, vulnerability, 
resilience, and sustainability in the Anthropocene. Understanding change and learning to respond to 
changes are important elements of adaptive capacity in social-ecological systems (SES) (Fath et al., 2015; 
Fazey et al., 2007; Lebel et al., 2010).
SES are a type of complex adaptive system. Complex adaptive systems are made of self-organized 
agents, or components that undergo co-evolutionary processes through varying degrees of equilibrium 
in the overall system's state. Inherent to this evolutionary (change) process is the limited predictability 
of thresholds (tipping points), where surprises can trigger cascading and transforming changes (Duit and 
Galaz, 2008, p.313). Cross-scale dynamics and feedback loops further increase uncertainty in SES 
(Walker et al., 2006), hampering the understanding and governance, of change. New strategies of 
adaptive governance have become increasingly important in the field of resilience management. The 
idea of adaptive governance builds on principles such as consensus-oriented decision making, (Ansell 
and Gash, 2008; Innes and Booher, 1999), social learning (Ensor and Harvey, 2015; Lebel et al., 2010), 
deliberation (Baber, 2004; Elster, 1998; Fishkin, 1991; Gutmann and Thompson, 2009; Muhlberger and 
Weber, 2006; Petts and Brooks, 2006), knowledge co-production (Armitage et al., 2011; Cash et al.,
2006; Kofinas, 2009) and community-based scenario building (Enfors et al., 2008; Oteros-Rozas et al., 
2015; Sheppard et al., 2011). At the heart of all these approaches is the goal of adaptive, anticipatory 
decision making that is equipped to help the SES navigate change and uncertainties.
The three research questions asked in Chapter 1 are situated at the crux of cross-scale dynamics,
CHAPTER 5: CO N CLU SIO N S
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uncertainties and risks, and adaptive, anticipatory decision making. The questions were addressed in the 
three studies (chapters 2-4) of this dissertation. This chapter is a discussion of the overall findings of the 
dissertation, focusing on interactions between scales of risks, change, and decision making, and the 
learning processes that help manage the SES for resilience.
5.2 SCALE AND LEVEL-SPECIFIC LESSONS: HOW DO WE LEARN FROM RISKS AND DISASTERS?
5.2.1 Chapter 2: Lessons from the disaster chronotope
Risk and disaster governance operate within complex and dynamic social-ecological systems. Decision 
makers face a number of constraints in their endeavor to learn from disasters. First is the challenge of 
what criteria are applied to accepting a phenomenon as learning. Any attempt to complete an 
assessment across diverse scales and actors based on the successes of policy changes is doomed to fail, 
because optimal policy evades definition and policy changes are greater part experiment than they are 
science (Ostrom, 1999). To complicate matters, there has been little systemic research to compare the 
organizational features of central governments and their impacts on disaster management (Britton, 
2007). Each community, region, and nation has seen the evolution of its own disaster policies, and even 
within nations, disaster planning isn't necessarily uniform; rather, it typically varies across hazard types. 
This situation has resulted in a vast array of disaster management approaches under centralized (top- 
down) national disaster management authorities, and decentralized (bottom-up) models for 
coordinating preparedness, relief and recovery through local governments and civil defense 
departments.
Chapter 2 presented a wide-angle view of interactions, evolving relationships, changing rules, coalitions 
and policies, before and after disaster events as stakeholders attempted to positively impact their 
futures. It did so by noting how events and institutions impacted the adaptive actions that may have
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occurred pre- and post-disaster; as a proxy for learning. As well, the four cases studies proved especially 
useful in identifying conditions for cross-scale learning as a factor of disaster type. As Birkland (2006) 
noted, learning from disasters is a bounded rational process, in which rational decision making (within 
the limits of analysis capacity) mixes with adaptive learning behaviors. Relying, in part, on Jones' (2001) 
review of social and behavioral scholarship, Birkland outlines why collective learning in general, while 
goal-oriented and adaptive, is subject to capture by focusing events such as disasters. Disasters and 
disaster risks tend to receive a disproportionate amount of attention (regardless of overall risk or 
pervious interest), following sudden calamities that captivate the public's attention. This temporary 
attention paves the way to learning. However, if done in haste and with incomplete information (and 
under pressure), actors who may intend to make the best available choices can deviate from them for 
one reason or another. The window of opportunity for corrective, collective action, such as policy or 
institutional change, is brief and closes with the end of the public attention.
Through the four case studies of Chapter 2, the essential role of temporal and spatial scales in learning 
became apparent. On the one hand, the causes of these systemic disturbances took on spatial and 
temporal qualities. Be it the duration of disturbance event (a short-term pulse or a long-term press), or 
the speed with which the disturbance emerges (rapid or slow onset), there is an observable temporal 
scale to the initial shock that influenced how much time there is to respond. The impacts of the disasters 
exhibit temporal qualities, due in part, to the particular vulnerabilities of the SES In some cases, like the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill, its impacts on the SES still continue today, while in others, such as the 1964 Great 
Alaska Earthquake, the social system's rebound was relatively fast (permanent geologic shifts 
notwithstanding). Spatial scales from disaster impacts, in addition to the temporal, also drive the actors 
who get involved in pre- and post-disaster governance, and the type of learning that takes place. In a 
panarchy, jurisdictionally removed stakeholder groups may be governing or impacting (by action, 
inaction, or systemic vulnerabilities) the same disaster hazards without coordination (e.g., Katrina). If
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hazard impacts scale proportionately (or if vulnerabilities are shared), collective action is more likely. 
When impacts are disproportionate—due to either uneven spatial dispersion or varying degrees of 
vulnerabilities—collective response is slow. This was the case in the Alaska coastal erosion example that 
highlights the challenge of global-local interactions.
The resulting learning models evolve according to how much these processes set the course for post­
disaster learning and building adaptive capacity. If recovery is quick and public interest in reform is low, 
learning fixates on previous ways of knowing and established institutions. When recovery takes a long 
time, the public may be invested in reform. However, success depends on the activation energy to 
support it, level of knowledge supporting the science of reform, and consensus among actors on the 
desired trajectory forward. This results in a pinball (i.e. erratically behaving) environment, where timing 
and competition are key factors in driving the outcomes. In disaster environments where the local 
system is in a constant state of collapse and reorganization, and the decision making environment is 
rigid—fixated in dysfunctional relationships— even when infused with global support, learning is 
vagabond and tangled in social pathologies. I suggest that a truly global disaster processes can similarly 
stunt adaptive learning when spatial and temporal boundaries are erased between action and effect. 
When attribution of responsibility and corrective action span several continents and generations, the 
chronotope of regular social contracts (hierarchies of actors and sources of political, financial, technical, 
and scientific support) are disordered. Furthermore, the interactions among the exposure, vulnerability, 
adaptive capacity of systems at different levels are often not known a priori (Smit and Wandel, 2006); 
increasing the level of uncertainty in future planning. This new chronotope demands new systems of risk 
and disaster governance because responsibility and action span continents and generations, and are 
thus beyond the reach of existing social institutions.
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The complex and rapid changes that are underway in Arctic SES provide a rich learning opportunity 
about cross-scale interactions. Two cases were presented to discuss spatial scales of risk perceptions in 
the Arctic Alaska context in Chapters 3 and 4. We learned from resident experts of two boroughs that 
there can be a shared culture of risk within same-level jurisdictional units that transcends policy 
subsystems. The strong consensus found about perceived risks shows that risks (depending on 
vulnerabilities and exposure) have level-specific dimensions that make them tractable beyond political 
borders. These studies also show how transcendence of scale has implications for political discourse. 
When exposure to the same drivers of change and shared vulnerabilities result in collective risk impacts, 
it may prompt mergers and coalitions of interests, a pooling of political will, and greater joint political 
influence upstream.
On the other hand, risk concepts may or may not scale vertically between hierarchies of administrative
jurisdictions. The case study that compared North Slope tribal council members' and state and federal
employees' perceptions of risks (Chapter 4) showed how years of interactions and information exchange
resulted in a good degree of shared understandings over risks, historical change, and their impacts to
the system. However, the comparison also outlined underlying differences in how level-specific risks are
prioritized. The degree to which level-specific perceptions and processes are compatible has bearing on
the extent to which actors (communities) at the different levels will be able to participate in, negotiate
over, and ultimately, control the fate of public discourse on risks. The institutions and norms of
cooperation, such as those established to reduce uncertainties and to achieve SES predictability and
stability, thrive on homogeneity or consensus of opinions (Duit and Galaz, 2008). Yet simultaneously,
risk and disaster resilience benefit from a rich vault of memory (Fath et al., 2015) of past disasters. For
example, large populations in the Philippines have lived through numerous typhoon events, and local
and individual adaptive actions may help survival. Higher (e.g. nation state) level adaptive action is
5.2.2 Chapters 3 and 4: Globally relevant lessons from the Arctic
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hampered if political systems are corrupt, or economic capital is absent.
5.3 RISK PERCEPTION AND ADAPTIVE CAPACITY: LINKS 
5.3.1 Chapter 2: Lessons from the disaster chronotope
The social-ecological system depends on changes and stability to occur during critical phases of the 
adaptive cycle for long-term stability (Chapin III et al., 2009, p. 15). It is through the interactions and 
feedbacks from these processes that communities may anticipate and minimize potential destructive 
forces. This iterative learning process is ideally adaptive. These studies support the assertion that 
adaptive learning from disaster greatly impacts risk perception, leading to increased understanding 
about the underlying vulnerabilities of a system, and the interactions between risk and disaster 
processes with these vulnerabilities. As a result, cognition about drivers of change (stresses) and the 
portfolio of proactive / reactive actions available evolves. Such mental models are a part of risk 
perception. Thus, learning, adapting, thinking, and perceiving directly impact a system's overall adaptive 
capacity. Following the Exxon Valdez disaster, the founding of the Oil Spill Council and Regional Citizen's 
Advisory Council ensured the long-term, collective, adaptive learning in the region's SES. In the case of 
typhoons in the Philippines, the stressors (the disaster events) came with relative frequency, and were 
amplified by the social vulnerabilities of large segments of the population. These impacts drain the 
resources that would be needed for long-term change. The Great Alaska Earthquake resulted in large- 
scale, technological and scientific learning, yet the basic vulnerabilities of the social system (isolation, 
dependence on outside flow of goods, limited and vulnerable transportation routes) have remained 
unchanged. The Alaska Coastal erosion case exhibited the kind of inertia that can occur at the highest, 
slowest=moving levels (state, federal, international) of governance, when risks are (1) creeping and 
thresholds are hard to identify, (2) large-scale, and (3) unequal in their impacts. The fast-moving speed
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of lower systems, in comparison with higher level ones, was demonstrated via the activities of the 
Newtok Planning Group in Chapter 2.
5.3.2 Chapters 3 and 4: Adaptive learning in the panarchy: Globally relevant lessons from the Arctic
In lower-level systems, practices are supported by a knowledge-base that places a high value on 
longitudinal knowledge (Young, 2006). This lower-level regime is the fast-moving system in the panarchy 
in which experimentation, trial and adjustment of behavior can move faster than in the larger, slower 
systems. This dynamic is also a supporting argument for collaboration of same-level social units. Thus, 
mutually agreeable initiatives can be implemented with relative speed. Often times, however, there is 
an inability to relate an understanding of larger-scale SES dynamics to the policy needs of lower-level 
actors—and vice versa (Cash et al., 2006). While managerial and knowledge-sharing interactions among 
the different levels happens most often among close neighbors on the jurisdictional scale (state and 
borough, state and national, borough and national), such sharing is not always the case. Rarely, but on 
occasion, the lowest and highest level regimes experience cross-scale interactions, such as international 
organizations with a mandate for marine life conservation and aboriginal subsistence hunter groups (e.g. 
Young, 2006).
Risk perceptions are informed by individual observations, experiences, personal traits, social processes, 
and cultural orientations. The sharing of these experiences and information among and across scales of 
governance are important, especially when the interplay between the levels of knowledge and 
management regimes is one of dominance. Failure to learn results in the social construction of disasters, 
and manufactured vulnerabilities such as poverty, inequality, exclusion and conflict.
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5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS TO OPTIMIZE DECISION MAKING
5.4.1 Chapter 2: Lessons from the disaster chronotope
Recommendation #1: Where disaster impacts long outlive political election cycles and any policy 
changes, and where competing economic interests and scale assumptions hamper learning outcomes, 
participatory risk assessments, risk attribution (determining liability) and participatory scenarios 
planning may help reduce socially constructed vulnerabilities to disasters.
Recommendation #2: Bridging organizations—such as the Newtok Planning Group—have an important 
role in keeping issues on the agenda and promoting bilateral information flow.
Five important factors create scale-dependent environmental resource regimes, as noted by Young 
(2006). The type of actors involved at the different jurisdictional levels create behavioral differences in 
what these groups are responsive to; how they factor future costs into present day calculations; what 
knowledge systems they use (experiential-longitudinal versus observational-methodological); and the 
policy instruments and compliance systems available for managing and monitoring resources. The 
different levels focus on level-specific spatial and temporal scales. Paying close attention to social 
regimes and systems aids in the cross-sectional analysis of disaster events and helps highlight issues of 
conflict, competition and inequality.
Chapter 2 outlined ways in which cross-scale interactions and scale-specific dependencies between the 
SES and disaster processes shaped learning and adaptive outcomes. The chapter discussed ways in 
which specific features of disasters contribute to these interactions. It also applied concepts from Fath 
et al. (2015) that described the role of the stages and phases of the adaptive cycle, and the readiness of 
the system to transition along, in a system's overall resilience. Decision making must consider scale- 
specific reflections not only to factor in cross-scale interactions and disaster types, but also the level- 
specific realities (progression and status of adaptive stages) of each SES. As a result, the extent to which
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improvisation and ad hoc groups, versus time-tested routines and institutions, should take prominence, 
can become clear. In the Philippines for example, the Provincial Government of Albay has integrated 
disaster risk reduction, environmental protection and development planning (reduction of social 
vulnerabilities) to reduce disaster risk. This is an example of a lower-level governing body acting to 
incorporate locally relevant considerations (e.g. poverty) in disaster planning. During the reorganization 
stage, modularity and access to stored capital are key features of success. This fact was highlighted in 
the events leading up to the Great Alaska Earthquake. A sizeable military personnel, equipment, and 
centralized disaster command in place made the recovery of Alaska communities possible.
During the growth stage, bilateral information flow, emergent leadership, and the ability to adapt and 
adjust (test and innovate) are most important. During times of stability in the K-stage, diversity and 
small-scale disturbances increase resilience and help avoid the rigidity trap. The Deepwater Horizon 
disaster was a result of failure to learn from small-scale events during times of stability.
During the collapse itself, cohesive leadership and maintaining vital functions are key to reducing fault 
cascade. The role of established rules and institutions in these functions is also essential, as is the extent 
to which they are capable of recognizing and accommodating emerging needs.
5.4.2 Chapters 3 and 4: Globally relevant lessons from the Arctic
Recommendation #3: Deliberation of sustainable futures increases understanding between same-level 
groups of stakeholders; this speaks to the role of process in collaboration.
Recommendation #4: Differences in priorities and perceptions between levels highlight the importance 
of membership in decision processes.
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Global sustainability targets in times of extreme events resulting from climate change and water and 
food insecurity, demand multi-scalar collaboration. Resource development goals, however, often create 
high-stakes, low-consensus policy processes. Because knowledge is held and perceived differently at 
different levels, there is a political economy unique to the multi-stakeholder risk (cost/benefit) calculus 
in sustainable development, climate change adaptation and disaster resilience. Finding the baseline for 
these common goals and risks that threaten their success can work via anticipatory governance and 
deliberation. The two Alaska case studies illustrate the cross-scale linkages and rapid changes that drive 
competing interests in the public sphere in nested SES. Chapter 3 revealed success in increasing mutual 
understanding between same-level groups of stakeholders via deliberation of sustainable futures. This 
outcome speaks to the role of process in collaboration. Chapter 4 revealed that despite shared 
understanding of scientific information, important differences still exist in risk priorities and perceptions 
of adaptive capacity between levels of stakeholder groups, highlighting the importance of membership 
in decision processes.
Collective identity is critical to Indigenous cultural values (Barnhardt and Kawagley, 2005), while 
collective governance is an important component of fate control. The Arctic Human Development 
Report (Larsen et al., 2010) (Larsen et al., 2010) and Arctic Social Indicators (Larsen et al., 2015) 
emphasized fate control as vital to northern people's sense of well-being and human development. It is 
therefore no surprise that North Slope tribal councils identified—in essence—a lack of political agency 
or control as the number one risk to their sustainable futures. On the other hand, the high degree of 
regional consensus over what are perceived as risks—confirmed in Chapter 3—suggest great potential 
for same-level groups (two northern Alaska boroughs in this case) to pool resources, better coordinate 
actions and use of political capital, to effect change.
In addition to observing spatial scales in the processes of decision making, temporal dimensions of
issues may also impact consensus. Issues can become priority at different times, at different rates,
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bringing to focus one issue area over (Westley, 2002, p.358). Scenarios planning is a promising tool for 
bringing together distal temporal and spatial realities, and creating decision points where adaptive 
actions can be taken (Lindgren and Bandhold, 2009; Tschakert et al., 2014). Adaptive actions can be 
anticipatory or reactive (based on timing), and strategic or tactical (based on duration) (Belliveau et al., 
2006). Scenarios support anticipatory-strategic adaptive actions by thinking ahead, increasing 
agreement, and reducing knowledge uncertainties. Ultimately, these steps keep decision making away 
from the edge of chaos (Stacey, 2007).
5.5 CONCLUSIONS: WHAT STEPS IMPROVE CROSS-SCALE ADAPTIVE LEARNING IN NESTED SES?
In these times of rapid change and transformation, increased inequity from climate change impacts, 
poverty and displacement, Arctic lessons on adaptation are ever important. Climate change is the issue 
with the greatest impact for the future both in terms of risks and in terms of opportunities. This 
understanding drives the need for the creation of a governance framework that can guide SES toward 
managing the unavoidable changes still to come. The governance of risks from natural disasters, climate 
change impacts, and resource development are complicated by issues of scale and perceptions. For 
example, the costs of climate risk mitigation are usually assumed by state and national governments, 
while its benefits are experienced globally (Parry, 2007). As another example, local adaptation action 
needs may depend on higher-level policy at the state or national level, where these needs must 
compete with the needs of the majority. Differences in perceptions also play a role in risk governance 
and adaptation strategies. For example, those residing near oil development sites may have vastly 
different views on the potential risks of the operation than others who live far away.
The very language of problem definition has an enormous impact on whether risk sources are 
acknowledged, and consequently, what type of learning, if any, takes place (Beck, 1992). There is a need
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for new governance arrangements that are transdisciplinary, and take on a social-ecological network 
approach in accounting for interdependencies between society and governed ecosystems (Bodin et al., 
2016).
Political context, the ability to bridge science and policy groups, and the salience, credibility, and 
legitimacy of knowledge are main factors in the success of learning processes (Cash et al., 2003;
Kunseler et al., 2015). These attributes are traits of participatory learning, along with having inclusive 
membership and processes for bringing together informed actors.
These points underline the importance of membership and process in decision making.
There are many sources of adaptive capacity in the Arctic context (natural, social, human, financial, 
cultural capital; infrastructure and knowledge assets) that together can strengthen resilience in times of 
great uncertainty in decision making. Understanding these system dynamics is important in SES 
management. The Arctic is undergoing dramatic changes. Decision making spaces must be designed 
carefully to fit ecological and social processes to match spatial and temporal characteristics (Meek et al., 
2008; Robards and Lovecraft, 2010), while allowing for social and institutional learning as a way to 
increasing resilience (Chapin et al., 2006).
The complex risks discussed in this dissertation highlight the questions that could drive further 
development of research policy in this region: what is the relationship between political capital (being at 
the table) and the capacity to deal with risks? Can inclusive risk management, based on a plurality of 
knowledge forms and stakeholder perspectives, increase adaptive capacity in a globalized, 
interconnected world where risks are interwoven?
Translating into practice the theoretical approaches to reducing uncertainties and building healthy, 
sustainable societies remains a challenge. Knowledge seeking and finding a common vision, on the one 
hand, are highly normative goals without some sort of standard in place, on the other hand standardized
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processes may not be attainable or even desirable as these activities are highly context and time 
specific. Risk framing, risk analysis and the evaluation of the acceptability of risks all contribute to a 
societal vision of the future, one that needs collective consideration. To move toward these goals, 
further research is needed to develop procedural recommendations for multi-stakeholder planning tools 
that facilitate horizontal and vertical scaling of shared understandings of risks and sustainability. For 
example, decision making may benefit from a consensus advisory process that is tailored to specific 
issue-areas, and can be employed by both ad hoc and permanent organizations. Research on the 
successes and failures of existing processes (such as the Danish Consensus Conference) can help specify 
the role of, and model the structure for, a consensus advisory panel. Iterative engagement of 
stakeholder groups and participatory scenarios planning may complement this process, and help to 
reduce conflicting viewpoints. Further research on the indicators that help gauge the perceived validity 
of membership, process and output in decision making, may be another important piece of the 
consensus-building puzzle. Together these indicators signal the sustainability of outcomes in competitive 
negotiations. Keeping in mind that perfect consensus is rarely possible, I believe that by strengthening 
and optimizing participatory processes and decreasing conflict, we better facilitate strategic futures 
thinking, reduce rates of issue renegotiation and increase consent over the outcomes.
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